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Abstract
Protecting children’s development is a key principle of international children’s rights law.
However, while the meanings of children’s development are a central concern of disciplines
such as psychology, sociology, neurology and pedagogy, so far there has been no systematic
analysis of the meaning of the child’s legal right to development. This thesis remedies this
significant gap in our knowledge by establishing the foundations for analysing the child’s
right to development, as protected by the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Interpreting the child’s right to development first requires unpacking the meaning of the term
‘children’s development’. In international children’s rights law, the thesis argues that the
meaning of this term derives from the concept of children as ‘human becomings’. The focal
point of this concept is the protection of children’s socio-psychological development and
caring for their future, as adults. Consequently, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
provides a broad protection for eight segments of children’s development, on top of
protecting children’s overall right to development. Based on an analysis of the UN
Committee on the Rights of the Child’s jurisprudence between the years 1993 and 2010, the
thesis concludes that the Committeeinterprets the Convention in a way that subjugated most
of the Convention’s rights to protect children’s socio-psychological development, while
overlooking the formulation of ‘development’ as a human right.
Based on literature on childhood studies, children’s rights theory, children’s development, the
Capability Approach, archival research of the drafting process of the Convention, the
jurisprudence of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, and interviews with members
of the UN Committee, the thesis challenges this absorption of ‘children’s development’ into
legal terms, and suggests a new framework for analysis.
This framework accommodates a hybrid conception of childhood, a respect for children’s
agency, recognition of the importance of the process of maturation (‘development’) as well as
its outcome, and a cross-disciplinary understanding of ‘development’. Under the suggested
framework, the child’s right to development is interpreted as a composite right that aims to
ensure the child’s abilities to fulfil her or his human potentialto the maximum during
childhood and adulthood alike.
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9Introduction
The image of children as developing human beings dominated childhood studies throughout
the 20th century.1 ‘How children grow up’, ‘what constitutes a normal course of maturation’
and ‘how children’s development can best be fostered’ are some of the questions asked in
anthropology, sociology, medicine, history, psychology and pedagogy. International
children’s rights law is concerned with similar questions. Dating back to the 1924 League of
Nations’ Declaration on the Rights of the Child, one of the main aims of international
children’s rights law, if not the most important one, has been to ensure children’s
development. Therefore, Article 6 of the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
(‘The Convention’), the most ratified human rights treaty of all, protects the child’s right to
development. In addition, five other articles of the Convention (Articles 18(1), 23(3), 27(1),
29(1)(a) and 32(1))protect eight specific developmental domains. These include physical,
mental, moral, social, cultural, spiritual, personality and talent. No similar protection to
human development or to the right to development can be found in any other binding
international human rights treaty.2
Despite the prominence of the child’s right to development, there has yet to be any systematic
analysis of its meaning. Only scarce attention has been paid to this right, mostly in the
context of discussing it as a derivative of other rights of the child,3 or focusing on the
meaning of ‘children’s development’, overlooking its articulation in human rights terms.4This
thesis plugs this gap by suggesting a framework through which to analyse the meaning of the
child’s legal right to development.
The premise of this thesis is that the child’s right to development should be critically
analysed within the context of the Convention. The connection between different images of
‘the child’, the realisation of children as rights holders and its influences on the interpretation
of children’s rights underpins my analysis. Therefore, this thesis analyses the protection for
1 Martin Woodhead, ‘Child Development and the Development of Childhood’ in Jens Qvortrup et al (eds) The
Palgrave Handbook of Childhood Studies (Palgrave, Basingstoke 2009, 2011) 46-61.
2 On the regional level, Article 5(2) of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child protects the
child’s right to ‘survival, protection and development’.
3 Manfred Nowak, Article 6: The Right to Life, Survival and Development (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden
2005) 43-49; James R. Himes, ‘Children’s Rights: Moralists, Lawyers and the Right to Development’ (1993) 1
International Journal of Children’s Rights 81; Douglas Hodgson, ‘The Child’s Right to Life, Survival and
Development’ (1994) 2 International Journal of Children’s Rights 369; Geraldine Van Bueren, The
International Law on the Rights of the Child (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague1998) 318-320.
4 Martin Woodhead, ‘Early Childhood Development: A Question of Rights’ (2005) 37 International Journal of
Early Childhood 80.
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the child’s right to development in international children’s rights law against the
Convention’s perspectives of children and childhood. The thesis asks how constructions of
childhood guided the creation of the child’s right to development in international children’s
rights law, how they informed the interpretation of this right, and what the shortcomings of
this interpretation are.
I argue that the significance of the conception of children as ‘human becomings’ and the care
for the child’s future led international children’s rights law to provide wide protection for
children’s development and their right to development. Dominated by developmental
psychology discourse,5 the ‘human becomings’ approach perceives the child as weak,
vulnerable, lacking agency and in need of protection. Childhood has primarily been
characterised as a journey towards adulthood.6 Consequently, the right to development has
been viewed as relating to what seems to be the natural course of life – the transformation of
a child into an adult. The fixation with the care for children’s future did not end even when a
paradigm shift in childhood studies allegedly took place during the 1970’s. According to the
new ‘human beings’ approach to childhood, children are seen as active agents in their lives,
families and communities, and as human rights bearers.7 While the Convention on the Rights
of the Child includes some articles that reflect this new paradigm, for example the
recognition of the child’s right to participation (Article 12), the right to freedom of expression
(Article 13), and the right to freedom of thought, and conscience and religion (Article 14), the
‘human beings’ conception has not been used to interpret the right to development, since it
fundamentally contradicts the normative grounds that underpin the right to development.
The care for the child’s future while overlooking the child’s life as a child in the present is
where the main gap in the interpretation of the child’s right to development lies. The thesis
highlights this gap, and suggests a socio-legal explanation for it, arguing that the difficulty in
understanding children’s development in terms of human rights is situated within the
difficulty of translating children’s psycho-social development into human rights norms. The
care for the child’s future cannot, and should not, be overlooked. However, at the same time,
I argue that the child’s present existence should not be ignored either. Therefore, caring for
children’s lives in the present, while they are still children, and recognising their freedom to
5 Erica Burman, Development – Child, Image, Nation (Routledge, London 2008) 163-171.
6 Nick Lee, Childhood and Society (Open University Press, Gosport 2001) 5-19.
7 Alan Prout and Allison James, ‘A New Paradigm for the Sociology of Childhood? Provenance Promise and
Problems’ in Allison James and Alan Prout (eds) Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood (2nd edition,
Routledge Falmer, London 1997) 7-33.
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be active agents in shaping their destiny and their right to grow up to become what they want,
requires a twofold conceptual shift.
First, there is a need to recognise that the care for children’s development is an issue of
human rights, and not only of welfare. Second, I suggest reconstructing the conception of
childhood and of ‘children’s development’, so that the term incorporates broad, cross-
disciplinary meanings, rather than being bound by developmental psychology. These two
paradigm shifts will enable us to redefine the meaning of the child’s right to development,
and to interpret it as the child’s right to fulfil her or his human potential to the maximum.
Structure
The thesis consists of six chapters following this introduction. The introduction
contextualises the thesis in the framework of childhood studies, and elaborates on the main
images of childhood that inform international children’s rights law.
Chapter one reviews the history of protecting children’s development in international
children’s rights law, focusing on key children’s rights theorists and legal paradigms. The
chapter establishes the connection between the ways that childhood is conceived, and the type
of legal protection given to ‘children’s development’. The chapter starts by reviewing the late
19th century and early 20th century attitudes towards childhood, focusing on the writings of
three key theorists that worked during that period (Janusz Korczak, Ellen Key and Eglantyne
Jebb). The chapter then analyses the first two international children’s rights law’s
instruments: the 1924 League of Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Child and the 1959
UN Declaration on the Rights of the Child. The image of children in international children’s
rights law is compared with the image of children in the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights and the two 1966 Covenants (the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). Lastly, the chapter
studies the key texts of the 1970’s child liberation movement and their approach towards
children’s development and human rights.
Chapter two studies the drafting history of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. It
unveils the motivations, intentions and ethical beliefs that led to the creation of the child’s
right to development. Based on comprehensive archival research, the chapter shows that
while the Convention’s drafters were keen to protect children’s development, the question of
what ‘children’s development’ means was rarely raised. Furthermore, no significant
12
discussions were held about the implications of formulating the care for children’s
development as a matter of legal right. The drafting process resulted in the creation of a
complex structure that relates to eight domains of children’s development, including a
general clause that protects the right to development. Based on the history of international
children’s rights law, the drafting process and the prevailing conception of childhood at the
time of drafting, the chapter suggests that the right to development can be understood as a
right of the child to have her or his needs for a healthy growth met, in order to enable the
child to become an adult.
Chapter three analyses the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child’s jurisprudence on the
right to development. By reviewing all of the Committee’s work between 1993 and 2010, the
chapter asks how the Committee understands the meaning of the right to development, and
how it articulates the relationships between the right to development and other rights of the
Convention. The chapter shows how the Committee subjugated most of the Convention’s
rights to support the child’s maturation process, whilesimilar to the Convention’s drafters,
ignoring the right to development. The chapter argues that although the Committee
repeatedly praises the importance of protecting the child’s right to development and defines it
as one of the Convention’s four guiding principles, it fails to provide a distinct, meaningful,
concrete or practical definition of the right. This failure is the result of upholding the ‘human
becomings’ conception of childhood, which inherent limitations led the Committee to ignore
children’s agency and the articulation of the care for children’s development as a matter of
human rights.
Chapter four studies the work of the Committee from a different perspective. The chapter is
based on in-depth interviews with nine current and former members of the Committee, as
well as an analysis of the Committee’s ‘chain of monitoring’,8 taking the year 2010 as a case
study. The chapter offers further explanations for the gaps between the symbolic importance
of the right to development and the Committee’s unsatisfying jurisprudence concerning this
right. Three explanations for this gap are concluded from the interviews: a lack of conceptual
clarity of the meaning of ‘the child’s right to development’, which in turn led the Committee
to ignore it; insufficient information given by States Parties limits the Committee’s abilityto
fulfilits role as a monitoring body; and a sincere account by one member of the Committee,
which admitted that the Committee forgot that this right exists. The claims concerning the
8 The Committee’s ‘chain of monitoring’ refers to States Parties’ implementations reports, the Committee’s
follow up questions (‘List of Issues’) and the Committee’s Concluding Observations.
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States Parties’ lack of reporting are empirically challenged with an analysis of the
Committee’s ‘chain of monitoring’. The findings show that regardless of whether a State
Party relates to the child’s right to development in its implementation report, or not, the
Committee is most likely to ignore the right to development in its follow-up questions and /
or Concluding Observations. The chapter concludes with the interviewees’ recommendations
about future steps that the Committee should take in order to promote the protection of the
child’s right to development. One of the key suggestions is to inform legal professionals
(lawyers, judges, academics) about the various meanings of children’s development.
Chapter five addresses three issues that were identified as impediments in the process of
interpreting the child’s right to development: the potential meanings of ‘children’s
development’; the ability to articulate these meanings in human rights terms; and the
prospects of concretising these meanings. The chapter therefore analyses the meaning of
‘development’ in comparison to two instruments: the ‘general’ right to development in
international law (i.e – international human rights law that is not group specific); and
according to the Capability Approach (also known as ‘the Human Development Paradigm’),
which thus far has been ‘under-theorized in relation to children’9. According to both
frameworks, ‘development’ refers to collective mobilization, emancipation, democratic
values of participation, empowerment, recognition of the agency of every human being, and
individual prosperity. The chapter suggests that since the ‘general’ right to development and
the child’s right to development share the yardstick of growth - either economic growth or
personal maturation - a comparison between the two can enable us to expand the
interpretation of the child’s right to development. I further suggest that using the Capability
Approach’s concept of ‘human development’ in the context of children’s rights can broaden
the scope of the right, so it will mean more than ensuring the child’s process of growth. The
second-half of the chapter presents key components of the Child Indicator Movement. This
movement refers to various projects that employ and concretise different ideas of ‘children’s
development’. I argue that the indices’fragments of ‘children’s development’ have the
potential to concretise the analysis of the child’s right to development.
The last chapter concludes the thesis by suggesting a new framework for the interpretation of
the child’s right to development. The framework proposes to uphold three key principles: a
hybrid conception of childhood, which synthesis the ‘human beings’ and ‘human becomings’
9 Kaushik Basu, ‘Prologue’ in Mario Biggeri et al (eds) Children and the Capability Approach (Palgrave
Macmillan, Basingstoke 2011) x.
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conceptions of childhood; respect for the child’s agency; and a distinction between the right
to development as a guiding principle of the Convention and as a separate human right of
children. I argue that this framework can be meaningful and can be implemented on the
ground if used in conjunction with a cross-disciplinary understanding of ‘children’s
development’. Without a common language and knowledge about the various meanings of
‘children’s development’, the interpretation of the right to development is destined to
continue to suffer from the same problems it suffers now, mainly lack of coherence and
inability to concretise it in human rights terms.
Childhood Studies and the Image of the Developing Child
The study of childhood suggests that childhood is neither natural nor neutral,10 but rather a
socially constructed concept.11 Childhood is the nexus of structure, agency, moral convictions
and social transformations.12 Adults have created ‘childhood’ as a social category using their
own point of view of society,13 in order to define the child as the negative other.14 According
to Erica Burman, separating people on the bases of age and capacities enables adults more
easily to control, colonise and ‘civilise’ children.15
Childhood is not a new social construction in Western cultures,16 and its meaningshavenot
remained unchanged over time.17 Childhood is constructed according to social views about
family values, gender roles, the labour market, political views and attitudes toward crime and
10 Allison James et al, Theorizing Childhood (Polity, Cambridge 1998) 126-128.
11 Allison James and Adrian James, Constructing Childhood (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2004) 10-26.
12 Prout and James 1990, supra n. 7; James et al, supra n. 10.
13 Lee, supra n. 6, 102.
14 David Archard, ‘Philosophical Perspectives on Childhood’ in Julia Fionda (ed) Legal Concepts of Childhood
(Hart Publishing, Oxford 2001) 43-56, 46.
15 Erica Burman, Deconstructing Development Psychology (2nd edition, Palgrave, London 2008) 77.
16 Colin Heywood, ‘Centuries of Childhood: An Anniversary – And an Epitaph?’ (2010) 3 Journal of History of
Childhood and Youth 343, 357-358; Richard T. Vann, ‘The Youth of Centuries of Childhood’ (1982) 21 History
and Theory 279. Though at the early stages of writing the history of childhood, a half a century ago, it was
argued by Philippe Ariès in Centuries of Childhood,that childhood as a social conception was invented only at
the seventeen-century. See Philippe Ariès, Centuries of Childhood – A Social History of Family Life (Translated
by Robert Baldick, Jonathan Cape, London 1962). For a contesting argument see Rex and Wendy Stainton
Rogers, Stories of Childhood (University of Toronto Press, Toronto 1992) 65-66; Ariès’ method and sources
were grounds for harsh critique. See Adrian Wilson, ‘The Infancy of the History of Childhood: An Appraisal of
Philippe Aries’ (1980) 19 History and Theory 132.
17 Suzanne Shanahan, ‘Lost and Found: The Sociological Ambivalence Towards Childhood’ (2007) 33 Annual
Review of Sociology 407.
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punishment and religion, to name just a few of the most influential factors.18For example, if
childhood was once considered as a time of innocence and purity, in other times if was seen
as a time of depravity.19 Children were once seen as ‘little angels’ and in different times they
were perceived as ‘little devils’. Thomas Hobbes, for example, characterised children as
malicious as adults, while John Locke thought that it is parents’ economic pressure that
shapes children’s behaviour.20 In the early twenty century, and with the influence of
capitalism and consumerism, childhood was seen as a time of happiness and cheerfulness.21
These social attitudes towards children and childhood influence the ways in which law treats
children. But law, as a powerful social instrument, also has a pivotal role in the
institutionalisation22 and conceptualising of childhood.23 Law shapes, develops and
reconceptualises childhood,24 and enforces its conceptualisations on children and adults
alike.25 Despite changes in the image of childhood and in jurisprudence concerning children,
which will be discussed in chapter one in more details, the image of children as developing
human beings, which is also known as the ‘human becomings’ approach,26 has always
prevailed. I will argue that this image led to the creation of the child’s right to development in
international law, and to large extent has dictated the interpretation of this right.
The ‘human becomings’ conception of childhood describes children as passive actors, lacking
agency, weak, vulnerable, and in need of protection.27 It positions childhood and children
18 James and James, supra n. 11, 70-74. On childhood and ‘time’ see Judith Ennew, ‘Time for Children or Time
for Adults?’ in Jens Qvortrup et al (eds) Childhood Matters (Ashgate, Farnham 1994) 125-134.
19 Colin Heywood, History of Childhood (Polity Press, London 2001); Shanahan, ibid, 413.
20 Cynthia Price Cohen, ‘Natural Law and Legal Positivism’ in Michael Freeman and Philip Veerman (eds) The
Ideologies of Children’s Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1992) 53-70; Peter O. King, ‘Thomas
Hobbes’s Children’ in Susan T. Turner and Gareth B. Matthews (eds) The Philosopher’s Child (University of
Rochester Press, Rochester 1998) 65-84; For a claim that no conclusive conclusions can be drawn from Lock’s
writing about children see David Archard, ‘John Locke’s Children’ in Susan T. Turner and Gareth B. Matthew
(eds) The Philosopher’s Child (University of Rochester Press, Rochester 1998) 85-104.
21 Peter N. Stearns, ‘Defining Happy Childhoods: Assessing a Recent Change’ (2010) 3 Journal of the History
of Childhood and Youth 165; Paula Fass, The Damned and the Beuatiful – American Youth in the 1920’s
(Oxford University Press, Oxford 1977) 15.
22 James and James, 2004, supra n. 11; Emily Buss, ‘What The Law Should (And Should Not) Learn From
Child Development Research’ (2009-2010) 38 Hofstra Law Review 13.
23 Michael King and Christine Piper, How the Law Thinks About Children (Gower, Vermont 1990) 36-37.
24 James and James, 2004, supra n. 11, 64-70.
25Ibid, 214.
26 Lee, supra n. 6, 8.
27 For a non-Western perspectives see, for example, Charles Stafford, The Roads of Chinese Childhood
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1995); Toshiko Ito, ‘New Education For Underprivileged Children:
The Condition of Children’s Rights in Japanese Law’ (2012) 48 Paedagogica Historica 153; See also Robert A.
LeVine and Rebecca S. New, Anthropology and Child Development (Blackwell Publishing, Malden,
Massacusets and Oxford 2008).
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against adulthood and adults, describes childhood as ‘the absence of adult qualities’.28
Children are seen as ‘unfinished product’,29 and as human beings in making. Therefore, the
aim of childhood is to be a ‘journey toward a destination’.30 As James and Prout put it,
childhood is ‘a highly complex and engineered trajectory towards adulthood’.31
Since the late nineteenth century, developmental psychology dominated, and to some extent
dictated, the social and legal attitudes towards children.32Developmental psychology was the
‘key cultural arena, in which evolutionary and biologising ideas [were] replayed and
legitimised’33 this attitude towards children. Developmental psychology divides childhood
into sequential developmental stages, where the child moves from one developmental stage to
the next, from being incompetent to competent, gradually learning the necessary skills to
‘achieve the fully social state of adulthood’.34 Developmental psychology includes wide
range of theories, some were, or still are, more influential than the others. Sigmund Freud, for
example, focused on sexual development, while Erik Erikson emphasized psychosocial
development. Jean Piaget’s theory of cognitive development probably had the most
significant influence on law and on the legal discourse about children’s capacities.35Lev
Vygotsky’s description of proximal development and the child’s process of transforming into
a healthy adult is also known for its influence on law,36and on childhood studies.37
The prominence of these European-US centric theories has been widely challenged,38 and
their cultural, gender39 and class biases40have been highlighted. According to Michael
Wyness, for example, the combination of the child’s biological growth and psychology
makes it ’difficult for us to view childhood any differently’.41Therefore, and despite its
28 David Archard, Children: Rights and Childhood (Routledge, London 1993) 36.
29 Carol Smart et al, The Changing Experience of Childhood (Polity, Cambridge 2001) 1.
30 Lee, supra n. 6, 8.
31 James and Prout, supra n. 7, 226
32 Lloyd deMause, ‘The Evolution of Childhood’, in Lloyd deMause (ed) The History of Childhood (Souvenir
Press, London 1976) 1-74.
33 Burman, Deconstructing Development Psychology,supra n. 15, 20-21.
34 Smart et al, supra n. 29, 4.
35 Buss, supra n. 22, 48-50.
36 Buss, supra n. 22; Woodhead, Early Childhood Development, supra n. 4
37 Buss, supra n. 22.
38 Erica Burman, ‘Deconstructing Neoliberal Childhood: Towards a Feminist Antipsychological Approach’
(2012) Childhood (Published online 17 May 2012) 2. See also Alison Diduck, Law’s Families (LexisNexis
London 2003) 74-77.
39 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1982).
40 Burman, Deconstructing Development Psychology, supra n. 15,18-19.
41 Michael Wyness, Childhood and Society (Palgrave, Basingstoke 2006) 18.
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theoretical and conceptual shortcomings, developmental psychology still dominates
childhood studies and has significant influence on law, particularly international children’s
rights law. As this thesis argues, international children’s rights law is entrenched with the
view of the ‘developing child’, focusing on the fact that children do grow up, while ignoring
the social and moral characteristic attached to the process of maturation.
The ‘human becomings’ approach enjoys prominence in other disciplines as well, and it is
not only developmental psychology that promotes it. Arguably the best example of its
integral place in Western culture is to be found in Ĕmile Durkheim’s article on education,
published in 1911:
'The essential function of this age, the role and purpose assigned to it in
nature, may be summed in a single word: it is the period of growth. That is
to say, the period in which the individual, in both the physical and moral
sense, does not yet exist, the period in which he is made, develops and is
formed… in everything the child is characterized by the very instability of
his nature, which is the law of growth'.42
Durkheim could not have expressed it more clearly: the child does not yet exist as an
individual with an agency, and the ‘law of growth’ should therefore govern childhood and
dictate the treatment of children. The ‘law of growth’ and the ‘human becomings’ approach
were also used in anthropology. The first major research to study the lives of children was
Margaret Mead Coming of Age in Samoa, published in 1928.43 Mead observed the maturation
process of girls, from childhood to adulthood, thus perpetuating the idea that the importance
of children’s lives lies in what the future holds for children.44Growing up in Samoa led to the
establishment of the Culture and Personality School of anthropology,45where anthropologists
and developmental psychologists teamed up under the umbrella of the Culture and
Personality School, to study the ways in which ‘children became adults’.46 Another important
anthropological study that was published around the same time is Katherine Bridges’sThe
42
Ĕmile Durkheim, 'Characteristics of childhood', in W.S.F. Pickering (ed) Essays on Morals and Education
(translated into English by H.L. Sutchliffe, Routledge, London 1979. First published in 1911) 150. Emphasis in
the original.
43 Margaret Mead, Coming of Age in Samoa: A Psychological Study of Primitive Youth for Western Civilisation
(Harmondsworth, Penguin Books 1943. First published in 1928).
44For a critique on Mead’s work see Derek Freeman, Margaret Mean and Samoa: The Making and Unmaking of
an Anthropological Myth (Harvard University Press, Cambridge and London 1983).
45 Heather Montgomery, An Introduction to Childhood (Wiley Blackwell, Chichester 2009) 22-23.
46Ibid, 23.
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Social and Emotional Development of the Pre-School Child.47 This research, which was
described by the Lancetas one of the most influential studies on children’s lives and
behaviour,48 observed the daily lives of children in the classroom and the playground, in
order to develop a ‘development scale’ of the infant.49
After World War I, one of the main projects of childhood studies was to define the ‘normal’
and ‘abnormal’ child,50 and to understand how children’s lives, bodies and minds should be
treated.51 Dozens of different manuals explaining to parents how to raise their children were
published in the UK. By using medical and psychological jargons to delineate, for example,
how to raise a ‘healthy child’,52 these guides are good examples of the centrality of the care
for the child’s future in Western culture.
Children’s development was the subject of numerous other studies, including research about
children’s play and development, language and development, social bond and development,
brain development, bodily development, sexual development, cognitive development,
biosocial development and others.53 These studies attempt to ‘reveal’ how children develop,
what factors have positive or negative influences on their development, what qualifies as
‘good’ development, and what is considered as a disability. The findings and conclusions of
these studies are of little significance in the context of this thesis; what concern me is their
volume and the diverse meanings of ‘children’s development’, which they use. The colossal
corpus of literature is evidence of the totality of the conception of children as ‘human
becomings’, which hinders most efforts to understand children and childhood in any other
way. As John Modell rightly noted, the history of childhood is written from a developmental
perspective.54Childhood, therefore, seems to be important only in terms of the child’s
47 Katharine M. Banham Bridges, The Social and Emotional Development of the Pre-School Child (Kegan Paul,
Trench, Trubner&Co, London 1931).
48 Anonymous note, ‘The Development of Young Children‘ (1931) 668 The Lancet.
49 See also Levine and New, supra n. 27.
50 André Turmel, A Historical Sociology of Childhood: Developmental Thinking, Categorization and Graphic
Visualisation (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008); See also Helga Kelle, ‘’Age Appropriate
Development’ As Measure and Norm’ (2010) 17 Childhood 9.
51 For a good review on this point see Annemike van Drenth and Kevin Myers, ‘Normalising Childhood:
Politics and Interventions Concerning Special Children in the United States and Europe (1900-1960)’ (2011) 47
Paedagogica Historica 719.
52 John Stewart, ‘”The Dangerous Age of Childhood”: Child Guidance and the “Normal” Child in Great Britain,
1920-1950’ (2011) 47 Paedagogica Historica 785.
53 See Brian Hopkins (ed), The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Child Development (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge 2005); Kathleen Stassen Berger, The Developing Person (7th edition, Worth Publishers, New York
2006).
54 John Modell, ‘How May Children’s Development be Seen Historically?’ (2000) 7 Childhood 81.
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future.55This perception reflects the common idea, or ‘desire’,56 that children simply ‘grow
up’.57 ‘Development’, then, is not only a hypothesis, but also the prognosis of childhood. It is
therefore clear why according to this paradigm of childhood, ‘children didn’t have rights’.58
As persons in making, children were subjects to the ‘law of growth’ and not to human rights
law.
While the term ‘children’s development’ is often used, we need to note that it does not have a
unified, common and universal meaning. As Brian Hopkins writes in The Cambridge
Encyclopaedia of Child Development:
‘take any textbook on human development and then look for whether it
provides a definition of ‘development’. You will probably find that such a
definition is absent or that it provides in a couple on unenlightening
sentences. In fact, most of these textbooks provide only a cursory definition
of the term. The reason is not hard to find: development is one of those
terms that we freely use in everyday language and yet when we try to pin it
down with a precise definition it assumes an almost evanescent-like
quality’.59
A new conception of childhood, the ‘human beings’ concept, emerges in the 1970s,60
embracing diverse and complex notions of childhood.61 According to the ‘human beings’
approach, children are perceived as persons and not as ‘projects’,62 and the study of
childhood should therefore be done independently, without comparing children to adults.63
Children are perceived as active human beings who should participate in shaping their own
lives, and have an active role in their communities.64 According to this view, children’s
agency should be respected and their voices should be heard.65
55 Allison James and Alan Prout, ‘Re-presenting Childhood: Time and Transition in the Study of Childhood’ in
James and Prout, supra n. 7, 230-250, 239.
56 Erica Burman, ‘Desiring Development? Psychoanalytic Contribution to Antidevelopmental Psychology’
(2011) 24 International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education 1, 9.
57Allison James et al, Theorizing Childhood (Polity, Cambridge 1998) 196. See also Onora O’Neill, ‘Children’s
Rights and Children’s Lives’ (1988) 98 Ethics 445.
58 Michael Freeman, ‘The Human Rights of Children’ (2010) 63 Current Legal Problems 1, 9.
59 Brian Hopkins, ‘What is Ontogenetic Development?’ in Brian Hopkins (ed) The Cambridge Encyclopedia of
Child Development, supra n. 53, 18-24, 18.
60 Karen Wells, Childhood in a Global Perspective (Polity Press, Cambridge 2009) 1-24.
61 Alan Prout, The Future Of Childhood (Routledge, London 2005) 7-34; Prout and James, ‘A New Paradigm
for the Sociology of Childhood? Provenance, Promise and Problems’, supra n. 7, 7-33.
62 Smart et al, supra n. 29, 13.
63 James and Prout, Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood, supra n. 7, 8. See also Berry Mayall, Towards
a Sociology of Childhood: Thinking From Children’s Lives (Open University Press, Gosport 2002) 33.
64 James and James, supra n. 11, 38-39.
65 James and Prout, supra n. 7, 8.
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Recognising children’s agency is, as Allison James argues, probably ‘the most important
theoretical contribution of this conception to childhood studies’.66 Recognising children as
social agents means that children are being seen as part of the social structure, and that their
active role in it is respected.67 As human ‘beings’, children are defined based on their own
rights,68and not by comparison to adults. It also means that they are considered as human
rights holders.69As Michael Freeman argues, those who have human rights ‘can exercise
agency… as agents, rights bearers can participate. They can make their own lives, rather than
having their lives made for them’.70
An important implication of recognising children’s agency is the realisation that children
should be listenand consulted with, and that their opinions and voices should be heard and
taken into consideration. This idea is reflected in Article 12 of the Convention, which protects
the child’s right to participation.71 When one listens to children, one realises just how much
children know about their lives and about their world. Children make sense of their own
experience of poverty (and what qualifies as well-being),72 of living on the street,73of their
health and the implications of dying,74what human rights means,75 and how the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child should be interpreted.76 If asked, children can
articulate just how much their relationship with friends and family members affects their
66 Allison James, ‘Agency’, in Palgrave Handbook of Childhood Studies, supra n. 1, 34-45, 34.
67Ibid, 38-40.
68 Lee, supra n. 6, 54.
69 Michael Freeman, The Moral Status of Children (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 1997).
70Michael Freeman, ‘Why It Remains Important to Take Children’s Rights Seriously’ (2007) 15 International
Journal of Children’s Rights 5, 8.
71 For an analysis of Article 12 see Laura Lundy, ‘’Voice’ is not enough: Conceptualising Article 12 of the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (2007) 33 British Educational Research Journal 927.
72 Laura Camfield et al, ‘What’s the Use of ‘Well-Being’ in Contexts of Child Poverty? Approaches to
Research, Monitoring and Children’s Participation’ (2009) 17 International Journal of Children’s Rights 65;
Haridhan Goswami, ‘Social Relationships and Children’s Subjective Well-Being’ (2011) Social Indicator
Research Online First 26.5.2011; Zoran Pavlovic and Tina Rutar Leban, ‘Children’s Rights International Study
Project (CRISP) – A Shift from the Focus on Children’s Rights to a Quality of Life Assessment Instrument’
(2009) 2 Child Indicators Research 265.
73 Udi Mandel Butler, ‘Freedom, Revolt and ‘Citizenship’ (2009) 16 Childhood 11; See also Marcela Raffaelli,
‘How Do Brazilian Street Youth Experience ‘the Street’?’ (2001) 8 Childhood 396.
74 Myra Bluebond-Langer, The Private Worlds of Dying Children (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1978)
5.
75 Martin D. Ruck et al, ‘Children’s and Adolescents’ Understanding of Rights: Balancing Nurturance and Self-
Determination’ (1988) 64 Child Development 404; Martin D. Ruck et al, ‘Adolescents’ and Children’s
Knowledge About Their Rights: Some Evidence For How Young People View Rights In Their Own Lives’
(1998) 21 Journal of Adolescence 275.
76 Wiebina Heesterman, ‘An Assessment of the Impact of Youth Submission on the United Nations Committee
on the Rights of the Child’ (2005) 13 International Journal of Children’s Rights 351.
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happiness and feeling of ‘well-being’.77If listened to, children can express their own point of
view about their own development. Children distinguish between the progression of
development and the aims it should achieve. They recognise ‘development’ with a sense of
direction in life, and what they see as the natural process of maturation. Perceiving
‘development’ as a natural process, according to Helga Kelle, means that the notion of getting
older ‘can hardly be seen as a personal achievement’.78
Children’s ability to make sense of the world around them is not only a characteristic of
adolescence, but as Priscilla Alderson et al have shown, also premature babies can do it.79
Therefore, children’s participation is not necessarily an issue of children’s capacities to
articulate their wishes and preference, but also the space that they have to do so, and the
willingness of adults to listen to them. Needless to say, it is not always easy to facilitate
children’s participation and decision-making, and there are numerous methodological and
structural problems in doing so.80 But problems in implementation should not undermine the
foundations of the principle and its pursuit. ‘Seeing children as subject of capabilities means
that we can consider them endowed with agency and autonomy, able to express their points
of view, values and priorities.‘81 The importance and implications of respecting children’s
agency and voice in the context of the right to development will be discussed throughout the
thesis, especially in chapters five and six.
Despite the paradigm shift towards ‘being’, the primary concern with respect to children
remains, to a large extent, focused on their development and growth. Not least because, as
Burman noted, ‘we cannot ‘unthink’ development’.82As chapter two argues, this background
led to the creation of the right to development in international children’s rights law.
77 Haridhan Goswami, ‘Social Relationships and Children’s Subjective Well-Being’ (2011) Social Indicator
Research online 26.5.2011.
78 Helga Kella, ‘The Discourse of ‘Development’ – How 9 to 12-Year-Old Children Construct ‘Childish’ and
‘Future Development’ Identified Within Their Peer Culture’ (2001) 8 Childhood 95, 109; In a different context
see Richard Maclure, ‘The Dynamics of Youth Participation: Insights from Research Fieldwork with Female
Youth in Senegal’ in Myriam Denov et al (eds) Children’s Rights and International Development (Palgrave,
New York 2011) 155-174.
79 Priscilla Alderson et al, ‘The Participation Rights of Premature Babies’ (2005) 13 International Journal of
Children’s Rights 31.
80 Sally Holland et at, ‘Power, Agency and Participatory Agenda: A Critical Exploration of Young’s People’s
Engagement in Participative Qualitative Research’ (2010) 17 Childhood 360.
81 Jérôme Ballet et al, ‘Children Agency and the Capability Approach – A Conceptual Framework’ in Mario
Biggeri et al (eds) Children and the Capability Approach (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2011) 22-46, 22.
82 Burman, ‘Desiring Development? Psychoanalytic Contribution to Antidevelopmental Psychology’, supra n.
56, 13-15.
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Another issue that should be considered is the universality, or not, of childhood, especially
the universality of ‘children’s development’. Traditionally, the concept of childhood
embraced a universal image of childhood in general, and of child’s development in
particular.83It was the influence of Euro-American developmental psychology that led to the
belief that all children, regardless of their identity, personality, ethnicity, gender, or society
that they are living in, should develop in similar ways.84 Childhood was seen as a coherent,
nuance-free, concept. As such, the universal child was also a standardised child. This
universal child represents an a-historical model of ‘the child’, which, according to James, is
mostly vested in the notion of bodily development.85Recent attempts made by the new
sociology of childhood and new approaches to developmental psychology (such as cultural
psychology)86 have challenged this perception. But the moral-political assumptions that
underpin traditional developmental psychology have yet to be substantially
undermined.87Smart at el claimed that ‘once the social nature of childhood was recognised, it
became possible to think beyond the developmental/socialization framework for
understanding children’.88Burman disagrees with this proposition, claiming that
contemporary children’s rights and childhood discourses represent and consolidate traditional
gendered, racialized and psychologized views.89The latter argument not only explains the
background for creating the child’s right to development by the UN Convention on the Rights
of the Child, but also, as the thesis argues, the ways in which this right has been interpreted.
I argue that although the Convention accommodates both conceptions of childhood,90 insofar
the child’s right to development, the Convention holds the view that there is one appropriate
way for a child to develop.91 As a result, the right to development is understood to provide an
un-distinguishable protection for the same ‘development’ to all children. The thesis
83 Martin Woodhead, ‘Reconstructing Developmental Psychology – Some First Steps’ (1999) 13 Children &
Society 3, 5-6.
84Ibid, 8-9.
85 Allison James, ‘The Standardized Child: Issues of Openness, Objectivity and Agency in Promoting
Childhood Health’ (2004) 13 Anthropological Journal on European Culture 93.
86 Woodhead, ‘Reconstructing Developmental Psychology – Some First Steps’, supra n. 83, 9-12.
87 Burman, Deconstructing Development Psychology,supra n. 15, 298.
88 Smart et al, supra n. 29, 12.
89 Burman, ‘Deconstructing Neoliberal Childhood: Towards a Feminist Antipsychological Approach’, supra n.
38, 1.
90 Freeman, The Human Rights of Children, supra n. 58, 11-12.
91 Ashleigh Barnes, ‘CRC’s Performance of the Child as Developing’ in Michael Freeman (ed) Law and
Childhood Studies (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012) 392-418.
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challenges these premises and offers a different, context-sensitive framework that respects
children’s agency and embraces a broad definition of ‘children’s development’.
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Chapter One:Embedding the Concept of ‘Children’s Development’ into
International Children’s Rights Law
‘The child is given rights so that he may become a complete and perfect
human being’ (Cuevas Cancino,the Rapporteur of the Drafting Committee
on the Declaration on the Rights of the Child, 1959)1
‘Children are not the people of tomorrow, but are people of today. They
have a right to be taken seriously, and to be treated with tenderness and
respect. They should be allowed to grow into whoever they were meant to
be – the unknown person inside each of them is our hope for the future’
(Janusz Korczak, educator, 1927)2
Introduction
This chapter studies the embodiment of the ‘human becomings’ conception of childhood in
international children’s rights law, focusing on the process of embedding protection for
children’s development. Chronologically, the chapter begins at the last quarter of the 19th
century and ends in 1978, with the introduction of a draft for an international convention on
children’s rights. I argue that despite changing attitudes toward children and children’s legal
status that occurred over a period of 100 years, the desire to protect what Western society
considers the essence of children’s existence has prevailed. Consequently, international
children’s human rights law was created with the ultimate aim of protectingchildren’s journey
toward adulthood.This chapter is not a study of the history of international children’s rights
law in general, but an introduction to the events and processes that led to the creation of the
child’s human right to development in international children’s rights law.
At the turn of the 20th century, the Western conception of childhood underwent significant
changes. Gradually, children began to be perceived as a source of pleasure for their parents,
rather than as a burden or a mouth to feed. Children were also seen as a potential skilled
labour force, and therefore, it made sense to investin their future. Society therefore began to
take an interest, and to protect, children’s growth, particularly with respect to education and
1UNHCHR, Legislative History of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Volume I (New York and Geneva
2007) 21.
2Janusz Korczak, The Child's Right to Respect(Council of Europe, Brussels 2009. Originally published in 1927)
18-19.
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health.3 These new attitudes resulted in new domestic legislation concerning the promotion of
children’s welfare. On the international law level, similar changes occurred a few decades
later. The First World War and its aftermath led the international community to embrace a
new perspective regarding children. In 1924, the League of Nations adopted the Declaration
on the Rights of the Child,4 the first international legal instrument dedicated solely to the
human rights of children, which continues to inspire the interpretation of children’s rights
today.5The Declaration pinned down ‘children’s development’ as a key concept in
international children’s rights law and the chapter analyses its meaning and importance in
detail. The chapter presents the work of three scholars: Janusz Korczak, Ellen Key and
Eglantyne Jebb, who worked at the beginning of the 20th century, and in different ways
contested the prevailing welfare paradigm.
After establishing the foundations of international children’s rights law, the chapter discusses
the second international legal instrument that acknowledges children’s rights: the 1959 UN
Declaration on the Rights of the Child. This Declaration is much broader in scope than the
1924 Declaration and includes many additional rights of children. Like the 1924 Declaration,
the 1959 Declaration embraces protection for children’s development, and links some of the
Declaration’s rights to support this end.
The chapter then describes the changes in international human rights law that occurred during
the 1960’s, and the rise of the child liberation movementin the 1970’s. The liberation
movement’s key argument was that children should be seen as equal to adults, and therefore,
be recognised as human rights holders in the same way that adults are. The liberationists
challenged the developmental model and its assumptions concerning children’s capacities,
arguing that society’s attitude towards children must change, and that relationships between
children and their parents, teachers and governments should be re-defined. The end of the
1970’s marked the resurrection of a new era in international children’s rights law, as the UN
declared 1979 as the International Year of the Child, and the government of Poland
3Priscilla Robertson, ‘Home as a Nest: Middle Class Childhood in Nineteenth-Century Europe’in Lloyd
deMause (ed) The History of Childhood (Souvenir Press, London 1976) 407-431, 407.
4The term ‘law’ refers also to what is known as ‘soft law’ in international law. Although the 1924 Declaration
on the Rights of the Child is not a binding international treaty, it nevertheless has a normative significance in
international law. Christine Chinkin, ‘The Challenges of Soft Law: Development and Change in International
law’ (1989) 28 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 850.
5Dominique Marshall, 'The Construction of Children as an Object On International Relations: the Declaration of
Children's Rights and the Child Welfare Committee of League of Nations, 1990-1924' 7 (1999) International
Journal of Children's Rights 103, 104.
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introduced the first draft of an international convention for the rights of the child. This draft
for the Convention on the Rights of the Child will be the departing point for the next chapter.
The 19th Century and Children’s Welfare Laws
The last quarter of the 19th century marked a period of significant economic, social,political
and legal changes in the West, all of which had an impact on the development of the concept
of childhood. The perception of children as their father’s property began to fade away, and
children began to be perceived as human beings.6The notion of ‘purity’ replaced the previous
concept of ‘sin’,7 and children were no longer seen as ‘little devils,’ but rather as innocent
creatures with no intention of doing harm. These kind of changes informed the development
of the care for children’s welfare, which not only humanized children, but also ‘more
explicitly victimized’8 them.
Society embraced the idea that parents, educators and the government should ensure
children’s welfare, mainly by protecting children from illness9 and from the hardships of
poverty.10Declining birth mortality rates, capitalism, consumerismand new advertising
techniques injected happiness into childhood,11leading parents to ‘plea for
cheerfulness’.12Mothershavebegun to believe that they could turn their children into ‘happy
and productive citizens’.13
The increasing need for skilled workers and rising recognition of the importance of nutrition
and personal hygiene14 led to the introduction of compulsory education. Schools ceased to be
a place where only children from wealthy families gained education, and transformed into
social institutions that were designed to create skilled and healthy workers.15 Combating child
6 For a review of the evolution in attitudes to children see Michael Freeman, The Rights and Wrongs of Children
(Frances Pinter, London 1983) 13-19.
7Karen Sanchez Eppler, Dependent States: The Child’s Part in Nineteenth-Century American Culture
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2005) XV; David Archard, Children: Rights and Childhood (2nd edition
Routledge, London 2004).
8Paula S. Fass, ‘A Historical Context for the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (2011) 633
ANNALS 17, 22.
9Mary Ann Mason, From Father’s Property to Children’s Rights – The History of Child Custody in the United
States (Columbia University Press, New York 1994) 87-92.
10Robert L. Geiser, ‘The Rights of Children’ (1976-1977) 28 Hastings Law Journal 1027, 1028-1034.
11Peter N. Stearns, ‘Defining Happy Childhoods: Assessing a Recent Change’ (2010) 3 Journal of the History of
Childhood and Youth 165.
12Ibid.
13Fass, ‘A Historical Context for the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child’, supra n. 8, 21.
14Ibid, 19-22.
15 Mary Jo Maynes, Schooling in Western Europe (State University of New York Press, Albany 1985).
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labour and creating the practical conditions (and obligation) for parents to send their children
to school led to setting a bar for a minimum working age and limited working hours.16
The rise of the idea of the State acting as Parens Patriae made it easier to introduce
legislation to combat child abuse.17 Such legislation did not only impose social norms
concerning child rearing on parents, but also enabled states to interfere (and in cases of
serious abuse, created a dutyto interfere) with the family unit and remove children from
parental custody. Parents,who did not follow and practise the changing views of childhood,
either because they were unwilling or incapable of adapting to the new middle-class ideal,
were subject to these new provisions.In England, the 1847 Larceny Act and the 1854 the
Reformatory School Act are two examples of this new perception.18 In the United States, the
establishment of the first juvenile court in the State of Illinois in 1899 was another important
benchmark, since it represented the obligation of the state to ‘aid and protection and to direct
him into a path that leads to good citizenship’.19
These changes in law supported this conception of childhood as a ‘time of happiness’ for
children and families alike.20Mary Ann Mason claims that this new social trendultimately
aimed at facilitatingchildren’s process of growing up and transforming children into
citizens.21However, from a child’s perspective, the message society sent might be seenless
obvious.
‘The young are told to work hard and value school, but also to enjoy
themselves. They are to be innocent but also sexually alluring. They are to
be respectful and obedient, but also independent consumer beholden to no
one. They are to be youthful but not childish. The basic contradiction is that
the young are told to grow up fast, but also that they needn’t grow up at all,
at least not until they reach their late twenties or early thirties’.22
16 C.R. Margolin, ’Salvation Versus Liberation: The Movement For Children’s Rights in A Historical Context’
(1977-1978) 25 Social Problems 441, 443-445.
17Geiser, supra n. 10, 1030; Rex and Wendy Stainton Rogers, Stories of Childhood (University of Toronto
Press, Toronto 1992) 22-24.
18Freeman, Rights and Wrongs of Children, supra n.6, 66-67.
19As quoted in Margolin, supra n. 16 443. See also Anthony M. Platt, The Child Savers – The Innovation of
Delinquency (2nd edition, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1977) 101-136.
20 Paula S. Fass, The Damned and the Beautiful – American Youth in the 1920’s (Oxford University Press,
Oxford 1977) 15.
21Mason, supra n. 9, 85-120.
22 Steven Mintz, Huck’s Raft – A History of American Childhood (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2004)
381.
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Nonetheless, children were generally not perceived as human rights holders. It was the care
for children’s welfare, rather than human rights, that was an important feature of law.23 Like
women, people of colour and other minorities, children were still discriminated against and
deprived of their basic human rights. Little, if any, attention or significance was givento their
life as children, rather than as future adults.24
As dominant as the voices calling to care for children’s welfare were at the end of the 19th
century and the beginning of the 20th century, other voices on children and childhood were
being expressed. With different biographical backgrounds and careers, Ellen Key (1848-
1926), Janusz Korczak (1878-1942) and Eglantyne Jebb (1876-1928), the three pioneers, as
Veerman described them,25 introduced fresh approaches towards childhood, children and
their rights. These three authors respected children not for the adults that they could become,
but for the children that they are, and therefore asked us to respect children as human rights
holders. Their illuminating approaches deserve to be discussed in detail.
Ellen Key
In 1900, Ellen Key, a Swedish teacher, published The Century of the Child.26This book is a
manifesto that calls upon society to place children at the centre of attention, and to make
some radical changes in social policies that relate to children, including marriage laws and
the education system.27 Summarising the book in today’s terms, it is evident that Key’s goal
was to promote the acknowledgement of children’s agency and children as human rights
holders. Nonetheless, Key did not settle with making a general claim in favour of recognising
children’s rights, and offered a list of these rights. On top of the list was the child’s right to
choose her or his parents. The right to education, the right to participation in the education
23Fass, The Damned and the Beautiful – American Youth in the 1920’s,supra n. 20, 23.
24 Nonetheless, it should be noted that the welfare legislation concerning children is part of the process of
recognizing children’s citizenship. Bryan Turner, ‘Personhood and Citizenship’ (1986) 3 Theory Culture Society
1, 8-10.
25Philip E. Veerman, The Rights of the Child and the Changing Image of Childhood (Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, Leiden 1992) 73.
26Ellen Key, The Century of the Child (G.P. Putnam’s Sons, New York and London 1909). On the influence of
this book see Kriste Lindenmeyer and Bengt Sandin, ‘National Citizenship and Early Policies Shaping ‘The
Century of the Child’ in Sweden and the United States’ (2008) 1 Journal of History of Childhood and Youth 50.
For overall appreciation of Key’s influence on the 20th century see Jeroen J.J. Dekker, ‘The Century of the Child
Revisited’ (2000) 8 International Journal of Children’s Rights 133.
27The book was translated into English in 1909. At the same year, US President Theodore Roosevelt called the
first White House conference on Children, which dealt with ‘care of dependent children’. Beck Rochelle, 'White
House Conferences on Children: an Historical Perspective' (1973) 43 Harvard Educational Review 653.
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process, the right to have a home, the right to be free from religious instructions, and the right
to be free from labour followed.
In comparison with the common trends of her time, Key offered a different, less paternalistic
perspective on children’s lives. She touched upon the pressing issues of child abuse and
schools, offering different approaches. For example, not only did Key call to put an end to
child abuse, she also asked to remove the veil of privacy that covers the family unit, which to
a very large extent, and despite new welfare acts, still shield families from external
intervention. Key argued that respecting children’s rights should not result in preventing only
some acts of abuse, but rather in ending all forms of abuse, including corporal punishment in
schools and by family members.28 Key also called for the elimination of the category of
'illegitimate children', arguing that the legal definition of the relationship between the child’s
parents should not define the status of the child.29
Schools and education were subjects of grave concern for Key. She asserted that school has
no other purpose but ‘to give to each separate individual as much development and happiness
as possible… the schools should be nothing but the mental dining-room in which parents and
teachers prepare intellectual bills-of-fare suitable for every child’.30 Key thought that at the
early stages of their life, children should stay at home and be educated by their mothers. They
should be able to go to school only at the age of primary education, but so long as their souls
would not ‘murdered’ by their teachers.31In contemporary vocabulary, it can be argued that
Key set the ground for respecting children’s right to education.
Despite the innovation of her work, to some extent Key also held the views that ‘the child’ is
an innocent, somewhat naïve, human being. This approach is best demonstrated when she
criticises common educational methods:
‘to bring up a child means carting one’s soul in one’s hand, setting one’s
feet on a narrow path; it means never placing ourselves in danger of
meeting the cold look on the part of the child that tells us without words
that he finds us insufficient and unreliable.’32
28Key, supra n. 26, 128-138.
29Ibid, 44-45.
30Ibid, 207.
31Ibid, 203-232.
32Ibid, 114.
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Furthermore, like Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s approach toward children as expressed in Emile,33
and to the ‘salvation’ discourse, Key sought to save children’s souls from those who would
try to 'master' their thoughts.34
Much of Key’s arguments were devoted to the question of child rearing and the process of
growing up. Echoing the tendency to rely on life science and psychology, Key called for the
establishment of a 'pedagogical culinary science' that would determine what children should
learn.35 In describing the objective of this science, Key invented what would become the
basic norm of international children’s rights law in general and of the right to development in
particular. According to Key, 'harmonious development is the finest result of man's training,
but it is only to be attained by his own choice. It implies a harmony between the real
capacities of the individual, not a harmony worked up from a pedagogical formula.'36
Key’s statement was ahead of its time. The term ‘harmonious development’ describes the
optimum stage of development that the child should achieve. Probably more important is the
recognition of the child’s agency and voice as important factors in developing the child’s own
capacities, instead of the perception that these capacities will result from training. Yet, this
quote resonates with the perception of a child that should develop her or his ‘harmonic’
nature, assuming the existence of a kind of coherent personality and good intentions. But as
much as Key was concerned with the child’s future (‘human becomings’), she also advocated
in favour of the importance of children’s life as children (‘human being’). Society, she
argued, should 'allow children to live'. 37
Janusz Korczak
Janusz Korczak was a paediatrician and the director of the Jewish Orphanage Dom Sierot in
Warsaw for thirty years, from 1912 until his murder in Treblinka on 6 August 1942.38
Korczak wrote a number of books wherein he spelled out his unique approach towards
childhood and children’s lives and rights. Korczak’s profound conception of children’s rights
33Julia Simon, ‘Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Children’, in Susan M. Turner and Gareth B. Matthews (eds) The
Philosopher’s Child (University of Rochester Press, New York 1998) 105-120, 111.
34Key, supra n. 26, 110.
35Ibid, 256.
36Ibid. Emphasis added.
37Ibid, 241.
38Veerman, supra n. 25, 93; See also Irena Sendlerowa, 'I Saw Korczak and the Children Walking from the
Ghetto to their Death' in Janusz Korczak's Legacy, supra n. 2, 43-45, 43.
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was the most advanced of his time, and to a large extent, might be considered ‘radical’ even
today.
Korczak believed that children are ‘complete’ human beings, and not merely persons engaged
in a process of becoming adults. As such, children’s personhood should be acknowledged and
their human rights respected. ‘Our indolence keeps us from discovering beauty in the
present’, Korczak wrote, ‘when I approach a child, I have two feelings: affection for what he
is today and respect for what he can become’.39 Korczak did not like the tendency to
characterize childhood using psychoanalysis jargon, arguing that Freud is a ‘dangerous
maniac’ because he ‘reduced childhood to a psychosexual stage’.40 According to Korczak,
childhood is not a sequence of insignificant stages of the human life that ought to be
accomplished in order for a child to be successfully transformed into an adult. On the
contrary, Korczak sought to have children respected for being children, and not merely for
being future adults. 'Is there a life that exists as some joke?' Korczak rhetorically asked. 'No,
childhood years are long and important ones in the life of a man’.41
Unlike Key, Korczak did not only view education as a means of transforming knowledge, but
rather as a process that ought to respect the child’s dignity in a participatory way. Children,
Korczak claimed, should take part in the educational process and should be given the space
necessary to influence the content of education as well as the administration it carries with it.
For these reasons, the orphanage he directed was self-governed. The children ran their own
parliament, where they could debate and decide about many different issues concerning their
lives. They had their own newspaper, as well as a court of peers where children and staff
alike, including Korczak, could face trial if they broke the house’s code.
In his seminal essay The Child Right to Respect, published in 1927, Korczak defines ‘the
child’ and the time of ‘childhood’ in the following terms:
‘The basic idea that the child is not now but will become later, does not
know anything but will do so, is not capable of doing anything but will
learn, makes us live in a perpetual state of expectation… For the sake of
tomorrow we fail to respect what amuses, saddens, amazes, angers, and
interests him today. For the sake of tomorrow, we steal many years of his
life…‘42
39Janusz Korczak, Loving Every Child(Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill, North Carolina 2007) 17.
40As quoted in Betty Jean Lifton, The King of Children– A Biography of Janusz Korczak (Chatto & Windus,
London 1988) 125.
41Korczak, The Child’s Right to Respect,supra n. 2, 33.
42Korczak, The Child’s Right to Respect, supra n. 2, 18- 19.
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Korczak argued that society should stop overlooking children’s experiences of the world, and
respect and appreciate the importance of the time of childhood. The child should not be seen
only as a future citizen, but as a person in the present. At the same time, Korczak does not
suggest ignoring the fact that the child is growing up, claiming that this process should be
celebrated, rather than be a reason for more suppression. ‘We should have more respect for
the mysteries and fluctuations of the hard business of growing up!’, he adds,43and warns us
from being to anxious with the future.
‘We search for signs of the future; we'd like to be able to foretell, to be
certain; this anxious anticipation about what the future holds increases our
indifference towards what it is’.44
In that sense, Korczak may have been the first to articulate the conception of the child as a
human ‘being’ rather than as a human ‘becoming’. But he does much more, as he refuses to
use polarized definitions, asking to break the dichotomy between these two concepts.
Korczak advocates for changing the model of childhood to a model that recognises children
as human ‘becoming’ and human ‘beings’ simultaneously. In the last chapter I term this idea
‘the hybrid conception of childhood’, and suggest how to utilize it in order to analyse the
child’s right to development.
Korczak’s scholarly work was primarily focused on social issues concerning children, but he
also wrote about their legal status. Like Key, Korczak recognised the importance of having a
human rights regime that protects children and, again like Key, suggested a list of these
rights. ‘I call for a Magna Charta Liberatatis concerning the Rights of the Child’.45This
‘Magna Charta’ can be established based on Korczak’s book How to Love a Child,46 and it
includes the following rights:47 the child’s right to respect; the right to autonomy; the right to
make mistakes; the right to fail the right to participate; the right to human dignity (which
includes the right to die prematurely); the right to information; the right to privacy; the right
to own property; the right to education; the right to belief and the right to resist any
43Korczak, Loving Every Child, supra n. 39, 63.
44Korczak, The Child’s Right to Respect, supra n. 2, 24-25.
45As quoted in Gabriel Eichsteller, ‘Janusz Korczak – His Legacy and its Relevance for Children’s Rights
Today’ (2009) 17 International Journal of Children’s Rights 377, 385.
46Janusz Korczak, ‘How to Love a Child’ in M. Wolins (ed) Selected works of Janusz Korczak (National
Science Foundation, Washington D.C. 1967)355-356.
47 Compare to Lifton, supra n. 40,
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educational influence; the right to due process and ‘to a children’s court’; the right to freedom
of religion; the right to love; and the right to respect for her or his grief.
This list of rights does not aim merely to protect the welfare of the child or seek to prevent
any harm to the child’s ability to bloom as an adult.This list of rights, including the right to be
loved by the child’s parents, is much more comprehensive and progressive than most of the
human rights instruments that existed at the time, including the 1924 Declaration on the
Rights of the Child (which will be discussed later in this chapter), or any other ‘general’
human rights instrument in international law. This list presents a completely different
approach towards children. Betty Lifton’s reading of Korczak’s work adds two rights to this
list, on the bases of the following two quotations: ‘we demand: do away with hunger, cold,
dampness, stench, overcrowding, overpopulation’, and ‘children are not people of tomorrow,
they are people today’. Consequently, she named the first right ‘the right to optimal
conditions in which to grow and develop’. The second right is titled the right to ‘live in the
present’.48
These quotes reflect a dualism towards children that is rarely expressed by other authors,
including most contemporary commentators. These quotes, and the rights that can be
concluded from them, create a broad legal framework for caring for children’s lives.
Introducing the care for the child’s future as an issue of human rights, the right to grow up
and the right to live in the present are not mutually exclusive but rather complement each
other. They represent a complex conception of childhood that results in acknowledging the
right to development of children while defining the idea of ‘development’ in complicated
terms.
Eglantyne Jebb
Eglantyne Jebb, an English teacher, made an enormous contribution to the creation of
international children’s rights law, though played a lesser role in developing its theoretical
understanding. Her two main contributions were establishing the organization ‘Save the
Children’, and drafting the League of Nations’ Declaration on the Rights of the Child.49
Jebb was less interested with domestic policies. Following the First World War, Jebb thought
that children should be protected from the mass killing, major traumas and other negative
48Korczak, How to Love a Child, supra n. 46, 355.
49 See Clare Mulley, The Women who saved the Children (Oneworld, Oxford 2009).
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influences of wars. The famine that spread through Europe after the War, which affected
children more than any other group in society, concerned her as well. Jebb thought that
children, whom she described as innocent people who had nothing to do with the War
generated by adults, should not suffer from the consequences of any future wars. Taking the
somewhat naïve view that ‘common people could not bear to see children die without at least
trying to help’,50 Jebb decided to establish ‘Save the Children’ as an organization that aims to
provide relief for children all over the world.51 The name and aims of the organization
perfectly reflect the Christian spirit of salvation, and the trend to ‘save’ children that inspired
the dominant ‘welfare’ paradigm.52
Alongside her charity work, Jebb realised that the newly established League of Nationscould
be used to providean international legal framework for the protection of children.
‘The world's children stand in urgent need of better protection… They who
pay the heaviest price for our short-sighted economic policies, our political
blunders, our wars. Adults can pass through a period of stress and strain and
perhaps be none the worst for it, once it is over, but if we fail to give
children their physical requirements and we restrict their educational
advantages, they may well be handicapped in consequences for the rest of
their lives’.53
Jebb is mostly concerned with the effect of adults’ ‘short-sighted’ views on children’s
‘physical requirements’ and education, as they compromise children’s future. Worrying that
children could become ‘handicapped’ in the future, Jebb calledfor satisfying their needs in the
present. Unlike Key or Korczak, Jebb used welfare discourse rather than human rights
discourse, arguing in favour of protecting children’s process of growing up and future well-
being as adults. The same rhetoric would later be used in the League of Nations’ Declaration
that she drafted.54
Despite the differences between them, what unites Key, Korczak and Jebb is their respect for
children, the recognition of their agency and the care for who they are – children. Children’s
prospect as adults or citizens is not the primary focus of Key, Korczak of Jebb, nor is the
paternalistic approach of care for children’s welfare while overlooking their wishes and
feelings. One possible reason for this similarity is that all three were teachers, and as such,
50Veerman, supra n. 25, 89.
51Ibid, 88.
52At 1865, more than half a century before, the organization ‘The Salvation Army’ was established in London.
53As quoted by Veerman, supra n. 25, 91.
54Veerman, supra n. 25, 91; Marshall, supra n. 5, 124.
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were in contact with children on a daily basis. Though one should wonder why all teachers do
not share these views about children.
The three of them also shared the view that children should be provided with the opportunity
to grow up, and to different extents, become whatever they wish to become. Korczak and Key
spoke about caring for children’s growth in human rights terms. The next section analyses the
protection for children’s development under the 1924 Declaration, showing the significance
given to saving children’s lives and their survival, rather than caring for their future.
1924 League of Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Child
The League of Nations was established in 1919, after the First World War. Its primary goals
were maintaining peace;55 ensuring ‘fair working conditions’ of men, women and children;
securing ‘just treatment of the native inhabitants’; preventing trafficking of women, children
and narcotic drugs; supervising arms trading; maintaining freedom of communication and
transit; and preventing and controlling diseases.56 In accordance with these goals, and as part
of a broader project of rehabilitation of war victims, children’s welfare was on the League’s
agenda from the beginning of its work.57
A coalition of organizations that included the International Committee of the Red Cross, the
League of the Red Cross Societies, Save the Children International Union and the
International Association for the Promotion of Child Welfare, together with Belgium,
Switzerland, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Sweden, China, Morocco and Egypt,58helped to
establish the Leagues’ Child Welfare Committee. One of the first items on the Committee’s
agenda was to adopt a children’s rights charter.59As previously mentioned, Eglantyne Jebb
was the dominant figure in persuading the Committee and members of the League of Nations
to adopt such a charter.60
The Declaration on the Rights of the Child,61 also known as the Geneva Declaration, was
adopted on September 26, 1924. This landmark document was the first international
55 The Covenant of the League of Nations, 1924.
56Ibid, Article 23.
57Marshall, supra n. 5, 106-108.
58Ibid, 110-120.
59Ibid, 128.
60Ibid, 128, and Veerman, supra n. 25, 155-156.
61 The Declaration on the Rights of the Child, League of Nations O.J. Spec. Supp. 21, at 43 (1924).
36
instrument recognizing the universality of children's rights and welfare.62But while the
Declaration's title and preamble use the term ‘rights’, this term is not mentioned in any of the
five substantive paragraphs. The substance of the Declaration uses the term ‘needs’, and
subsequently focuses on promoting these needs, ignoring the promise to promote human
rights, which the Declaration’stitle makes.
The short document mandates that certain needs of the child should be met by ‘men and
women of all nations’. The Declaration addressed the needs of hungry children to be fed, the
need of sick children to be nursed and the need to reclaim delinquent children.63 The
Declaration further asserted that children should be the first to receive relief in times of
distress,64 and that children need to be in a position where they can earn a livelihood, whilst
being protected against every form of exploitation.65 The last paragraph of the Declaration
stated that children should be brought up with the consciousness that their talents must be
devoted to the service of their fellow men.66
By promoting children’s needs and not children’s rights, the Declaration treated the child as
beneficiaries rather than as a subject of international law.67Children are seen, according to
Geraldine Van Bueren,as ‘recipients of treatment' rather than right's holders.68 Nevertheless,
Van Bueren claims that by linking children’s needs and rights, at least at a declaratory level,
the Declaration created international standards for children’s rights.69Korczak was much less
satisfied with the Declaration, rightly arguing that it primarily reflects the conception of
children as subjectsof care and as persons in constant need for protection, rather than
respecting children’s agency. In addition, since the Declaration did not assert the rights-
bearing status of children themselves, Korczak claimed that it amounts to nothing more than
'an appeal to goodwill' of adults.70 Using Korczak’s terminology, the Declaration asserted
that adult goodwill results in protecting children from the risks that an adult-shaped world
might pose to their journey toward adulthood. In similarity to the dominant perception of
childhood of that time, it is the child’s future development that the Geneva Declaration is
62 Veerman, supra n. 25, 155-156.
63Paragraph 2.
64Paragraph 3.
65Paragraph 4.
66Paragraph 5.
67Geraldine Van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of the Child (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
Dordecht 1995) 7.
68Ibid.
69Ibid, 8.
70Janusz Korczak, The Child's Right to Respect, supra n. 2, 34.
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primarily concerned with. This conclusion is best demonstrated by the first Article of the
Declaration, which reads:
'The child must be given the means requisite for its normal development,
both materially and spiritually'
ThisArticle protects the child's 'normal development', which seems to include two elements:
material and spiritual. By using the word ‘must’, the Article sets forth a strong obligation to
ensure that the child receives the 'means' required for this 'normal development'. But
theArticle is as vague as it is important. It raises the questionsof who determines what
constitutes ‘normality’, and on what bases should this decision be drawn? It is also not clear
whether this ‘development’ refers to a process or, rather, to the outcome of a process. The
Declaration also does not elaborate on the means required to fulfil the need for this ‘normal’
growth, on top of referring to the two domains it covers – material and spiritual.
By protecting ‘development’ first, the Geneva Declaration embraced ‘development’ as a core
principle of international children’s rights law. The Geneva Declaration communicates the
centrality of the role of development in the nature and aims of children's rights. It echoes
developmental psychology in suggesting that there is a course of ‘normal’ development that
ought to be protected, in contrast to an abnormal development that might jeopardize the
child’s future.71The Declaration further reflects the perception that growing up is what
childhood is all about and what law should enable children to do. There have been few
significant changes in international children’s rights law since 1924 with respect to this idea.
The next instrument in international children’s rights law is the 1959 UN Declaration on the
Rights of the Child. Before discussing this Declaration, I will briefly review other
developments in international human rights law, namely the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights and the 1966 Covenants. It would be wrong to ignore these treaties when analysing
international children’s rights law, as they had a significant impact on the ways in which
human rights, and the identity of the rights holder, have been defined in the UN system,
including by the 1959 Declaration and later on, the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child.
71See Erica Burman, Deconstructing Developmental Psychology (2nd edition, Routledge, London 2008) 71-73.
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1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights
The United Nations was established,like the League of Nations, following another World
War. Although one of the organization’s main objectives is protecting human rights,72 it took
more than a decade before the UN generated any progress in international children’s rights
law. Progress was first made in ‘general’ international human rights law, with the adoption of
the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR).73
The UDHR protects civil and political rights and social and economic rights alike.74The
rights holders are defined as ‘all members of the human family’,75emphasising that ‘all
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’ and,therefore, ‘everyone is
entitled to the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration’.76 Presumably, this definition
includes children as well.77Articles 25 (right to an adequate standard of living) and 26 (right
to education) of the UDHR potentially undermine this conclusion. Reading Article 25 from a
developmental perspective, the first part of it is of great importance. It reads:
‘Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and
well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing
and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in
the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or
other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.’
Article 25 aims to provide all the necessary social services adequate for ‘everyone(s)’ ‘health
and well-being’, but it does not stipulate what these entitlements ought to achieve or what
kind of life they should facilitate. As far as children are concerned, though the term
‘everyone’ is in principle refers to children and adults alike, the Article nevertheless names
‘himself and of his family’ as the explicit right holder. Therefore it is not ‘everyone’ who is
the right holder, but rather only those men who head a household. These men, and only these
men, are entitled to the right to an adequate standard of living and social security. And it is
with their courtesythat other family members, including children, benefit from this right
72Article 1(3) to the Charter of the United Nations (1945).
73UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III).
74For some background on the document and its drafting process see Johannes Morsink, The Universal
Declaration on Human Rights – Origins, Drafting and Intent (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia
1999). Chapter three of this book is dedicated to equality, women’s and minorities’ rights. However, the absence
of children from the UDHR is not mentioned by the author. See pages 92-116.
75UDHR, Preamble.
76UDHR, Article 1.
77Hans-Joachim Heintze, ‘Children’s Rights within Human Rights Protection’ in Michael Freeman and Philip
Veerman (eds)The Ideologies of Children’s Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1992) 71-78, 72.
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being fulfilled. Children may enjoy the fruits of having a social security net, and thus may
have their development needs met. But if this happens, it is not because the children are seen
as right holders.
Article 25(d) relates to children differently, and it is one of the few places in the UDHR
where children are explicitly mentioned. However, Article 25(2) does not address children’s
right to an adequate standard of living, but rather aims to eliminate discriminatory practices
that prevent children from enjoying this right. The Article echoes Key’s call to disconnect
children’s legal status from the status of their parents,declaring that ‘all children, whether
born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection’.78Furthermore, the Article
protects children from only one ground of discrimination (legal status) and in relation to only
one right (adequate standard of living), while ignoring other grounds of discrimination and
many other rights. Article 25 does not name children as direct rights holders, but rather asks
to remove one obstacle that prevents children from enjoy the courtesy of the man who heads
the household, presumably their father. Later, in the 1959 Declaration on the Rights of the
Child and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, not only would children be
acknowledged as human rights holders of both the right to an adequate standard of living and
to social security, but these two rights would be connected to children’s development and
their right to development.
The second article to mention children is Article 26, which protects the right to education.79
Although children are obvious and immediate holders of this right, the Article refers to them
only as passive actors, and as subjects of parental rights. While Article 26(1) declares that
‘everyone’ is entitled to the right to education, children are only mentioned in Article 26(3).
Article 26(3) does not protect any issues or rights related to education of children, but rather
protects the right of parents ‘to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their
children’. Thus, not only does the UDHR fail to address specific issues that relate to children,
it also fails to recognise them as rights holders. It is against this perception of children as non-
rights holder and as passive recipients of aid that the development of the protection of
children’s development should be realised.
The idea of ‘development’ is mentioned in Article 26(2), which declares: ‘Education shall be
directed to the full development of the human personality …’. This is a different kind of
78For a commentary on Article 25 see Asbøjrn Eide and Wenche Barth Eide, ‘Article 25’ in Gudmundur
Alfredsson and Asbøjrn Eide (eds) The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague
1999) 523-550.
79For a commentary on Article 26 see Pentti Arajärvi, ‘Article 26’ in Alfredsson and Eide (eds), Ibid, 551-574.
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protection for development than the type ofprotection for the ‘means’ required for ‘normal’
development, which is provided under the Geneva Declaration.
Article 26(2) does not protect the ‘normal’ course of development, but rather refers to the
outcome of the educational process. It sets a results-based test by attempting to provide for a
‘full development of the human personality’.These are two different perspectives on ‘human
development’. One is focused on the process, while the other is keen to achieve a certain
result. Though both concepts (‘normal development’ and ‘full development’) are vague and
biased, they nevertheless tell us something different about the child and about childhood.
Furthermore, the UDHR definition for development is broader, as it relates to the child’s
personality in general, rather than only to her or his maternal or spiritual development.
The UDHR was an important step in promoting human rights, and in putting human rights on
the world’s agenda during the Cold War. Therefore, its overall contribution to international
human rights law should not be dismissed. Having said that, the general progress the UDHR
has generated had a relatively lesser impact on children. Children’s legal and social status
under the UDHR can be described as: children are not yet adults, and the meaning of this gap
is inferiority. Consequently, broad protection should be given to their development.
1959 UN Declaration on the Rights of the Child
In 1950, soon after the UDHR was adopted, the UN Social Commission asked the UN
Secretary General to draft a declaration concerning the rights of the child.80 Nine years later,
in 1959, during which time other ‘general’ human rights conventions were drafted as well
(later resulted in the 1966 Covenants),81 the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on
the Rights of the Child.82
This new declaration was intended, according to the UN Social Commission, to 'emphasize
the need for special care of the rights of the child because of his immaturity in respect to a
name, nationality, security, health, education and protection against all forms of exploitation
which might prejudice his development'.83 The Commission perceived the child as an
80Legislative History of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra n. 1, 4.
81Henry J. Steineret al, International Human Rights Law in Context (3rd edition, Oxford University Press,
Oxford 2007) 136.
82Declaration on the Rights of the Child (Adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 1386 (XIV) of 10
December 1959). For a background on the drafting process see Veerman, supra n. 25, 161-166.
83Legislative History of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra n. 1, 5. Emphasis Added.
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‘immature’ person and as such, it sought to protect the child’s development from six
potentially threatening elements: not having a name; not having a nationality; security;
health; education and exploitation. Once provided with this protection, the child could then
develop and become an adult. These six components of development are different from the
two developmental components of the Geneva Declaration (material and spiritual), and
reflect a broader conception of development –in terms of what harms ‘development’ and
what advances ‘development’. These components can also be seen as an attempt to concretise
the UDHR’s ‘full development’ model.
The first draft of the new Declaration included ten substantial principles. The first principle
followed the Commission’s mandate and stated:
'the child shall be given the means necessary to enable him to develop
physically, mentally, morally, spiritually and socially in a healthy and
normal manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity'.84
Principles 4, 6 and 9 protected additional aspects of child’s development and introduced new
dimensions of the right. Principle 4 protected the child's right to social security. Unlike the
UDHR, Principe 4 recognised children as right holders, and stated that the child 'shall be
entitled to grow and develop in health…'. By emphasising ‘grow’ and linking it to
‘development’, Principle 4 provides protection for the process of development, not for its
outcome, and identifies ‘health’ as the indicator for a successful process of growth.
Principle 6 declares that the child 'needs love and understanding,’ as these needs are essential
'for the full and harmonious development of his personality'. This obscure statement, similar
to those made by Korczak and Key, is not often found in human rights instruments. This
Principle takes the human desire for love and transforms it into a need, fulfillment of which
should generate the process of ‘full and harmonious development’ of the child. As such,
Principle 6 defines a broad, but nevertheless vague, spectrum of development, as it ought to
be both ‘full’ and ‘harmonious’. Oddly, the Principle does not name ‘normal’ as a
characteristic for this course of development.
Principle 9 is similar to the fourth Principle of the Geneva Declaration. It declares that the
child shall 'in no case be caused or permitted to engage in any occupation or employment
which would prejudice his health or education, or interfere with his physical, mental or moral
development'. This Principlereflects a concern that child labour might not only be hazardous
84Ibid.
42
to the children's health or education, but would also jeopardise three aspects of development:
physical, mental and moral. Principle 9 is important for two reasons. First, it detaches
development from the right to health, social security or education and acknowledges the
independent and distinct importance of development for children. Second, it expands
children’s development to include three explicit components (physical development, mental
development and moral development) as opposed to only one or two components, and surely
expands upon more ambiguous concepts such as ‘full development’ or ‘harmonious
development’. However, Principle 9 makes these distinctions only in relation to occupation or
employment, excluding other activities or situations that may interfere with children’s
development.
In 1959, Cuevas Cancino, the Rapporteur of the Declaration’s Drafting Committee, presented
the final text to the UN General Assembly, which was very similar to the first draft. In his
speech, Cancinodescribed the ideas that lay at the heart of the Declaration. Upholding
Durkheim’s principle of childhood as a time governed by the ‘law of growth’,85 Cancino
emphasized the importance of protecting children’s development by international law:
'a human being that is to say, in a state of physical and moral growth…The
draft Declaration dwells upon the ultimate contribution which the child will
make to the human group to which he belongs. The child is given rights so
that he may become a complete and perfect human being… It is not
surprising that the draft Declaration should attach such importance to the
spiritual factors, which determine the development of the child… As being
in a process of development, the child requires special protection in that
process; his development must be neither impeded nor forced into anti-
social directions'.86
Cancino continued expressing strong views concerning childhood and children’s
development, adding that the Declaration considers the child as an 'immature being', and
therefore 'sets forth those rights which it regards as essential to the child's full development'.87
It is not only the content of the speech, but also its patronizing tone that reveals the
Declaration’s perception of children, childhood, children’s rights and children’s development.
The speech portrays a clear image of the child:the child is immature, her or his course of
growth should be protected, especially with regard to spiritual development, and eventually,
the child should not only turn into an adult, but more specifically, should turn into a
85 See the Introduction, next to footnote 42.
86Legislative History of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra n. 1, 21.
87Ibid, 22.
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‘complete and perfect’ one. According to Cancino, the Declaration does not acknowledge
children’s human rights because it respects them as human beings, but rather ‘gives’ children
some human rights so they can become ‘a complete and perfect human being’. These words
sound like a contractual condition, rather than a human rights declaration. Children are
obliged to grow up in a particular way, forbidding them to become an ‘anti social’ person, in
return for receiving human rights.
Principle 2 of the final text of the Declaration perfectly demonstrates these ideas:
‘The child shall enjoy special protection, and shall be given opportunities
and facilities, by law and by other means, to enable him to develop
physically, mentally, morally, spiritually and socially in a healthy and
normal manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity. In the enactment
of laws for this purpose, the best interests of the child shall be the
paramount consideration’
The Principle defines a broader spectrum of development than previously defined, and
declares what the goals of development are and what the development process should look
like. While the first draft protected six components of development (name, nationality,
security, health, education and exploitation), this Principle delineates five components of
child development - physical, mental, moral, spiritual and social development, tying them all
to the principle of ‘best interests’ of the child. This is the first time that the ‘best interests
principle’ is mentioned in an international document,88 and one of the rare occasions where it
is connected to the concept of ‘development’.
Reading principles 2, 4, 6 and 9 and Cancino’sspeech demonstrate the typical perception of
childhood and children as the negative others. The Declaration takes the position that since
the child’s purpose is to grow up, international human rights law should protect the child's
physical, mental, moral, spiritual, social and full and harmonious development as a means of
ensuring the outcome of this process. Underscoring the process of growing up in this way
reflects a conception of childhood that emphasises the end point of the developmental
process, where the child turns into a ‘fully developed’ adult.
The Declaration began to clarify the meaning of ‘child’s development’, specifies its
components, and attaching more aspects of the child’s life to her or his course of growth.
Taken together with the Geneva Declaration, the two Declarations establish the centrality of
the idea of children as developing human beings in international children's rights law; the
88Michael Freeman, Article 3 – The Best Interests of the Child (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2007) 15.
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urge to protect children’s ‘development’; and the hesitation to see children as human rights
holders. Both Declarations, at least with respect to ‘children’s development’, subjugate the
justification for recognizing children as human rights holders to the support of children’s
development. Nonetheless, neither of the Declarations identifies a legal right to development.
The 1960’s and the Emerging Recognition of Children’s Autonomy
The 1959 UN Declaration on the Rights of the Child was adopted on the threshold of the
1960’s and the rise of the human rights movements. It was during this period that women’s
rights, black people’s rights and anti-colonial movements gained impressive victories in
promoting their agendas.89Some calls to recognise children’s rights were expressed as well,90
but it is difficult to speak of any significant ‘children’s rights movement’ occurring during
this time, at least not on the same scale as these other human rights movements. The changes
in legal rhetoric and practices generated by the human rights movements led to some progress
in the area of children, but the obsession with protecting their ‘development’ remained
virtually unchanged in law and in mainstream legal theory.
In the United States, for example, children began to be seen as civil rights holders under one
of the two paradigms that emerged. The first paradigm, as identified by Hillary Rodham, took
the view that children should be granted equal protection for their rights in the same ways
that adults have. According to Rodham, this approach mainly influenced criminal law, and
the United States Supreme Court adopted it in 1967, inIn Re Gault.91In this case, dealing with
the conviction of fifteen year old Gerald Gault, the Court concluded that ‘neither the
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone’.92The approach that there
was no reason for denying children any of the rights promised to adults prevailed in this area
of law until very recently.93 This approach will be further discussed in the next section, with
respect to the child liberation movement that bloomed in the USA during the 1960’s and
1970’s. The secondparadigm followed the traditional welfare paradigm, asking to protect
89Micheline R. Ishay, The History of Human Rights (University of California Press, Berkeley 2008) 191-205,
225-243.
90Veerman, supra n. 25, 113-124.
91In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
92Ibid, 13.
93 See the latest Supreme Court judgments that bar mandatory life term for juvenile (Miller v. Alabama 567
U.S. ___(2012)), determining that juvenile offenders can not be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole
for non-homicide offences (Graham v. Florida 560 U.S ___ (2010)), and invalidating the death penalty for all
juvenile offenders under the age of 18 (Roper v. Simmons 543 U.S. 551 (2005)).
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children from abuse and neglect and to promote their well-being. Its influence expanded the
juvenile justice system, and it changed family law and education law. According to Rodham,
legislation allied with this welfare tended to unveil ‘a blueprint for the child's fullest
development’.94Nonetheless, Rodham argued that new legislation and case law that were
based on this perspective reflected a conceptual stagnation of childhood, rather than progress
towards recognition of children as rights holders. Children’s status as civil rights holderswas
not recognized because:
‘these "needs manifestos" proclaim the rights of children to adequate
nutrition, a healthy environment, continues loving care, a sympathetic
community, intellectual and emotional stimulation, and other prerequisites
for healthy adulthood. Although a child may be entitled to such rights under
theories of natural law or moral philosophy, most claims based on
psychological and even physical needs are not yet considered legal rights
by our system.’95
Rodham draws an important distinction between what adults see as psychological and
physical needs of the child and what the law does. She highlights the role that psychology
plays in the legal field and the impact it has on the formulation and interpretation of
children’s human rights. Rodham does not argue against utilizing psychology in law, but
suggests that children’s needs as identified by other disciplines are not necessarily recognised
as human rights. Robert Geiser shares Rodham’s analysis concerning the importance given to
child’s development in United States law. Focusing on mental health law, Geiser argued that
‘children’s rights are often given a developmental justification – that is,
children need these rights satisfied in order to develop into physically and
mentally healthy adults and to realise their full potential as human
beings’.96
These exponents of children’s rights’, he continues, ‘prescribe a catalogue of the needs of
children which must be met to ensure the development of children into productive citizens’.97
94Hillary Rodham, ‘Children Under the Law’ (1973) 43 Harvard Educational Review 487, 494. For a review of
the changing attitude toward children in US laws during this time see also Bruce C. Hafen, ‘Children’s
Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their “Rights”’ [1976]
BYU Law Review 605.
95Rodham, Ibid.
96 Geiser, supra n. 10, 1040.
97Ibid, 1044. For a review on the rise of children’s rights in the UK during this time see Bob Franklin (ed) The
Rights of Children (Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1986).
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The influence of developmental psychology on legal theoryand positive law, as well as on the
way in which law imagines ‘the child,’ is clear. Geiser argues that protecting children’s rights
is understood as a means to an end, and that children’s rights are not respected due to
acknowledgement of children’s humanity. According to this approach, children’s rights are
the legal modification of children’s welfare needs and of developmental psychology, and are
designed to facilitate children’s development. Law does not define what these needs are or
what ‘children’s development’ means, but rather serves as a tool to promote those needs.
On the international level, the rise of the human rights movement resulted in the adoption of
two human rights treaties in 1966: The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR)98 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR).99 Although these Covenants signified major progress for the protection of the
human rights of ‘all’ human beings, as both Covenants state, the term ‘all’ does not always
include all part of society, and too often, certain social groups and individuals, including
children, found themselves being left at the margins in practice. Nevertheless, and despite
strong opposition during the drafting process,100 bothinclude specific clauses dedicated to
children and some of their rights, excluding the right to development.
Common Article 3 of the ICCPR and ICESCR aims to protect the ‘equal rights of men and
women’. In addition, the ICCPR refers to ‘all individuals’ (Article 2) and to ‘every human
being’ (Article 6) as rights holders. The ICCPR declares that ‘everyone shall have the right to
recognition everywhere as a person before the law’ (article 16). In similarity to the UDHR,
these definitions seem to include children, but in practice, children, like other discriminated
groups, were marginalised from these seemingly inclusive definitions. For this reason, and in
order to stress the need to protect the rights of members of some of these groups, the
Covenants dedicate specific provisions for the rights of women and children. Later, both
groups will be the subjects of specific human rights conventions: The Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights
of the Child.
98The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Adopted and opened to signature, ratification and
accession by General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1996. Entered into force on 23 March
1976.
99 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Adopted and opened to signature,
ratification and accession by General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966. Enter into force
on 3 January 1976.
100Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – CCPR Commentary (N.P. Engel, Kehl 1993)
422-434, 423.
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Article 24 of the ICCPR recognises children’s right to non-discrimination, the right to
‘measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family,
society and the State’, the right to be registered after birth, the right for a name and the right
to acquire a nationality.101 In addition, four other articles mention children’s rights. Article
6(5) protects the right to life and establishes that ‘persons’ below the age of 18 should not be
sentenced to death. Articles 10(2)(b) and 14(4) address the rights of children in criminal
procedure. Article 23 protects the right of ‘men and women’ to marry and protects children
when marriage ends.
These articles reflect a liberal interpretation of equality and take a minimalistic approach
towards children and their rights. The articles further express concern with preventing harm,
but none of them(or any of the other articles in the Covenant), refer explicitly or implicitly to
children, their needs, including their developmental needs, or their future.
The ICESCR addresses even fewer rights of the child than the ICCPR. Article 10(3) deals
with families, and requires States Parties to take ‘special measures of protection and
assistance’ on behalf of:
‘all children and young persons without any discrimination for reasons of
parentage or other conditions. Children and young persons should be
protected from economic and social exploitation. Their employment in
work harmful to their morals or health or dangerous to life or likely to
hamper their normal development should be punishable by law...’
Children’s right to non-discrimination is protected, and the ground of parental status is
explicitly mentioned (inline with Key’s suggestion). To a limited extent, the Article also
protects children’s development. Using the same term as the Geneva Declaration, children’s
‘normal development’ should not be obstructed (in addition to being actively promoted), but
only in relation to the labour market. It is not clear from the text whether the child’s ‘normal
development’ refers to the process or the outcome of it. Article 13 refers to the right to
education,102 and ‘recognise[s] the right of everyone to education’. In similarity to Article 26
of the UDHR, Article 13 does not name children as rights holders and again, like Article 26,
children are mentioned only in reference to the parental right to choose a child’s education
(Article 13(3)).
101Ibid.
102For a comprehensive analysis of Article 13 see Klaus Dieter Beiter, The Protection of the Right to Education
by International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishes, Leiden 2006) 459-569.
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As neither children nor their rights receive significant attention in these two important
Covenants, it is difficult to draw definite conclusions concerning the image of the child or the
care for their development they reflect or ask to promote. Nevertheless, mentioning children
as rights holders in a binding convention is not without significance. Children are seen as a
distinct and defined social group, and to some extent, this recognition further respect their
agency.
The Child Liberation Movement
The children liberation movement emerged in the United Kingdom and the United States in
the late 1960’s and 1970’s. After a decade of activity, it gradually faded away until it
virtually vanished. Today, it is hard to find any reference to its ideas, as they were dismissed
for being too simplistic. I nevertheless argue that despite its simplicity, insofar the
jurisprudence about the child’s right to development, there is much to learn from this
movement.
The child liberationists called for the end of paternalistic approaches towards children, for the
elimination of the discrimination between children and adults, to grant children the same
constitutional rights as adults, and ultimately to make children free beings.103According to
Martha Minow, the usage of equality discourse and the language of rights, ‘offered a way to
argue for both more protection and more independence for different children, or for the same
children in different circumstances.’104However, Nan Berger argues that dissolving
discriminatory legislation is not enough, because in order to promote children’s rights, there
is also a need to recognise children’s agency and give them a voice.105
‘While much could be done through alternation and modification of the law
to bring freedom to children, children could not, like Negroes and women,
be liberated entirely by the actions of others. Freedom, if it is gained at all
meaningfully, is self-gained and the most helpful thing which could be done
toward this end would be to make children involved in the decisions in their
own life from a very early age.’106
103For a general background see Veerman, supra n. 25, 133-152; Michael S. Wald, ‘Children’s Rights: A
Framework for Analysis’ (1979) 12 University California Davis Law Review 255; In the UK, liberationists came
forward a decade later. See Bob Franklin, supran. 97.
104Martha Minow, ‘What Ever Happened to Children’s Rights’ (1995-1996) 80 Minnesota Law Review 267,
273.
105Nan Berger, 'The Child, the Law and the State' in Paul Adams et al (eds) Children's Rights(Elek Books,
London 1971) 153-179; See also Ann Palmeri, 'Childhood's End: Toward the Liberation of Children' in William
Aiken and Hugh LaFollette (eds) Whose Child? (Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa, New Jersey 1980) 105-124.
106Berger, Ibid.
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The liberationists’ approach marks a significant change in the field of children’s rights. To a
large extent, this movement shifted attention away from the welfare paradigm and the general
developmental perception of childhood in law, by offering new ways to conceptualise
childhood and a new understanding of children’s human rights. Since most of the
liberationists worked and wrote in the United States, much of their focus was on the
protection of children’s constitutional rights.107
Before addressing the contribution of the children’s liberationists to the debate concerning
‘development’ and law, and at the risk of generalizing and over-simplifying, I will first
summarise their theories. The children’s liberationists rejected the welfare paradigm and the
perception that ‘rationality’ is a necessary component in executing human rights. Instead,
they demanded respect for the equal rights of children. Moreover, some liberationists, like
Ann Palmeri, claimed that the argument that requires mental and cognitive capabilities as a
prerequisite for either having or exhausting rights is not valid for two reasons. The first is that
children have the sufficient and necessary capacities to make an autonomous choice, and the
second is that children have at least as much capacity as adults.108 The liberationists also
rejected the usage of developmental psychology in conceptualising childhood. They
considered children as ‘persons’, claiming that ’childhood is a stage in life with internal
significance in and of itself, and not just an apprenticeship. Society should acknowledge that
and until it does and expresses this understanding in action, children will remain appendages
of others and will be unable to develop in their own image’.109 The liberationists were keen
on reforming social and parental attitudes toward children. John Holt, one of the prominent
advocates of this idea, claimed that a child should have the right to do what any adult may
legally do.110 Richard Farson used different words to describe the same idea, suggesting that
society should have a ‘single standard of morality and behavior for children and adult.111
Theseideas reflect a liberal model of equality and reject the social structure that oppresses
children. This perception challenged the welfare paradigm and the conception of children as
‘adults in making’ and accordingly, parental domination over children.As A.S Neill claimed:
107See Annie Franklin and Bob Franklin, 'Growing Pains: The developing Children's Rights Movement in the
UK' in Jane Pilcher and Stephen Wagg (eds) Thatcher's Children? (Falmer Press, London 1996) 94-113.
108 Palmeri, supran.106, 110; Katherine Hunt Federle, ‘Looking Ahead: An Empowerment Perspective on the
Rights of the Child’ (1995) 689 Temple Law Review 1585, 1593.
109Berger, supra n. 106, 153 – 179.
110John Holt, Escape From Childhood (Penguin Books, Middlesex 1974) 19.
111Richard E. Farson, Birthrights (Macmillan, University of Michigan Press, Michigan 1974) 27.
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‘the two enemies of children are ignorance of parents and unhappiness of
marriages…. The problem is parents, always parental. Children are ruined
by the complexes of their parents’.112
As part of rejecting what they saw as an oppressive social order, the liberationists also
challenged one of the welfare paradigm’ crown jewels: compulsory school attendance.
According to Berger, and in similarity to Key’s approach in Century of the Child, schools are
used by society to oppress children’s minds, to programme children’s future and to make
children dependent on their parents for a longer time.113
The liberationists generated a huge amount of controversy and gained considerable criticism.
They were accused of promoting an irresponsible approach that leads to abandoning children
to their rights.114In 1979, Michael Freeman claimed that ‘the liberationists’ case is politically
naïve, philosophically faulty and psychologically wrong’.115 With respect to the right to
development, the argument about what is psychologically right or wrong is at the heart of the
debate. Rejecting developmental psychology as the basic for understanding children’s rights
might indeed undermine their entire theory, but it can also open the door for new and
different interpretations of children’s rights in general, and of their right to development in
particular. Throughout the Thesis, especially in the last two chapters, I make the claim that
mainstream developmental psychology limited the interpretation of the right to development,
and precluded from understanding this right in any way other than as a right that protects the
child’s transformation into an adult.
Now I would like to focus on the liberationists’ critique of the developmental model of
childhood, their alternative views concerning childhood and the similarities and differences
between their approaches to the right to self-determination and protection of children’s
development.
The liberationists argued against using developmental psychology as a criterion to dictate law
and policy toward children. Palmeri made the point that because there is no serious way to
determine or define what ‘developed enough’ means, there is no justification for using
capabilities in order to determine one’s entitlements to have rights.
112A. S. Neill, 'Freedom Works' in Adams et al (eds), supra n.105, 127-152, 131-132.
113Berger, supra n. 106, 158-159.
114Hafen, supra n. 94, 644-650.
115Michael Freeman, ‘Children’s Rights and Some Unanswered Questions and Some Unquestioned Answers’
(1979-1980) 5 Poly Law Review 9, 15.
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‘We lack an adequate psychological account of the process of development
and, therefore, we also lack satisfactory criteria for recognizing the "end
product" of this development. How we are to determine when children
possess such a capacity is very unclear. Accordingly, we have only the
vaguest idea of what counts as a "moral being"’.116
This view challenges the certainty that developmental psychology pretends to provide. If
taken seriously, this view has the potential to undermine the coreprinciples of international
children’s rights law, as reflected in both the 1924 and 1959 Declarations. However, one can
ask what Palmeri would have argued if a more ‘scientific’ or ‘satisfactory’ criteria for
determining what ‘sufficient capabilities’ is had become available, for example in the form of
empirical tests and neurology. Alternatively, she argued that if the notion of ‘development’ is
considered important, then it should be expanded to all ages,117 so that all people, including
adults, will be subject to the same regime. In this way, then, there is a chance to create ‘a
world where people have the best characteristic[s] of both adults and children’.118One way or
the other, if ‘development’ is the wrong image of the child, then according to this
understanding of ‘development’, there is no justified need to protect the child’s right to
development.
Robert Ollendorfstands on the other side of the equation concerning the use of developmental
psychology.119 For Ollendorf, developmental psychology signifies the right way to
understand childhood, defining the discipline as a necessary model to analyse both childhood
and adolescence alike.His main project is to distinguish between childhood and adolescence,
claiming that adolescence is the most important phase of human life. In embracing the
welfare paradigm, he defines adolescence against the image of the child (which was created
as a mirror image of adults), conceptualises adolescence as a time when the child is no longer
dependent, immature, non-productive and a non-responsible sexual actor, but rather almost an
adult.120
Somewhat confusingly, and although Ollendorf embraced developmental psychology as the
right approach to childhood, he nevertheless rejected the capacities approach as a benchmark
116Palmeri, supra n. 106, 110.
117Ibid,119.
118Ibid, 121. For more on the limitation of the developmental paradigm see Arlene Skolnick, ‘The Limits of
Childhood: Conceptions of Child Development and Social Context’ (1975) 39 Law & Contemporary Problems
38, 52-59.
119Robert Ollendorf, 'The Rights of Adolescents' in Adams et al (eds), supra n. 105, 91-126.
120Ibid 99.
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for acknowledging the human rights of children. Ollendorf claims that the child should be
able to determine ‘on his own how he is going to learn, what he wants, what he rejects, what
kind of art he likes, what kind of art he dislikes, what books he wants to read, in which way,
if any, he wants to worship’.121 However, and in spite of the importance he gives to the
development process, development is not named as part of this list of rights. Instead,
Ollendorf names four other rights that the adolescent childshould be entitled to in order to
ensure their adequate development: the right to self-determination; the right to sexual
freedom; the right to education and the right to work.122 Implementing these rights should
‘ultimately’ lead, according to Ollendorf,to the ‘promise of a happier future’.123
This approach praises the child’s future and the child’s current life. It takes the end point of
‘development’ as an important goal, but the means of achieving it are different from those
presented by the welfare paradigm. Instead of emphasizing needs, Ollendorf emphasises
autonomous rights as the means to achieve a very similar aim. A competent adult will be
‘created’ only by respecting the adolescent’s liberal freedoms.
Paul Adams stands in between Palmeri and Ollendorf. Adams adopted the general Freudian’s
developmental model, and perceives childhood to be a time of change and
growth.124However, he disagrees with Palmeri, arguing that psychiatry and psychology can
measure ‘true competence’. Adams does not use the developmental approach as a reason to
deny children their rights, but rather argues that children should have a ‘right to a healthy
childhood’.125 This right includes three dimensions: A. objective dimensions(competence and
custodial stability) B. neither entirely objective, nor entirely subjective dimensions
(entitlement to grow and learn, to live in a meaningful world and the opportunity for
‘unfolding of loving relations with other people’); and C. subjective dimensions (a ‘favorable
picture of self’ and a ‘sense of some unsocialised uniqueness’).126It is evident that this
approach is entrenched within development psychology. Even the ‘objective’ aspects are
biased and subjective. Such an attempt to formulate emotional needs of the child as bases for
human rights, and as valid as these needs may be according to any psychological theory, fails.
121Ibid, 120.
122Ibid, 119-120.
123Ibid, 126.
124Paul Adams, 'The Infant, the Family and Society' in Adams et al (eds), supra n. 105, 51-90, 82-86.
125Ibid, 89.
126Ibid, 89-90.
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A more comprehensive approach to children’s development can be found in John Holt’s
seminal book Escape from Childhood.127 Holt rejects the division between childhood and
adulthood,128and challenges the common paradigm of childhood as a time of happiness and of
gradual development into a mature adult.
‘Childhood, as in happy, safe, protected, innocent Childhood, does not exist
for many children. For many other children, however good it may be,
childhood goes on far too long, and there is no gradual, sensible, and
painless way to grow out of it or leave it’.129
It is not only the being happy nature of childhood that Holt dismisses, but also the perception
that a child will gradually ‘grow out’ towards a desirable end.In principle, he rejects the basis
of the developmental model. Based on the position that there is no difference between
childhood and adulthood, it follows that there should be no difference in the legal rights
children hold. Consequently, children’s human rights should be acknowledged and protected
in the same way that adults’ rights are acknowledged and protected. Holt names what he
believes to be the most important eleven human rights of children. The first right on his list is
the right to vote. It is followed by the right to work, the right to own property, the right to a
guaranteed income, the right to choose one’s guardian, the right to travel, the right to drive,
the right to control one’s sex life, the right to use drugs, the right to total legal and financial
responsibility and the right to control one’s learning.
This list is in some ways similar to Key’s list and perfectly symbolises the liberationists’
approach. This list not only makes the case for granting children the same rights as adults, but
primarily seeks to liberate children from many of the restraints they face in their daily lives in
the USA. The rights to travel, drive, have sex and use drugs are dissimilar from any other list
of human rights, reflecting the spirit of the 1960’s.
Nonetheless, the list challenges those who argue that lack of capabilities requires denying
some of the rights of children, in favour of satisfying their needs. For this reason, the first
right on Holt’s list is the right to vote, perhaps the most important political right, which has
always been denied to children in both the United States and the United Kingdom. Among
other things, the right to vote is the right that enables a person to participate in determining
how her future will look and how life will be regulated. Granting children the right to vote
127Holt, supra n. 110.
128Ibid.
129Ibid, 23
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contradicts T.H Marshall’s claim that children cannot be citizens because they are ‘citizens in
making’.130Without the right to vote, children will always remain subject to policies
determined by others.131
Following his rejectionof the distinction between childhood and adulthood, Holt claims that
phrases such as ‘a child needs to be allowed to be a child’ are meaningless, since there is no
such thing as a ‘child’.132He also rejects the ‘development’ model as part of rejecting all
alleged unique characteristics of childhood.133 As a result, a right ‘to development’ is not part
of his list of rights that children should have.
Joel Feinberg expresses a position similar to Holt’s in his essay The Child’s Right to an
Open-Future.134While Feinberg asserts that children should have the same human rights as
adults have, unlike Holt he does not think that children can execute all of their human rights,
since they are ‘quite different animals’.135 Feinberg tries to eradicate what he believes to be a
misunderstanding of children’s rights, and to offer a conceptual solution of his own. Feinberg
suggests dividing human rights into three categories. The first category includes rights that
adults and children share, such as the right to body integrity (Feinberg name this category ‘A-
C rights’). The second category includes rights that belong only to adults, such as the right to
vote (‘A rights’). The third and final category includes rights that are not particular to
children but characteristic of them (‘C- rights’, or ‘rights in trust’).136He defines rights in trust
as those rights that children cannot execute during the time of childhood, but will be available
to children as ‘future options [and will be] kept open until he [the child] is a fully formed
self-determining adult capable of deciding among them’.137As such, a ‘right in trust’ fulfils
the child’s right to an open future.138 According to Feinberg, understanding some rights of
children as ‘rights in trust’ solves the tension between capacities, rights and
130 T.H. Marshall, ‘Citizenship and Social Class’ in T.H Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class and Other
Essays (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1951) 1-86, 84.
131 See Aoife Nolan, ‘The Child as ‘Democratic Citizen’: Challenging the ‘Participation Gap’ (2010) 4 Public
Law 767.
132Holt, supra n. 110, 110-112.
133Ibid, 77.
134Joel Feinberg, ‘The Child's Right to an Open Future’ In Aiken and LaFollette (eds), supra n. 105, 124-153.
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autonomy.139Despite promising children the right to an open future, Feinberg does not think
that they have a right to pursue their future.
In order to explain and simplify his approach, Feinberg takes the right of a two-month-old
baby to walk freely down the street as an example. According to Feinberg, despite the
obvious lack of physical capabilities of this child to walk down the street, this child
nevertheless has the right to walk freely, and this right should not be forbidden or dismissed.
However, if we fail to acknowledge the future usage of this right, we might end up cutting
this child’s legs and argue that it did not prevent the child from exhausting her right to walk
freely in present time. If we do so, and this is the key to Feinberg’s theory, we undermine the
child's right to walk freely in the future.140
‘right-in-trust cannot always be established by checking the child's present
interests, a fortiori it cannot be established by determining the child's
present desires of preferences. It is the adult he is to become who must
exercise the choice, more exactly, the adult she will become if his basic
options are kept open and his growth kept "natural" or unforced". In any
case, that adult does not exist yet, and perhaps he never will. But the child
is potentially that adult, and it is that adult who is the person whose
autonomy must be protected now’.141
Feinberg’s theory requires evaluating the child’s development, and hence takes children as
not-sufficiently developed human beings. Feinberg seeks to enable the future adult that hides
within every child the opportunity to come into life and enjoy the entire spectrum of human
rights. ‘It is that adult who is the person whose autonomy must be protected now’,142 he
claims. Feinberg is therefore willing to compromise some of the child’s fundamental
autonomy rights, since a ‘child's future autonomy, as an adult, often requires preventing his
free choice now’.143 This proposition has an inherent theoretical difficulty, as Feinberg
compromises the right to free choice, which is fundamental to the liberal theory, in favour of
the ability to execute that right in the future.
Feinberg does not justify his argument by using developmental arguments, nor does he
describe any developmental stages. But he does see an end point where the process of
changing terminates and the child reaches sufficient autonomy. Feinberg sees the end point of
139Ibid, 126-127.
140Ibid,127.
141Ibid.
142Ibid.
143Ibid.
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childhood as a goal that requires protection throughout childhood. Moreover, for Feinberg,
this end point is not only an interest of the child, but also a right ‘because to some extent, the
child's own good (self-fulfilment) depends on which interests the parents decide to create’.144
This point draws a clear divide between him and the rest of the liberationists, who seek to
disengage children rights from parental rights. Though he is not using this term, he would
probably understand a right to development as the right to become a free adult.
The finalliberationist addressed here is Richard Farson. Farson presented probably the most
extreme liberal point of view in his book Birthrights, published in 1974.145 In Birthrights,
Farson claims that despite the sense of achievement with respect to children’s rights that
some, like Rodham, had described, the children’s rights movement did not achieve much.
Moreover, it certainly did not liberate children or lead to social or legal recognition of their
humanity. In fact, he claims that the increasing attention to children only led to a situation
where ‘children’s rights have actually diminished, for we have simply replaced ignorant
domination of children with sophisticated domination’.146 According to Farson, the current
social structure should be revoked not only because it ‘is not a good place for children’, but
primarily because society ‘refuses their right to full humanity’.147 For Farson, then, children
are already ‘full’ human beings and, as such, do not need protection in order to develop and
become ones.
Farson believed that children have the capabilities and the rights not only to determine their
own future, but of their present as well. ‘Children like adults’, he writes, ‘should have the
right to decide the matters which affect them most directly’.148 Like the other liberationists,
Farson claimed that children should enjoy the same human rights that adults enjoy, but his
reasoning was different. He did not focus on formal equality and he dismissed claims about
differences between adults and children. Rather, he claimed that ‘liberation will help give
children back their childhood…’,149thus rejecting characterizations of childhood as either a
time of joy and innocence or as a time of violence and cruelty.150In light of this perception,
Farson offered a comprehensive list of human rights that children should have, including the
144Ibid, 148.
145Farson, supra n. 111.
146Ibid,3.
147Ibid, 2.
148Ibid, 27.
149Ibid,4.
150Ibid, 6.
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right to self determination,151 the right to alternative home environment,152 the right to
responsive design,153 the right to receive information,154 the right to educate oneself,155 the
right to freedom from physical punishment,156 the right to sexual freedom,157 the right to
economic power,158 the right to political power,159 and the right to justice.160
These rights, like those on Holt’s list, aim to free children from social constraints, and grant
them citizenship rights. Because Farson does not perceive children only as future adults, he
does not argue for the protection of their rights to grow up. The process of growing up is not
without importance for him, but it is not considered the only merit of children.
A final point that needed to be addressedis the liberationists’ approach towards the right to
self-determination. For the individual person, the right to self-determination means the right
to make autonomous decisions, and to dictate one’s own future. Most of the liberationists
rejected the idea that a person’s rights are subject to her or his capacities, and some also
rejectedthe underlying narrative dictated by developmental psychology, which hints that
children do not have the necessary capacities to make decisionsand,therefore, to be human
rights holders.161Sharon Bishop, for example, argued that ‘the point of the right to self
determination is to enable people to work out their own way of life in response to their own
assessments of current conditions and their own interests, capacities and needs’.162 In relation
to children, Bishop took anapproach similar to Feinberg’s concept of rights-in-trust, arguing
that:
‘Young persons should be treated in whatever ways give them the strength
and imagination to make use of their right to self determination
autonomously when they reach maturity. Treating them in ways which are
151Ibid,26-41.
152Ibid,42-62.
153Ibid,82.
154Ibid,83-96.
155Ibid,97-112.
156Ibid,113-128.
157Ibid,129-153.
158Ibid,154-174.
159Ibid,175-190.
160Ibid,191-212.
161Federle makes an interesting differentiation between autonomy, capacity and power. She argues that capacity,
rather than autonomy, should be the foci of conceptualising children’s rights Katherine Hunt Federle, ‘Rights
Flow Downhill’ (1994) 2 International Journal of Children’s Rights 343. See also Federle, supra n. 108.
162Sharon Bishop, ‘Children, Autonomy, and the Right to Self-determination’ in Aiken and LaFollette (eds),
supra n. 105, 154-177, 163-164.
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believed to do this is a way of respecting the right they will have when they
reach maturity’.163
These words complete the circle that starts with denying children’s rights all together and
ends with full liberation. The idea of ‘maturity’ prevails, triumphing over other dimensions of
the child’s life. It emphasises the result of the developmental process as the main justification
for acknowledging children’s right to self-determination, overlooking the importance of
recognizing the rights of children during the time of childhood.
Other international human rights instruments of the time did not address the individual right
to self-determination, not least because according to the liberal idea of human rights, personal
autonomy and self-realisation are the underlying assumptions. The right to self-determination
was discussed in relation to a broader national / collective emancipatory discourses. In
chapter five I discuss the relationship between self-determination, collective rights, and
personal development. Here, I focus on the claim that the right to self-determination shares
some core justifications with the argument that children’s human rights should be recognised
in order to ensure the child’s future. Both views take the child’s future to be important and
both take the position that it needs to be addressed by law. However, it is not sufficiently
clear from the liberations writing on this subject whether it was the process of creating this
future (i.e, the process of development) that matters, or whether the result of this process is
important in and of itself. One way or the other, it seems that those who refer to this right,
like Farson, saw significance in enabling the child to enjoy some degree of self-determination
and autonomy as a child, regardless of the contribution it may or may not have to the child in
the future.
Conclusion
The end of the 1970’s found children and the children’s rights movement in an odd situation.
On the one hand, it was a fairly grounded legal presumption that children are human beings
and as such, cannot be treated as anyone’s property or only as subjects of welfare policies. On
the other hand, paternalism remained the dominant attitude towards children in law. While
they were seen as human rights holders, children were predominantly conceptualised under
the Durkheim’s paradigm of ‘law of growth’.
163Bishop, Ibid, 175.
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Many of the changes in international human rights law during the 20th century did not change
the image of children. To a large extent, children did not enjoy the liberation process that
other oppressed groups enjoyed. International law continued to perceive ‘the child’ as
vulnerable, weak and lacking the capacities' of a persons, focusing on ensuring children’s
process of growth and protecting them from threatening elements that might jeopardise their
transformation into independent adults. The child’s traditional ‘development’ was a source
for concern and, therefore, a source for legal protection. The approaches of the liberationists,
as well as of Key or Korczak, were either actively rejected by the mainstream establishment
or forgotten. International law’s approach adopted ‘development’ as its underlying narrative,
focusing on the mission of ‘saving the children’.
However, while ‘development’ came to be a key concept, it gained no thorough analysis.
Law presumably protected many components of ‘development’, but it was difficult to sketch
a coherent picture of what it really meant. For example, what does ‘normal development,’ to
use the words of the Geneva Declaration, mean? Who defines what ‘normal’ is? How does it
differ, if at all, from the different terms used by the 1959 Declaration? Even if accepting the
presumption that developmental psychology prevails and law ought to adopt this perspective
on human life, we should ask which stream of psychology has international law adopted, or
which ought it adopt, and why? Needless to say, asmany other disciplines, developmental
psychology is neither homogeneous nor neutral and unbiased.164 These questions have
significance only if one doubts the premise that children’s main remedy is to grow up.
In 1976, the UN General Assembly celebrated the 20th anniversary of the UN Declaration of
the Rights of the Child by declaring 1979 to be the ‘International Year of the Child’.165 A
‘deep concern’ that ‘in spite all efforts, far too many children, especially in developing
countries, are undernourished, are without access to adequate health services, are missing the
basic educational preparation for their future and are deprived of the elementary amenities of
life’,166was one of the reasons for this decision. The government of Poland introduced a draft
for a binding convention concerning children’s rights, based on the 1959 Declaration.167 In
1989, ten years after the ‘Year of the Child’ and after countless debates, this draft became the
164For example, see Carol Gilligan’s most influential critique of the gender biased of developmental
psychology. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1982). See also Sara
Karkness, ‘The Cultural Context of Child Development’ (1980) 8 New Directions of Child Development 7.
165General Assembly Resolution 31/169, adopted on 21 December 1976.
166Ibid.
167Letter from the Permanent representative of Poland to the United Nations Office at Geneva E/CN.4/1284 (18
January 1978).
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UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Polish draft for a Convention on the Rights of
the Child continued this narrative. This draft was no different in its intentions and held the
same vague conceptions of children and development. In the next chapter I review the draft
and the entire drafting process of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. I focus on
the drafters’ perception of children’s development and the course of actions that led to
inclusion of a right to development in the Convention.
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Chapter Two: Creating the Right To Development Of Children
‘The protection of the child should be one of the prime objectives of a
social and economical development strategy. The creation of a social
climate favourable to the child would perhaps eliminate some of the
problems, which were obstacles to the right to development… The
privileged children had a right to leisure and to the full development of their
personality, and to be protected against violence, cruelty, exploitation,
drugs and the slave trade, while the underprivileged children of developing
societies had the right to life, to their daily bread, to shelter and to
protection against underdevelopment. Only through international solidarity
could children be properly protected.’ (Sheikh Fadli, commenting on the
first draft of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1978)1
'[T]he physical and mental nature of the child is identical everywhere… the
process of growth and adolescence takes a similar course in all children.
Their physical and mental needs are also similar.' (Adam Lopatka,
Chairperson of the Working Group on a Draft Convention on the Rights of
the Child, 1992)2
Introduction
This chapter studiesthe process of creating the child’s right to development under the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child (‘UNCRC’ or ‘The Convention’),3 and the broad
protection for children’s development that the Convention provides. The chapter aims to
explore the potential meanings of the child’s right to development, which can be concluded
from the Convention’s drafting process.
The UNCRC is the first, and currently the only, binding international law instrument that
protects the right to development. Article 6(2) of the Convention reads:
‘States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and
development of the child’
1 UNHCR, ‘Summary Record of the 1471st Meeting’ (13 March 1978) UN Doc E/CN.4/SR.1471, 11.
2Adam Lopatka, 'The Rights of the Child are Universal: The Perspective of the UN Convention on the Rights of
the Child' in Michael Freeman and Phillip Veerman (eds) The Ideologies of Children's Rights (Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, Dordrecht 1992) 47-52, 49.
3 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 44/25 of 20
November 1989, entered into force on 2 September 1990).
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Five additional articles - Article 18(1), Article 23(3), Article 27(1), Article 29(1)(a) and
Article 32(1) - protect eight differentcomponents of ‘development’, namely physical, mental,
moral, social, cultural, spiritual, personality and talent.
This chapter studies the process of incorporating this extensive protection of children’s
development into the Convention and asks when, why and how the concept of ‘development’
became an issue of concern for human rights law and a fundamental principle of the
Convention. Taking the assumptions that different conceptions of childhoods lead to different
interpretations of children’s rights, the chapter analyses the drafters’ conception of childhood
and asks how it contributes to the understanding of what children’s right to development can
mean. This course of analysis does not aspire to flush out the ‘true’ intentions of the drafters
or the ‘true’ meaning of the right under the Convention,4 not least because I do not argue that
there is a singular ‘true’ meaning.
The previous chapter has established that one of the main aims of international children’s
rights law, and of legal theories concerning children’s rights in general, it to protect
children’s development. This chapter continues the historical review of the child’s right to
development and picks up from the point where the previous chapter has ended. The point of
departure for this chapter is the first draft of the Convention, which was presented by Poland
in 1978. The chapter then follows the entire drafting process of the Convention, and ends
with the final text of the Convention, as adopted by the UN General Assembly on 20th
November 1989. The drafting process is presented chronologically in order to facilitate an
understanding of the processes and progresses made during the creation of the Convention in
general, and of the right to development in particular. Analysing the drafting process
chronologically paints a complex picture, and enables to understand the motivations that led
to the creation of this particular right in a specific point in time, as opposed to studying each
right in isolation, detached from any historical or other context.
I take this line of analysis for two main reasons. First, as I argued in chapter one, the
perception of children as developing human beings and the comprehensive protection for
their development were key components of international children’s rights law before the
creation of the Convention. Therefore, I assume that the Convention’s drafters not only
shared the conviction for the need to protect children’s development, but that they also
4 See Ronald Dworkin, ‘Law as Interpretation’ (1982) 9 Critical Inquiry 179, 196-199; Stanley Fish, ‘Working
on the Chain Gang: Interpretation on the Law and in Literary Criticism’ (1982) 9 Critical Inquiry 201. See also
Dennis Patterson, Law and Truth (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1996) 71-127.
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understood the practical implicationsof transforming this idea into a human right. The right to
development is presumed to have been included in the Convention for a good reason,
although it is neither explicitly protected in any of the previous international declarations on
children’s rights nor in any ‘general’ human rights treaties. Therefore, the travaux
préparatoires should shed light on the drafters’ intentions and their understanding of the right,
and can serve as a valuable source in assessing the scope and practicality of this right.
The second reason is derived from the law of treaty interpretation. The Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties5 is the positive source for justifying analysis of the travaux préparatoires.
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention declares that treaties should be ‘interpreted in good faith
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the term of the treaty in the context
and in the light of its object and purpose’.6 The Vienna Convention also mandates that ‘a
special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended’.7
According to Article 32, other sources such as ‘preparatory work of the treaty’ can be used in
the interpretation process, together with the text of the treaty itself. Moreover, even before the
adoption of the Vienna Convention, travaux préparatoires was a valid source for
interpretation, though there was no rule-of-thumb concerning the validity of referring to the
preparatory work.8
The travaux préparatoires includes, according to Lord McNair, a former judge of the
International Court of Justice, ‘all the documents, such as memoranda, minutes of
conferences and drafts of the treaty under negotiation’.9 This is not a definitive list. First, it is
hard to determine the scale of these documents; and second, while McNair’s definition
emphasizes the information that is available on record, some diplomatic negotiations
5 Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties (Done at Vienna on 23 May 1969, Entered into Force on 27
January 1980). United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1155, 331.
6 Article 31(1). See Francis G. Jacobs, 'Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation: With Special Reference
to the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties before the Vienna Diplomatic Conference' (1969) 18
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 318, 343.
7Article 31(4).
8 Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1961) 411. Martin Riss, ‘Treat
Interpretation and ICJ Recourse to Travaux Préparatories: Towards a Proposal Amendment of Articles 31 and
32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’ (1991) 14 Boston College International & Comparative
Law Review 111, 116. See also Richard A. Falk, ‘On Treaty Interpretation and the New Heaven Approach:
Achievements and Prospects’ (1967-1968) 8 Virginia Journal of International Law 323; For a critique on these
approaches see Ian Johnstone, ‘Treaty Interpretation: The Authority of Interpretive Community’ (1990-1991) 12
Michigan Journal of International Law 371.
9 As quoted by Riss, ibid, 112.
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concerning an international treaty also being done orally,10 and therefore are not part of the
formal documentation of the negotiations.
This chapter is based on materials available at the UN Archive in Geneva, including the
original draft of the Convention; summary of the Open-Ended Working Group’s (the forum
composed of diplomats and professionals from Non Governmental Organisations(NGO’s)
and UN agencies that drafted the Convention) meetings; and various memoranda and
suggestions that were submitted to the Working Group before, during and after each drafting
session, by UN agencies and NGO’s. The chapter systematically analyses all of the Open-
Ended Working Group’s report. However, as lengthy as the reports are, and some of them are
hundreds of pages long, they nevertheless are summaries, and not protocols, of the Open-
Ended Working Group’s meetings. Thus, they provide only a selective account of the debates
and the information and conclusions that can be drawn from them are necessarily limited.
If the interpretation method in this chapter needs to be classified, it most closely follows the
Teleogical School, since it will give effect to the ‘object and purpose of a treaty’.11 This
approach refers to both the text and the intentions of the drafters. Subsequently, this chapter
refers to the drafting process of Article 6, as well as the other articles in the Convention that
refer to children’s development.
The primary finding of this chapter is that the drafting process included very few substantive
discussions on either the right to development or the perception of children as developing
human beings. Although both terms (mainly ‘development’ and to lesser degree ‘the right to
development’) were used consistently throughout the process, their meanings were rarely
discussed. Though the drafters often mentioned the need to protect children’s development,
they did not elaborate on the content of this suggestion, choosing instead to focus on ancillary
questions such as the cost of ‘development’, or the division of responsibilities between
parents and the state in relation to children’s development.
I argue that the main reason for this gap is the drafters’ perceptions of children as future
adults, and the desire to provide legal protection to this hypothetical future. I further argue
that despite the lack of attention given to ‘the right to development’ during the drafting
process, it is possible to unlock the potential of Article 6 and to draw conclusions about the
potential meanings of the right to development.
10 Riss, supra n. 8, 112.
11Ibid, 115 and references there.
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‘We Should Have a Convention on the Rights of the Child’ - The First Draft of the
Convention
In 1976, the UN General Assembly decided to commemorate the 30 year anniversary of the
1959 UN Declaration on the Rights of the Child by declaring 1979 the ‘International Year of
the Child.12 The Government of Poland believed that this was the right time to advance the
idea of adopting a convention on children’s rights. On 17 January 1978, Ambassador
Eugeniuz Wyzner of Poland submitted to the UN Commission on Human Rights a draft for a
Convention on the Rights of the Child, asking that the draft be brought before the
Commission during its 34th session.13Eleven years later, in 20 November 1989, the General
Assembly adopted the Convention.
The draft was based on the 1959 Declaration of the Rights of the Child and included twenty-
eight articles. The first ten articles were dedicated to substantive rights of children, while the
remaining eighteen articles referred to procedural and technical aspects of an international
treaty. Poland also submitted an Explanatory Memorandum elucidating its motivations for
introducing the Convention,14arguing that the 1959 Declaration ‘played a significant part in
the assistance, care and the rights of children’ around the world, including ‘shaping various
forms of the international co-operation in this sphere’. Poland further argued that the care for
children and their rights should not lag behind ‘the collaboration of the international legal
order in other spheres’. Therefore, adopting such a convention would be the appropriate way
to celebrate the coming international year of the child.15
The ‘question on a Convention on the Rights of the Child’ was item number 22 on the
Commission on Human Rights’ agenda on 13 February 1978.16 Mr. Keba M’Baye, then the
Chairperson of the Human Rights Commission, will later play a key role in creating the right
to development in ‘general’ international law.17The Commission held a short discussion
about Poland’s suggestion and decided to ask the Economic and Social Council to proceed
with the process of adopting the suggested convention.18
12 General Assembly Resolution 31/169, ‘International Year of the Child’ adopted on 21 December 1976.
13 UN Economic and Social Council (18 January 1978) UN Doc E/CN.4/1284.
14UNHCHR, Legislative History of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Volume I (New York and Geneva
2007) 31.
15Ibid.
16 UNHCR, ‘Summary Record of the 1438th Meeting’ (15 February 1978) UN Doc E/CN.4/SR.1438.
17 See chapter five.
18 UNHCR, ‘Question of a Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (7 February 1978) UN Docs E/CN.4/L.1366.
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The Economic and Social Council accepted the Commission’s recommendation,19 and asked
the General Assembly to consider adopting a convention on the rights of the child.20 One of
the reasons for this decision was the Commission’s awareness of the ‘special need to assist
children in the developing countries in a manner consistent with the goals of the new
international economic order’.21 This comment is one of the few comments made during the
entire drafting process of the Convention that suggests some kind of awareness to
developmental policies that tackle poverty and other economic disadvantages. Nevertheless,
this comment refers to the public policy idea of ‘development’, and not to the right to
development. The differences between these concepts are discussed in chapter five.
This decision of the Economic and Social Council marks the beginning of the Convention’s
drafting process. Following this decision, a group of twenty one NGO’s submitted a long list
of concerns about the proposed Convention. Although in principle the group welcomed the
new convention, it asked to postpone its adoption until further studies concerning the
implementation of the 1959 Declaration, due in 1980, had been completed.22 Following these
requests, as well as some more comments, Poland submitted a revised draft of the
Convention, which included changes only in relation to technical issues.23
In 7 March 1978, the UN Commission on Human Rights held another meeting on the topic.24
Most of the discussion was dedicated to the question of timing rather than content, and
arguments were made for and against adopting the convention in 1979. Very few speakers
referred to the human rights mentioned in the draft. Nevertheless, one very important
comment was made by the representative of Syria, Sheikh Fadli:
‘The protection of the child should be one of the prime objectives of a
social and economical development strategy. The creation of a social
climate favourable to the child would perhaps eliminate some of the
problems which were obstacles to the right to development… The
privileged children had a right to leisure and to the full development of their
personality, and to be protected against violence, cruelty, exploitation,
drugs and the slave trade, while the underprivileged children of developing
societies had the right to life, to their daily bread, to shelter and to
19Ibid.
20 UNHCR, ‘Question on a Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (6 February – 10 March 1978) UN Doc
E/1978/34/E/CN.4/1292, p. 4.
21Ibid.
22 UN Economic and Social Council, ‘Question of A Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (23 February
1978), UN Doc E/CN.4/NGO/225.
23 UNHCR, ‘Question on a Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (6 February – 10 March 1978), supra n. 20.
24 UNHCR, ‘Summary Record of the 1471st Meeting’, supra n. 1. The discussion concerning the convention on
the rights of the child is taken from agenda item 22, supra n. 22.
67
protection against underdevelopment. Only through international solidarity
could children be properly protected.’25
This is the first and nearly the last instance where any of the drafters used the term ‘right to
development’. In this comment, Fadli portrayed a relatively clear vision concerning the
Convention’s aims and the unique role that the right to development should have in relation
to these aims. Fadli highlighted the differences in life experiences between children of
different societies and consequently, the differences in their statuses of development. Fadli
saw the opportunity for the Convention to create an international framework for cooperation,
which could be used to change this unequal reality. Unlike most of the comments concerning
development made thus far in the process of creating international children’s rights law (in
relation to the 1959 Declaration, for example), as well as those that would be made later,
Fadli did not focus on psychological development, nor did he only refer to an individual
child’s process of development, but rather addressed the social and economic conditions that
to a large extent dictate children’s daily life. Linking two dimensions of development – the
individual and the social – Fadli argued that the latter influences the former and creates the
necessary conditions for it to occur. This comment did not get the attention it deserves, and
from this point on, psycho-social development underpinned the drafters’ perception of
children’s development.
Another round of comments was held in December 1978.26 Some commentators addressed
the issue of ‘development’, but none made any substantive comment about it. Bulgaria, for
example, argued that some of the principles embodied in the 1959 Declaration were not
implemented, including the principle that related to child labour, ‘which are injurious to the
health of children and prevent their proper development’.27 France made a comment on
Article 7 of the draft, which protected the child’s rights to education and leisure time.
According to France, the draft should be amended in a way that does not limit the protection
given to children’s play time, because ‘while educational games are to be encouraged’ the
French delegate argued, ‘they should not be the only ones the child can play. For his full
25 UNHCR, Summary Record of the 1471st Meeting, supra n. 1.
26 UNHCR, ‘Question of a Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (1 February 1979) UN Doc
E/CN.4/1324/Add. 1.
27Ibid, 5.
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development, he [the child] also needs to involve himself in activities which are not
necessarily part of a specific educational system’.28
A number of non-governmental organizations and UN agencies made some more useful
comments.29 The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) claimed that the draft did not ‘accord sufficient importance to the right of the
child to cultural development’, and therefore recommended that the convention include
broader protection of the rights to education and cultural identity. These rights, UNESCO
argued, should include, inter alia, the right of the child to be educated in respect to human
rights and providing adults with children’s rights training.30 The World Health Organization
(WHO) expressed concern about the level of protection provided to children’s well-being,
arguing that despite the binding nature of the Convention, the current draft might weaken the
protection given to children’s rights by the 1959 Declaration. To overcome this fault, the
WHO asked to add an explicit and detailed provision concerning the ‘obligations of parents,
both as individuals and as couples, of the family and the society, particularly in relation to the
protection of the child growth and development in its threefold dimensions: physical, mental
and emotional.’31 The International Association of Youth Magistrates endorsed the draft for
the ‘well-formulated catalogue of minimum conditions for the mental, physical and
educational well-being of the child’.32
These comments mix terms, such as ‘development’ and ‘well-being’, without differentiating
between them or between different features of development. Consequently, no coherent
conception of what children’s ‘development’ might mean can be drawn from these
comments. ‘Development’ was addressed in relation to different articles and rights of the
Convention, but not as a human right in and of itself. Nevertheless, wide support for the idea
of adopting a Convention on the Rights of the Child led to the establishment of an Open-
Ended Working Group, which was given the task of drafting the convention. The Working
Group held its first meeting in February and March 1979.
28Ibid, 7-8.
29General comments by specialized agencies on the first Polish draft – annexed to Commission on Human
Rights resolution 20 (XXXIV) of 8 March 1978 (27 December 1978) UN Doc E/CN.4/1324.
30Legislative history, supra n. 14, 64.
31Ibid, 64-65.
32Ibid, 65.
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1979 Round of Discussions33
This preliminary round of discussions was primarily dedicated to general discussions about
the Convention, and less about the specific articles it includes. Nonetheless, the care for
‘children’s development’ was raised few times, indicating just how significant this issue is
going to be.
Several delegates stated that attention should be given to ‘the status of children in developing
countries suffering from malnutrition, hunger or poverty’.34 Similar concerns were mentioned
throughout the entire drafting process, and were often linked to the status of children’s
development. In similarity to the 1924 Declaration, the proposition was that malnutrition,
hunger and poverty were three conditions that not only jeopardized children’s lives, but also
had an impact on children’s future.
In October 1979, following the comments made during the discussions, Poland submitted a
third revised draft of the Convention. In this draft, children’s development was referred to in
different ways under six articles (Articles 3, 9, 13, 15, 17 and 19). The article reads:
Article 3(2)
‘The States Parties to the present Convention undertake to ensure the child
such protection and care as his status requires, taking due account of the
various stages of his development in family environment and in social
relations, and, to this end, shall take necessary legislative measures.’
Article 9
‘Parents, guardians, State organs and social organizations shall protect the
child against any harmful influence that mass media, and in particular the
radio, film, television, printed materials and exhibitions, on account of their
contents, may exert on his mental and moral development.’
Article 13(1)
‘It is recognized that the child shall be entitled to benefit from the highest
attainable standard of health care for his physical, mental and moral
development, and also, in the case of need, from medical and rehabilitation
facilities’.
33 UNHCR, ‘Report of the Open-Ended Working Group on a Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (12
March 1979) UN Doc E/CN.4/L.1468.
34Ibid, 2.
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Article 15
‘1. The States Parties to the present Convention recognize the right of every
child to a standard of living adequate for his healthy and normal physical,
mental and moral development in every phase of the child’s development.
2. The parents shall, within their financial possibilities and powers, secure
conditions of living necessary for a normal growth of the child….’
Article 17(1)
‘The States Parties to the present Convention recognize that the bringing up
and education of the child should promote the full development of his
personality, his respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.’
Article 19(2)
‘The States Parties to the present Convention recognize that the child shall
not be employed in any form of work harmful to his health or his moral
development, or in work dangerous to his life or which would interfere with
his normal growth…’35
These Articles indicate the drafters’ approach toward children’s life, development and human
rights. One Article considers the child’s stage of development while in care. Other two
Articles seek to ensure that an adequate standard of living will be provided to children, and
dictate that the aim of education is to promote the full development of the child’s personality.
Two of the Articles are concerned with the child’s ‘normal growth’. Three aspects of
development are mentioned: mental, moral and physical development. In addition, two
qualitative processes of development are mentioned: healthy and non-healthy ones.
The terms ‘development’ and ‘normal growth’ are used alternately without distinguishing
between them. Presumably, both terms are used to describe the same utopian future that the
drafters sought to create for children. The Articles signify a clear aim for the Convention to
take the child’s future as an achievable and desirable goal explicitly referring to specific
domain of development. However, reading these Articles together does not give a sense of
what such a future should look like, on top of transforming the child into an adult. This
perspective about childhood and the aim of the Convention did not change throughout the
drafting process, and this vagueness was not ever fully refined.
35 All emphasis added.
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From this point in time and until the drafting process ended, the Open-Ended Working Group
held annual sessions. In every session the Working Group debated various versions of each
right and each article, and at the end, the group’s Chairperson published an official report that
summarising the session.
1980 Round of Discussions36
The third Polish draft was at the centre of this round of discussions. The debates evolved
around the questions of defining the ‘child’, the references ought to be given to the 1924 and
1959 Declarations in the Convention’s preamble, parental responsibilities and the right of the
child to a name. Questions related to children’s development were not raised in this round of
discussions, and a right to development was not mentioned either.
1981 Round of Discussions37
The Working Group dedicated this session to a comprehensive review of the Convention’s
draft. Though all of the rights included in the draft were mentioned by name, in similarity to
the previous round of discussions, children’s development was not singled out as an issue
worth debating. The Working Group’s silence on this issue could be a result of many factors,
ranging from lack of time, to more substantive reasons, such as lack of interest. Therefore, I
am cautious in drawing any conclusions at this stage.
1982 Round of Discussions38
This session was dedicated to discussing Articles 6, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the Convention’s
draft, which protect the right to parental care and family environment, the right of children
who seek refuges status or were recognised as refugees, and the rights of children with
disabilities. In addition, discussions were held with regard to some new Articles that were
36 UNHCR, ‘Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (10 March 1980)
UN Doc E/CN.4/L.1542.
37UNHCR, ‘Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (17 February 1981)
UN Doc E/CN.4/L.1975.
38Legislative history,supra n. 14, 94. UNHCR, ‘Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention on the
Rights of the Child’ (8 March 1982) UN Doc E/CN.4/1982/30/Add. 1.
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suggested. These Articles protect the child’s right to freedom of movement, right to privacy,
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and the right to freedom from abuse.39
The debate of Article 9 (right to information) marked the first substantive discussion on
‘children’s development’. A few delegates expressed concern that ‘too much’ information
might jeopardise children’s naivé and, therefore, ‘States Parties to the Convention should
have the obligation to protect children against any harmful influence that the contents of mass
media may expert on their mental and moral development’.40 The Holy See shared these
concerns but also suggested adding ‘spiritual and social development’ to this list of
developmental domains that might be in danger.41
In these comments, the drafters took for granted the alleged perils of mass media and echoed
a common social panic of the time that a ‘flood’ of information could bring ‘childhood’ to an
end.42In other words,that some kind of information could jeopardise the ‘development’ of the
child and thus bring to an end a specific image of childhood.
The discussion about Article 10 and the right of children with disabilities was informed by
the apprehension for the future of these children. For example, the Canadian delegate, with
the support of Australia, asked to include in the Convention a right to ‘special protection and
care’ that ‘will ensure him [the child] the right to enjoy a decent life, as normal and full as
possible…’. The Canadian delegate further suggested including protection for the right of
disabled children to employment, which would be ‘designed to achieve the child’s fullest
possible social integration’.43 Such a comment acclaims the need to protect children’s future
(‘decent life’) and make an effort to design this future according to one moral standard -
‘normal’ and ‘full’.
39Ibid, 71-72.
40Ibid, 57. Emphasis added.
41Ibid, 58.
42Neil Postman warned that exposing children to the mass media and to floods of information would bring
childhood to an end. Neil Postman, The Disappearance of Childhood (Vintage Books, New York 1984).
43UNHCR, ‘Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (8 March 1982),
supra n. 38, 69-70.
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1983 Round of Discussions44
The 1983 session focused on the rights of children separated from their parents (Article 6),
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 7), and the rights of children
with disabilities (Article 12).
Only the debate concerning Article 12 and the rights of children with disabilities raised the
issue of child’s development. The travaux préparatoires tells us that ‘several delegates
supported the view that wherever assistance is extended to a disabled child, it should be
provided in a manner most conducive to that child’s social integration and individual
development’.45 Canada was very active in this debate, suggesting the addition of another
clause concerning the services that children with disabilities should be entitled to:
‘…3. Assistance extended shall be designed to ensure that the disabled
child has access to and receives education, training, health care services,
rehabilitation services, and preparation for employment, and enjoys
recreation opportunities, in conditions most conducive to the child’s fullest
possible social integration and individual development’.
‘4. The disabled child’s special education needs and rehabilitation needs
shall be provided in a manner most consistent with realizing the child’s
fullest potential …’.46
In congruence with previous suggestions, these clauses also used the terms ‘development’
and ‘fullest potential’ alternatively, this time perceiving them as the aims of ensuring the
disable child’s rights.
Australia submitted a similar amendment, which included a commitment to achieve the
‘fullest possible social integration’ to children with disabilities, but it omitted the
commitment to the child’s individual development.47 The discussion on these suggestions
resulted in ‘no agreement’ with regard to ‘the insertion of such a clause’.48
Later in the meeting, Canada revised its amendment. The new version included protection for
more aspects of child’s development, so these children will be able to achieve ‘the fullest
44 UNHCR, ‘Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (25 March 1983)
UN Doc E/CN.4/1983/62.
45Ibid, 14.
46Ibid, 15. Emphasis added.
47Ibid.
48Ibid, 14.
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possible social integration and individual, cultural and spiritual development’.49 This
proposition added support for the child’s ‘cultural and spiritual’ development on top of the
promise for ‘individual’ development. However, why there was a need to emphasis these two
components in particular over other potential developmental components. The travaux
préparatoires does not shed light on this question.
After further discussion, an agreement for the text of article 12(3) was reached. The agreed
version aimed to facilitate services that would be designed to enable the disabled child to
achieve ‘the fullest possible social integration and individual development, including his
cultural and spiritual development’.50
This version still suffered from the same ambiguity as the previous versions. It combined the
child’s potential and two developmental aspects intrinsic to the child, with social integration
as an external dimension. It linked cultural and spiritual development as necessary
ingredients to social integration and individual development, but it did not adequately clarify
why or how this might happen. Nor did this version clarify the relationship between child’s
development and supporting the realisation of the child’s fullest potential.
1984 Round of Discussions51
This round of discussions focused on right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion
(Article 7(bis)), the right to be protected from abuse (Article 8(bis)), the right to freedom of
information (Article 9), and the right to social security (Article 13).
In similarity to previous rounds, Article 9 and the right to freedom of information stimulated
a heated debate in general and regarding its potential impact on ‘development’ in particular.
Poland suggested amending article 9 to include the following protection:
‘…The States Parties shall also encourage parents and guardians to provide
their children with appropriate protection if, on account of its contents, the
disseminated information might negatively affect the physical and moral
development of the child’.52
49Ibid, 16. Emphasis added.
50Ibid, 17. Emphasis added.
51 UNHCR, ‘Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (23 February
1984) UN Doc E/CN.4/1984/71.
52Ibid, 11. Emphasis added.
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Thissuggestion generated a debateabout media regulation, flow of information within state’s
borders and between states and state’s intervention in disseminating content. However, no
comments were made regarding the underlying assumption that some type of information
could have a negative impact on the child’s physical and moral development. Consequently,
no discussion was held regarding the phrases ‘physical and moral development’.
Two revised versions of Article 9 were then submitted, one by an ad-hoc informal drafting
group and the second by Ukrainian SSR. Child’s development was omitted from both
versions. The ad-hoc group’s version replaced the care for ‘development’ with care for the
child’s ‘social, spiritual and moral well-being and physical and mental health’,53 while the
Ukrainian SSR’s version asked to promote ‘the health and welfare of the child, his social and
cultural upbringing’.54 In addition, this version asked to protect the child ‘from material
injuries to his physical or mental health or to his social, spiritual or moral well-being’.55
These two versions demonstrate once again the lack of distinction between ‘development’,
‘well-being’, and ‘upbringing’. There are three possible explanations for the use of these
terms: The first is lack of difference between them; the second is lack of attention to these
differences; and the third is a situation where these four terms have different meanings, and a
conscious choice has been made to use them alternately. However, since no explanation was
given concerning this choice of words, the last option seems most unlikely. Nonetheless,
what can be inferred is the common desire of all drafters to protect the course of children’s
growth and ensure some sort of an imaginary optimum result.
More discussions followed, and the USA and Ukrainian SSR jointly suggested a new version
for this article. It read:
‘The States Parties recognize the important function performed by the mass
media and shall ensure that the child has access to information and material
from a diversity of international and national sources, including those
aimed at the promoting of his social, spiritual and moral well—being and
physical and mental health…’.56
None of the comments that followed, except for one made by the UK, were related to
development, to children’s well-being or to children’s upbringing. The UK referred to the
53Ibid, 12. Emphasis added.
54Ibid. Emphasis added.
55Ibid, 13. Emphasis added.
56Ibid, 14. Emphasis added.
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distinction between well-being, and upbringing, arguing that ‘anything injurious to a child's
physical and mental health would be injurious to his well-being also.’57Thus, the UK
argument presented a pyramid, where mental health and physical health are the foundations,
while well-being is placed on top of the pyramid. This structure identifies ‘well-being’ as the
ultimate object of protection of this Article.
While the pyramid analogy sheds some light on the drafters’ understanding of these terms, it
does not sufficiently clarify whether ‘well-being’ is identical or similar in any way to
‘development’, or whether ‘good health’ lays the foundation for the process of achieving
good ‘well-being’.
1985 Round of Discussions58
The 1985 round of discussions saw extensive and lengthy discussions about children’s
development. The Working Group discussed children’s right to health (Article 12), right to an
adequate standard of living (Article 14), right to education (Article 15), the aims of education
(Article 16), and the right to rest and leisure (Article 17).
Article 12 addresses the right to health of children. In the first drafts that were debated, the
Article did not mention ‘development’ as an aim for ensuring children’s health. However,
after long discussions that touched upon questions of health care funding and how accessible
health services should be for children, an NGO Ad-Hoc working group suggested adding an
additional paragraph:
‘The States Parties to the present Convention shall undertake to protect
children from any medical investigation or treatment detrimental to their
physical or psychological health and development, and to take all
appropriate and necessary measures to prevent children being subject to
traditional practices harmful to their health’59
This terminology suggests a desire to protect children’s ‘physical or psychological’
development from ‘medical investigation or treatment’ that might put them at risk. Unlike
other clauses, this clause does not provide for active promotion of development, but rather,
establishes negative protection against actions that might put the child’s ‘physical or
57Ibid, 16.
58 UNHCR, ‘Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (11 March 1985)
UN Doc E/CN.4/1985/L.1.
59Ibid, 8. Emphasis added.
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psychological health and development’ at risk. The Article does not link development and the
general right to health, and is confined to a narrow aspect of health.
The second half of the paragraph mentions traditional practices and takes them to be harmful
to children’s health, but it does not link these practices to children’s development. Such a link
would be made later in the drafting process. The discussion that followed this suggestion did
not touch upon any of these concerns, nor did it mention ‘development’.
The debates about Article 14 and the right to an adequate standard of living are of great
importance. The discussions were based on a text proposed by the NGO Ad-Hoc group,
which reads as follows:
‘The States Parties to the present Convention recognize the right of every
child to a standard of living adequate to guarantee the child’s physical,
mental, moral and social development. The parent(s) or those responsible
for the child have the primary responsibility to secure, within their financial
possibilities and powers, the conditions of living necessary for the healthy
development of the child. …’60
There are different ways to read this article. It can be read to protect two standards of living,
rather than only one. The first standard is protected by a general right to an adequate standard
of living, which guarantees the first four elements of the child’s development. The second
standard ought to ensure a fifth element of development, the ‘healthy’ development of the
child, which is the sole responsibility of parent(s) to ensure. There is also the possibility that
the drafter did not think of these as two different standards, and took ‘healthy’ development
to have the same meaning as ‘physical, mental, moral and social’ development. Another
possible explanation for this division is not the difference between the meaning of these
developmental domains, but rather the desire to differentiate between the obligations of states
and of parent(s). If this later possibility is the case, it seems that less attention was given to
the content of the obligation vis-à-vis the child’s development, compared to the different
levels of obligations imposed on states and parents.
Despite the fact that the drafters had a relatively lengthy discussion on this right, the travaux
préparatoires does not shed much light on these questions. Only the Holy See referred to the
question of development, when it asked to add ‘spiritual’ development to the list of
60Ibid. Emphasis added.
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developmental components that should be protected by the child’s standard of living.61 This
suggestion was rejected.62
The wording of this clause tells us that the list of children’s developmental domains is not a
closed list, but depends on one’s perception of ‘the child’ and of ‘development’. But since the
drafters ignored these questions, no definitive answers can be deduced.
The discussions on the right to education and on the aims of education (Articles 15 and 16 of
the draft, respectively) generated some debates about the issue of children’s development as
well. According to Article 15,63ensuring the child’s right to education is needed in order to
promote the child’s ‘talents and abilities to their fullest potential, and to prepare the child for
future life’.64 This clause does not address an abstract process or any components of
development, but rather focuses on two specific dimensions of the process of growing up:
talent and abilities. The Article articulates a forward looking aim of education, which is
designed to generate the creation of maximum talent for each individual chid. The drafters
further debated the issues of the cost of education, whether children should be entitled to free
education and if so, for what period of time, and whether state’s financial resources should be
taken into account in either formulating their obligations or in implementing them. Other
discussions touched upon the issues of rights and duties of parents to ensure their children’s
education, and the duties of international cooperation with respect to education.65
The aims of education were discussed in relation to Article 16. The Working Group debated
five versions of Article 16, two of which refer to children’s development. The first was the
Canadian version that defined the aim of education to ‘promote the development of the
child’s personality, talents and abilities to their fullest potential…’.66 The second version,
introduced by the Baha’i International Community, includes much broader objectives for
education:
‘in addition to academic education, the child shall be entitled to receive
guidance, training and education designed to promote his social, spiritual
and moral development and well-being. The fundamental objectives of such
guidance, training and education shall be (a) to promote the harmonious
61Ibid, 9.
62Ibid.
63 ‘The States Parties to the present Convention shall guarantee to every child compulsory and cost-free
education, at least at elementary school level, designed to assist the child to develop his or her talent and
abilities to their fullest potential, and to prepare the child for future life….’. Ibid, 11.
64Ibid.
65Ibid, 11-15.
66Ibid, 16.
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development of the personality of the child and the realization of his full
potential…’.67
While the Canadian version used familiar terms such as ‘talent’ and ‘fullest potential’, the
Baha’i’s version introduced several new ideas and terms. It took development and well-being
as two complementary but nevertheless distinct terms. This version preferred to have the
child’s ‘harmonious development’ promoted instead of promoting fractions of ‘development’.
It also aimed to create the conditions necessary to ensure the ‘full potential’ of the child.
Unfortunately, the drafters were not impressed by the innovative nature of this suggestion and
at the discussions that followed did not address the issue of the child’s development at all.68
The end of this round of discussion left the term ‘children’s development’ in a familiar state
of conceptual ambiguity. The term ‘development’ was used by the drafters and different
components of development were mentioned. But the drafters did not discuss the meaning or
content of any of the terms, or explain their relevant, their connection or context. Even when
the potential link between ‘development’ and ‘well-being’ was suggested, no attention was
given to the meaning of such a link.
1986 Round of Discussions69
Almost a dozen rights were discussed during this session, including the right to non-
discrimination (Article 4(bis)), the right to leave the state (Article 6(bis)), the right to identity
(Article 9(bis)), the rights of children who were removed from their family environment
(Article 12(ter)), the educational and cultural rights of indigenous children (Article 16(bis)),
the right to be protected from economic exploitation (Article 18), measures needed to be
taken against usage of narcotic drugs (Article 18(bis)), the right to freedom of association and
assembly (Article 18(quarter)), rights of children in the criminal procedures (Article 19), the
rights of children in respect to international humanitarian law and during international armed
conflict (Article 20) and the relationship between children’s rights in domestic law and the
Convention (Article 21). Most of these clauses explicitly refer to children’s development, but
67Ibid.
68Ibid, 17-19.
69 UNHCR, ‘Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (13 March 1986)
UN Doc E/CN.4/1986/39.
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unlike the previous rounds, this time the Working Group did not address to the issue of
‘children’s development,’ with two exceptions.
The first relevant debate to the issue of child’s development took place as part of the
discussions on Article 18, which addressed the protection of children from economic
exploitation. Poland suggested a new text:
‘The child shall not be employed in any form of work harmful to the child’s
health or education or which will interfere with his physical, mental or
social development…’.70
The drafters held an intensive debate about this version of Article 18. However, despite the
alleged impact that any form of work might have on children’s development, the reasons for
such impacts were not discussed, let alone challenged. Only the Holy See referred to this
issue and, as usual, seized the opportunity to suggest including ‘spiritual’ development to the
list of developmental domains that might be put in dangerous due to economic exploitation.71
The next relevant discussion concerned Article 19, which protected the rights of children in
the criminal justice system. Different versions of this article were submitted to discussion,
and all were aimed at ensuring the child’s rehabilitation. All the different versions reflected
similar concerns regarding the impact that state’s custody can have on the child’s future.
However, despite the obvious connection between these concerns with various developmental
issues, including those already mentioned by the drafters, the different wording did not make
any such connection, or even mentioned children’s development as an object of concern.
Nonetheless, the versions that Canada and Poland presented mentioned children’s level of
development, as a factor that should be taken into account when realizing rehabilitation
programmes. The Polish text reads as follow:
‘…the child subject to penal procedures shall be treated in a manner
commensurate with his phase of development, with his reformation and
social rehabilitation in law’72
70Ibid, 13. Emphasis added.
71Ibid, 14.
72Ibid, 18.
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And the Canadian version reads:
‘State Parties to the present Convention recognize the right of children
accused or found guilty of infringing the penal law to be treated in a
manner… which takes into account their age and the desirability of
promoting their rehabilitation’73
These suggestions are the prototype for what would later become the principle of ‘evolving
capacities’ of children in the Convention. Despite its significance, the drafters dedicated only
a short discussion to them, with nothing substantial being said.
This round of lengthy discussion ended with ‘development’ on the margin of the debates. In
comparison to previous rounds, the discussions in this round were exceptionally dull.
‘Development’ was either not an important enough issue to warrant discussion, or the drafters
did not feel any need to address this issue. This ongoing disregarding from ‘development’
strengthens the conclusion that drafters shared the view that ‘development’ has a self-
explanatory meaning. The drafters did not think that there was a need to discuss the meaning
of ‘development’, and simultaneously, they all thought that there is a need to protect
‘development’. Thus far, no suggestion was made to refer to children’s development as an
issue of human rights.
1987 Round of Discussions74
During this session, a dozen rights and issues were discussed, including how to encourage
children to read books(Article 9), the rights of children in alternative care, protecting children
from harmful traditional practices(Article 12), the aims of education, the educational rights of
children belong to minorities or indigenous populations (Article 16), protecting children from
sexual exploitation(Article 16(ter)), prevention of sale or traffic of children(Article
18(quinto)), parental rights and responsibilities(Article 5(bis) and Article 14), the right to
freedom of expression and association (Article 7(ter)) and the right to privacy (Article 7(ter)).
The term ‘development’ was repeatedly mentioned, but was not considered to be an issue
deserving of attention or worth discussing. Nonetheless, some discussions do worth paying
attention to.
73Ibid, 19.
74 UNHCR, ‘Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (23 February
1987) UN Doc E/CN.4/1987/25.
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The debate about the need and the measures required protecting children from economic and
sexual exploitation continued in this session. France and The Netherlands suggested
including in the Convention an article that would protect children from ‘all forms of
exploitation, particularly sexual exploitation, as well as against all degrading treatment and
all acts prejudicial to the moral, spiritual, mental or physical integrity of the child.’75These
words are remarkably similar to the language usually used in relation to children’s
development, with one significant difference. In this version, the object of concern is not
children’s development itself, but rather children’s ‘moral, spiritual, mental or physical
integrity’. This is the first time that the term ‘integrity’ was used. Like ‘well-being’ or
‘growth’, it was used as a substitute for the term ‘development’. But this new term is as
ambiguous as the other terms, does not have a common meaning, nor does it provide a clearer
definition for ‘moral, spiritual, mental or physical’ development. It is also not sufficiently
clear what ideological baggage this term carries with it in relation to children’s life and
children’s rights: how did the drafters understand it and whether they were in fact aware of
any kind of different meaning that this term had compared to other terms? Once again, the
travaux préparatoires does not provide answers to these questions.
Some delegates highlighted this opacity. The representative of the UK, for example, argued
that this phrase was ‘too vague and more precise meaning would have to be given to [it]’.76
The representatives of the USA, Venezuela, France and the Netherlands (who introduced this
version) further claimed that this wording ‘had no substantive legal meaning in the United
States and several other legal systems, and therefore could not be enforced’.77 Eventually, the
Working Group decided to replace the term ‘integration’ with the term ‘welfare’. However,
this change had little impact, since it did not resolve the fundamental problems regarding the
meaning of this clause. ‘Welfare’, like ‘integration’, is at best a term calling for a definition
and is open to interpretation. Thus, unlike ‘integration’ or ‘well-being’, ‘welfare’ is a term
that has been long used in children’s law and promoting children’s welfare has been a long
time aim of children’s law. Nonetheless, welfare was rarely seen as a matter of human
rights.78
Another relevant discussion was held in relation to Article 5(bis), which deals with parental
rights and responsibilities. The drafters debated the following text:
75Ibid, 16.
76Ibid, 17.
77Ibid, 22-23.
78 See chapter one.
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‘…parents or legal guardians shall enjoy the primary rights and
responsibilities for the care, upbringing and development of the child,
having due regard for the importance of allowing the child to develop the
skills and knowledge required for an independent adulthood’.79
This text is one of the rare occasions where the drafters explicitly relate to the concept of
childhood as they understand it. According to the text, the child is destined to grow up into
‘an independent adulthood’ and others have the responsibilities to facilitate this course of
growth. The discussion that followed touched upon the narratives of children’s future,
children’s development and the perception of children as developing human beings.
Canada argued that its support for this provision depends on giving ‘due regard for the
evolving capacities of the child and for the child’s need to mature into an independent
adulthood’.80 This comment is important for two reasons. First, it includes an explicit
reference to a certain conception of childhood. Second, this comment presumes the evolving
capacities principle as an inherent characteristic of children. In different words, the sense of
development and changeare the profound characteristics of children. Taken together, the text
and the comments create a relatively coherent picture of the drafter’s conception of
childhood: it is a process of maturation. In the end, the debate resulted in no decision being
reached and the Working Group decided to postpone the conclusion to a later session.
The debate concerning Article 7(ter) and the right to freedom of expression, freedom of
association and right to privacy generated several additional comments concerning the
principle of evolving capacities. Reflecting its general stand during the Cold War era, the
United States submitted a text that included comprehensive definition and protection for these
rights.81 But nothing in the wording of that version either suggested that those rights should
be restricted according to the child’s stage of development, or aimed to facilitate the child’s
development. However, during ‘a lengthy discussion’,82 the question of children’s
development did arise. The representative of Australia was the first to ask why the provision
did not refer to ‘the evolving sense of responsibility of children’,83 and Sweden made a
similar claim, suggesting drafting ‘a separate article on the evolving capacities of the child’.84
79Ibid, 24.
80Ibid, 25.
81Ibid, 26.
82Ibid, 27.
83Ibid.
84Ibid.
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The representative of Norway supported the United States’ version, but expressed concerns
similar to those expressed by Australia, saying that there is ‘a need for a general provision
dealing with the evolving capacities of the child’.85 Canada and Argentina shared this view.
The USSR and China objected to inclusion of these rights, claiming that the focus on political
rights neglected other important interests of the child such as economic and social rights. The
representative of China also referred to the evolving capacities argument, saying that ‘the
freedom of association, peaceful assembly and privacy could not be enjoyed by children in
the same way as they are enjoyed by adults, because the intellect of a child was not as
developed as that of an adult, and therefore a child could only engage in activities
commensurate with its intellect’.86
The end of the 1987 round of discussions left the protection for children’s development at a
crossroads. On the one hand, protecting and promoting children’s development were taken as
the aims for many of the Convention’s rights. The idea of children as developing human
beings underpins the drafters’ idea of childhood in two different ways: Development was
either the expression of the process of growing up, or a point of reference in the form of ‘the
evolving capacities principle’. On the other hand, wide-ranging and alternative components
of ‘development’ were being discussed, but the meaning or meanings of them were not
addressed. A part of the failure to engage with the meaning of ‘development’ in itself was
due to the fact that it was mixed with other concepts such as ‘well-being’, ‘upbringing’ and
‘integrity’. But, since the drafters clarified none of these terms either, their potential
connection to ‘development’ (similarity, completion of meanings, being a synonym, distinct
meaning all together) was ignored as well.
After this round of discussions ended, the preparation for the next round began. At this stage,
India submitted the following proposal for Article 1 bis (or 2 bis):
‘The States Parties to the present Convention undertake to create an
environment, within their capacities and constitutional processes, which
ensure to the maximum extent possible, the survival and healthy
development of the child’.87
85Ibid.
86Ibid.
87 UNHCR, ‘Pre-Sessional Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of a Convention on the Rights of the
Child, ‘Proposal Submitted By India’’(28 January 1988) UN Doc E/CN.4/1988/WG1/WG.13.
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This was the first time that the terms survival and development were introduced as separate
concepts, and were not attached to any other right. Having said that, this proposal attached
the two concepts together and confined State’s obligations only to the ‘healthy development’
of the child.
1988 Round of Discussions88
The 1988 round of discussions was the one before last. During this round, the Working
Group debated many of the Convention’s rights, including the right to freedom of expression
and information (Article 7a), the right to freedom of association and peaceful assembly
(article 7ter), the right to privacy (Article 7quater), the right health (Article 12bis), the right to
physical and psychological recovery and social re-integration (Article 14), and children’s
rights during armed conflicts (Article 20). Children’s development was mentioned with
respect to some of these rights, but none of the comments about it add more than what
already known. I will focus on the debates concerning the proposal of India.
The proposal by India to adopt Articles 1(bis) or 2(bis) was discussed at length. These
discussions were the first time since the drafting process had begun that the drafters directly
discussed the meaning of ‘development’. The drafters also discuss the definition of ‘survival’,
explored the relationships between the concepts of ‘survival’ and ‘development’ and between
these two concepts and the right to life. Due to the importance of these debates, I will quote
from the travaux préparatoires at length.
‘During the course of the debate’ the travaux préparatoires reports, ‘several governmental
representatives commented that the concept of survival was not legally defined and one
representative expressed the belief that it could even prove harmful to the concept of the right
to development’.89 While these anonymous representatives were correct in their concern
regarding the concept of survival, they did not make a similar claim with regard to the right to
development. This omission can lead to the conclusion that these commentators had an
understanding of what the right to development stands for. The debates that followed, in this
round of discussions and the next one, prove this assumption wrong.
Following these comments, four different versions to the Article were proposed:
88UNHCR, ‘Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (6 April 1988) UN
Doc E/CN.4/1988/28.
89Ibid, 5.
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The first version:
‘The States Parties to the present Convention shall respect the right of the
child to survival. The States Parties shall, within their capacities and
constitutional processes, take all necessary measures to ensure, to the
maximum extent possible, the survival and healthy development of the
child.’
The second version:
‘The States Parties to the present Convention undertake to promote
conditions which ensure, to the maximum extent possible, the survival of
the child.’
The third version:
‘The States Parties to the present Convention undertake to create within the
available resources the psychosocial conditions which will guarantee, to the
maximum extent possible, the life and the full development of the child.’
And the fourth version:
‘The States Parties to the present Convention undertake to promote
conditions which guarantee the life and healthy development of the child.’90
There are several similarities and few differences between these four alternatives. First,
child’s development is mentioned only in three of them. Second, two different adjectives are
used to describe what sort of ‘development’ should be ensured by this article – it is either the
child’s ‘healthy’ development, or the child’s ‘full’ development. Third, one of the versions
presents an obligation to ensure the child’s ‘full development’, which should be facilitated by
guaranteeing the ‘psychosocial conditions’ for this type of development. No other clearer or
more coherent ideas can be found in any of these alternatives than can be found in India’s
original proposal.
The observer of UNICEF tried to explain the reason that lay behind these alternatives. She or
he ‘explained what the Fund [UNICEF] understood by survival’.91 Unfortunately, the travaux
préparatoires does not elaborate on the content of this explanation. Nonetheless, following
this unreported explanation:
90Ibid, 5-6. Emphasis added
91Ibid, 6.
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‘the representative of India was of the view that the right to survival should
be stressed, bearing in mind, as indicated by UNICEF, that many children
died from preventable causes and that children could also survive in very
poor conditions, the right to survival should be supplemented by the notion
of healthy development’.92
In different words, India linked the right to survival with the right to life and the right to
development, in order to ensure that the child could survive birth, the course of childhood,
and to develop in a healthy manner.
At this point, the discussions ‘focused mainly on the definition of the concepts of survival,
right to survival, right to development and the child's development. The view was expressed
that life and survival were complementary and were not mutually exclusive, and that survival
could even mean the diminution of infant mortality’.93 Again, the travaux préparatoires
provides no further details concerning the content of these discussions,except for the
comments about the meaning of the right to development, which were expressed earlier. This
is a surprising omission in light of the drafters’ own concerns about the meaning or the ‘right
to development’ at the beginning of the discussion. Moreover, since some parts of the travaux
préparatoires includes lengthy discussions about the meaning of well-established rights such
as freedom of expression or non-discrimination, it is only expected that when introducing a
new right to the UN human rights treaties system, as many explanations (and maybe
justifications) as possible will be provided.
Following this hazy discussion, the Italian representative offered to add to the Convention a
provision concerning children’s right to life.94 In response,
‘it was stated that the right to survival carried with it a more positive
connotation than the right to life, it meant the right to have positive steps
taken to prolong the life of the child. The view was further expressed that
conditions should be defined in order to permit the exercise of the right to
life, and not the right to (mere) survival. Two speakers stated that despite
the explanations that had been given on the word ‘survival’, they continue
to have ‘serious doubts about the inclusion of this concept in the
convention’.95
92Ibid.
93Ibid.
94Ibid, 7.
95Ibid.
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Two new versions for the article were introduced:
‘The States Parties to the present Convention undertake to promote
conditions which protect, to the maximum extent possible, the life of the
child.’
and
‘The States Parties to the present Convention undertake to promote
conditions which ensure, to the maximum extent possible, the survival and
healthy development of the child;
‘States Parties shall protect the right to life of children and ensure the
survival and healthy development of children.’96
For the first time, these proposals offered to include a right to life in the Convention. In
similarity to the original Indian proposal, these suggestions included a protection for
children’s ‘healthy development’. Nevertheless, none of these alternatives helps clarify the
meaning of the right to development or the nature of the relationship between the rights to
life, survival and development.
The travaux préparatoires concludes the discussion in these words:
‘In summing up the debate, the Chairman-Rapporteur stated that the right to
life had been omitted from the draft convention, and that the proposal made
in working paper 13 was intended to remedy that shortcoming. The right to
life, already enshrined in the International Covenants on Human Rights
should be included in the draft convention and listed as a priority before
other rights of the child. The approach to the right to life in the Covenants
was rather negative, while that of the convention should be positive and
should take into account economic, social and cultural conditions’.97
Following this concluding remark, an Ad-Hoc Drafting Group led by India introduced a new
version for this clause:
‘1. The States Parties to the present Convention recognize that every child
has the inherent right to life.
2. States Parties shall ensure, to the maximum extent possible, the survival
and development of the child.’98
96Ibid. Emphasis added.
97Ibid.
98Ibid.
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According to India, this version aimed to meet the following concerns: ‘(a) the inherent right
to life of the child, and (b) the focus on obligations for States parties to promote measures and
conditions for the survival and development of the child.’99 This explanation did not clear the
ambiguity of either ‘development’ or ‘survival’, or the meaning of the relationship between
the two. Presenting this version at this point in time was the embodiment of the ‘becomings’
model. There is no doubt that the perception of children as developing human beings and the
need to ensure their course of growth was inherent to the drafters’ visions of childhood, and
therefore became a fundamental aim of the Convention.
The discussion about the Article continued, but focused primarily on the right to life.100It
ended with no further amendments to the text of the Article.101 The travaux préparatoires
includes no further details regarding whether the drafters debated the meaning of the right to
life, the right to survival and the right to development, the differences between the three and
the pros and cons of including any of them in the Convention. Since the final version of the
text is similar to India’s original proposal, it is reasonable to assume that the discussions
resulted in the drafters being satisfied with the original version and the explanations that
followed. If this is the case, one can wonder whether the concerns some of the delegates
expressed about the vague nature of the right to survival were met with convincing
explanations. Another question is whether some of the draftershad a profound understanding
of the meaning of any these rights, or their practical implications. The travaux préparatoires is
silent about this point.
The next item of the Working Group’s agenda was Article 5, which refers to the evolving
capacities principle and parental responsibilities.102 Most of the discussion about this Article
was dedicated to the latter issue, and only two comments were concerned with the evolving
capacities principles. The first described the evolving capacities principle as an ‘important
general concept’,103while the second argued that the evolving capacities principle aims to
ensure that children’s rights are fulfilled ‘in accordance with his [the child] age’.104 Similarly
to the previous rounds of discussions, no further comments were made and there was no
99Ibid.
100Ibid.
101Ibid.
102Ibid, 7-9.
103Ibid, 8.
104Ibid.
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discussion concerning the content of the principle, let alone its justification, importance,
implications for other rights or relationship with the right to development.
1989 Round of Discussions105
The 1989 round of discussions was the final round of discussions, and by the end of it the
Working Group had adopted the final version of the Convention.At this round, the Working
Group discussed most of the Convention’s rights, and children’s ‘development’ was
mentioned in relation to few of them. I will focus on the debates concerning the adoption of
Article 6 and the rights to life, survival and development.
Two versions of Article 1(bis), which after a technical reading became Article 6,106 were
discussed in this final round. The first version was the one adopted at the end of the previous
round of discussions. Venezuela presented a second version, which reads:
‘1. For the purposes of the present Convention, 'child' means every human
being up to the age of 18 years unless, under the law of his State he has
attained the age of majority earlier.
2. The States Parties to the present Convention recognize that every child
has the inherent right to life.
3. States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the healthy
growth and development of the child.’107
In this version, the protection for the child’s ‘healthy development’ remained, but the right to
survival was omitted and replaced with the term ‘healthy growth’. Consistent with its
position, the representative of the WHO objected to this change on the ground that ‘the term
"survival" had a special meaning within the United Nations context, especially for his
organization and UNICEF.’108 In an unprecedented manner, not only did the WHO
representative provide a detailed explanation of the meaning of the term ‘survival’ for the
organization, the explanation was also not omitted from the travaux préparatoires. According
to the WHO,
105 UNHCR, ‘Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (2 March 1989)
UN Doc E/CN.4/1989/48.
106 UNHCR, ‘Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child, Working Paper Submitted by the Chairman, Text as
Adopted at First Reading With Suggested Revisions’ (24 November 1988) UN Doc E/CN.4/1989/WG.1/WP.2.
107Ibid,17.
108Ibid.
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‘"Survival" included growth monitoring, oral rehydration and disease
control, breastfeeding, immunization, child spacing, food and female
literacy; the term "growth" represented only a part of the concept of
"survival" and the change would be a step backwards from standards
already accepted’.109
This explanation shed light on some of the drafters’ understanding of the concepts of
‘survival’ and ‘growth’. First, the usage of the term ‘growth’ and not ‘development’ in this
context indicates the overlapping meaning of the two terms. Second, taking this broad
interpretation of ‘survival’, this explanation raises questions concerning the difference
between ‘survival’ and ‘growth’, and consequently between ‘survival’ and ‘development’.
Third, considering this comment and the other comments made during the previous rounds of
discussions, the question of whether ‘survival’ has any added value over ‘development’ and if
so, what does it mean, remains unclear.
Australia, Norway, Italy, Sweden and India expressed support for the WHO’s
interpretation,adding some substantial comments. Italy added that
‘in the language of international organizations the two words "survival" and
"development" had come to acquire the special meaning of ensuring the
child's survival in order to realise the full development of her or his
personality, both from the material and spiritual points of view’.110
This comment addresses some of the concerns mentioned earlier. According to this position,
children’s survival is necessary in order to ensure that ‘full development’, which is the
ultimate goal of childhood. In other words, the drafters aspired to ensure that every child gets
the opportunity to grow up to her or his fullest potential.
The discussion ended with the Working Group adopting the following text:
‘1. States Parties recognize that every child has the inherent right to life.
2. States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival
and development of the child.’111
These words became the text of the Convention’s Article 6.
109Ibid.
110Ibid.
111Ibid, 18.
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‘Development’ gained additional scarce attention in this round of discussion, while the
Working Group debated the principle of the best interests of the child. ‘Development’ was
mentioned at the margin of the debate on this principle, when the representative of Venezuela
addressed the potential links between the principle of the best interests and children’s
development:
‘although her delegation was not opposed to the phrase “best interests of the
child” being included in the final text, she however wished to draw
attention to the subjectivity of the term, especially of the Convention
contained no prior stipulation that the “best interests of the child” were his
all-round – in other words, physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social –
development. That would mean leaving the interpretation of the “best
interests of the child” to the judgment of the person, institution or
organization applying the rule. In the ensuing debate a number of
delegations expressed satisfaction with the phrase and the representative of
Venezuela therefore withdraws her suggestion’.112
Not only does this statement highlight the ambiguity and arbitrariness of the different terms
that the drafters used throughout the years, it also draws attention to the subjective nature of
the terms ‘development’, ‘well-being’, ‘growth’ and ‘adulthood’. All these terms were used
in order to describe a similar idea and to ensure the fulfilment of the same desire: to enable
the child to transform into an adult and fulfil her or his inner potential. Furthermore,
‘adulthood’ as an ending point has various components in and of itself, which need to be
protected during all the stages of childhood, and in relation to different aspects of the child’s
life. Ultimately, this ending point of childhood will only be achieved when the child becomes
an adult.
Discussion
The drafting process of the Convention informs us about the reasons for incorporating a wide
protection for children’s development into the Convention, the process that led to the creation
of the rights to development and the drafters’ perceptions about children’s development and
the right to development.
Despite the heterogeneous composition of the Open-Ended Working Group (geographically,
institutionally etc), most, if not all, of the references to children’s ‘development’ stemmed
from a conviction on the conception of children as ‘becomings’ human beings. The drafters
112Ibid, 22. Emphasis added.
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shared the ‘human becomings’ conception of childhood, and created a Convention that ought
to support and protect the main objective of this concept - children’s growth. If, as I argue,
this perception was the consensus among the drafters, then it is obvious why there was no
pressing need to dwell on the meaning of ‘development’. For this reason, not only did the
Convention introduce a new right with the title ‘the right to development’, but it also
embedded the protection for children’s development in five other provisions. In that sense, as
Heather Montgomery claims, the Conventionis designed to influence how children grow up,
envisaging the child as ‘an individual, autonomous being, an inheritor of liberal, humanist
ideals of the Enlightenment’.113
The presumption that children’s development is a term that does not invite interpretation is
wrong. Its ambiguity led the drafters often to mix it with other terms such as children’s ‘well-
being’. Likewise, the term ‘well-being’ is open to interpretation as well, and prima facia does
not necessarily has the same meaning as ‘children’s development’ has.114
There are four points that are worth discussing with respect to the drafting process and the
meaning of the right to development. The first is the conclusions that can be drawn from the
process of embedding the protection for ‘development’ in the Convention. The second is the
meaning of Article 6 and the meaning of the rights to life and survival. The third is the
meaning of Article 6 and the right to development. The fourth and final point is the
differences between the Convention’s right to development and the right to development in
‘general’ international law.
Embedding the Protection of ‘Children’s Development’ in the Convention
The conception of children as ‘human becomings’ underpinned the drafting process of the
Convention and led the drafters to introduce a new human right into the world of
international human rights law: the right to development. This innovation continued the
113 Heather Montgomery, An Introduction to Childhood (Wiley-Blackwell, West Sussex UK 2009) 6.
114 Jane Aldgate, for example, suggests that Child’s well-being is composed of ecological approach to child
well-being, children’s physical and psychological wellness, strengths and attachment. Jane Aldgate, ‘Child
Well-Being, Child Development and Family Life’ in Colette McAuley and Wendy Rose (eds) Child Well-Being
(Jessica Kingsley Publishers, London 2010) 21-38. For a more general discussion about the meaning of human
well-being see James Griffin, Well-Being (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1986).
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evolutionary narrative of international children’s rights law in protecting children’s
development that began in 1924.115
The ‘human becomings’ conception led the drafters to assimilate the protection of eight
components of ‘children’s development’ into five different articles. The eight developmental
components are: physical, mental, moral, social, cultural, spiritual, personality and talent. The
Articles are Article 18(1), Article 23(3), Article 27(1), Article 29(1)(a) and Article 32(1) that
refer to parental responsibility, protect children’s right to health, the right to adequate
standard of living, define the aims of education and protect the right to freedom from
economic exploitation, respectively.116
The novelty in subjugating a human rights treaty to the developmentalist perception of
childhood is also reflected in Article 5 of the Convention, which pins down the evolving
capacities principle. Determining that the rights of children will be respected ‘in a manner
consistent with the evolving capacities of the child’117makes a specific perception of
childhood the rule-of-thumb for the implementations of the Convention, and subjects the
implementation of the Convention to children’s ‘development’ stages.118
The centrality of the developmentalist concept stands in contrast to the lack of any substantial
or thorough analysis of the meaning of children’s development or the right to development,
or any subsequent questions that follows.119Analysing the drafting process, it is evident that
115On events and narratives in international law see Fleur Johns Pahuja, ‘Introduction’ in Fleur Johns, Richard
Joyce and Sundhya Pahuja (eds) Events: The Force of International Law (Routledge, Oxford 2011) 1-17, 1-8.
116 Article 18(1): ‘States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle that both parents
have common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child. Parents or, as the case may be,
legal guardians, have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child. The best
interests of the child will be their basic concern.’
Article 23(3): ‘Recognizing the special needs of a disabled child, assistance extended in accordance with
paragraph 2 of the present article shall be provided free of charge, whenever possible, taking into account the
financial resources of the parents or others caring for the child, and shall be designed to ensure that the disabled
child has effective access to and receives education, training, health care services, rehabilitation services,
preparation for employment and recreation opportunities in a manner conducive to the child’s achieving the
fullest possible social integration and individual development, including his or her cultural and spiritual
development.’
Article 27(1): ‘States Parties recognize the right of every child to a standard of living adequate for the child’s
physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development.’
Article 29(1): ‘States Parties agree that the education of the child shall be directed to: (a) The development of
the child’s personality, talents and mental and physical abilities to their fullest potential.’
Article 32(1): ‘States Parties recognize the right of the child to be protected from economic exploitation and
from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s education, or to be
harmful to the child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development.’
117 Article 5.
118 Gerison Lansdown, The Evolving Capacities of the Child (Save the Children and UNICEF, Florence Italy
2005) 16.
119 With the exception of the few comments made in the 1988 round of discussions.
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discussions concerning the micro level of what constitute a component of development and
what factors might impact ‘development’ were held, while the macro level of the perception
of childhood that this right was created in light of was rarely addressed.In most, if not in all,
of the debates about the different articles that protect ‘development’, the drafters did not
debate the conceptual issues that the right to development raises.
As the Working Group’s Chairman explained (in an article published after the Convention
was adopted), the Convention was designed in order to protect a universal course of growth:
'the physical and mental nature of the child is identical everywhere… the
process of growth and adolescence takes a similar course in all children.
Their physical and mental needs are also similar'.120
It is one thing to protect a (universal) model of child’s development, and it is another to
create a human right to development. The former does not necessarily leads to the latter.
Understanding Article 6 and the Rights to Life and Survival
Development became a human right as the drafting process was coming to an end. The right
to development was introduced after a decade of discussions, at a time when different
Articles already protected varieties of developmental domains. Moreover, the right to
development was not introduced as an independent and separate right, but rather as part of a
clause that also protected the right to life and the right to survival.
I suggest understanding these three rights as positioned on one continuum, with the right to
life at one end, the right to survival in the middle and the right to development at the other
end. The right to life is located at the negative end of the continuum. Traditional
interpretations of the right to life proclaim that it imposes only negative duties on the state. It
means that a state cannot unlawfully take away life, but it is also not required to take any
positive obligations to ensure and protect life. For example, the right to life does not mean
that the state has an obligation to provide food for a starving person, but it also cannot
prevent one from eating. A more progressive interpretation tends to ease the dichotomy
between the negative and positive obligations, especially when it comes to children. As
Manfred Nowak asserts, the right to life under the Convention obligates States Parties to
reduce mortality rate of babies, to ensure adequate nutrition for children, and act against
120Lopatka, supra n. 2.
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infanticide and reduce the number of homicides.121 But as we introduce more positive
obligations into the meaning of the right to life, we move on the continuum towards the place
where the right to survival is located,122 and the entitlements it mandates for children.
The right to survival, like the right to development, is another innovation of the Convention.
According to the explanation given by the WHO during the drafting process, the right to
survival means: ‘growth monitoring, oral rehydration and disease control, breastfeeding,
immunization, child spacing, food and female literacy’.123 Some of these goals overlap with
the positive obligations that the right to life generates. Moreover, this interpretation does not
sufficiently distinguish it from other rights of the child that the Convention protects, such as
the right to health (Article 24), the right to an adequate standard of living (Article 27), and the
right to education (Articles 28-29). Therefore, the question why did the drafters decide to
enfold these issues together under the title of ‘survival’ and to designate a distinct obligation
to fulfil them remains open.
A possible answer to this question is that context makes a difference and symbolism is
important. Locating these obligations within the context of the life-survival-development
continuum emphasises their importance to the child’s future development. This context
emphasises the pressing importance of protecting children’s basic needs that are necessary for
a healthy course of growth, and for providing equal opportunities to all children (the latter
reason led the WHO to ask to include female literacy as part of this list of components).
This interpretation not only clarifies the importance of the right to survival, but also of the
right to development, which is located at the positive end of the continuum. According to this
line of analysis, the right to development is not about preventing a child from dying or
providing the immediate needs required for her or his physical survival. The right to
development addresses the long terms needs of the child. The right is a forward-looking right
that focuses on the child’s course of growth and future. It aims to provide for the child’s
maturation process and the future adult that the child will eventually become.
121 Manfred Nowak, Article 6: The Right to Life, Survival and Development (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
Leiden 2005) 18-35.
122 See F. Menghistu, ‘The Satisfaction of Survival Requirements’ in B. G. Ramcharan (ed) The Right to Life in
International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1985) 63-83.
123Supra n. 110.
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Understanding Article 6 and the Right to Development
The right to development should be understood as a positive right that aims to ensure the
child’s transformation into an adult. In light of the travaux préparatoires and the text of the
Convention, I suggest that the right to development can be interpreted in five different ways.
One inherent limitation of all of these suggestions is their usage of the same ambiguous terms
that the drafters themselves used.
The first possible interpretation takes the right to development as a right that aims to protect
the child’s ability to reach the end point of the developmental process (i.e adulthood).
Second, the right to development can be understood as a right that enables the process of
growth itself. The third option combines the previous two together, suggesting that the right
to development can be understood as a right that facilitates the course of growth and the
desirable outcome of fulfilling the child’s potential as an adult. The fourth option is to claim
that the right to development lacks any substantial and distinct meaning. According to this
interpretation, this right has no added value or distinct meaning over other rights in the
Convention, such as the rights to life, survival, health, adequate standard of living or play and
leisure.
The fifth option attempts to avoid these polarized views. This option substantiates Article 6
and delineates its distinct meaning, interpreting the right to development as the right of a
child to have her or his materialistic and non-materialistic needs, which are required for a
healthy process of growth, met. An obvious difficulty of this interpretation is that to some
extents, it brings us back to square one. This suggestion derives from the above mentioned
assumptions about children and development that underpinned the drafting process.
Therefore, in order to substantiate it, first there is a need to unfold the meaning of ‘children’s
development’, what its necessary components are, and what ‘healthy growth’ is. The
unfolding process requires making some normative decisions. It requires the
acknowledgment that the alleged universality of ‘development’ is misleading, and there is
more than one meaning to the psychological development of children, and that children’s
development is not only a concern of psychologists.
Having said that, this interpretation does provide a distinct meaning to Article 6 and justifies
its existence. It protects more than a summary of the other developmental components that
are protected by other Articles of the Convention. It requires taking the individual child’s
future seriously, mandates that all of the child’s needs in course of childhood be met, in order
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to ensure the utilization of childhood in the form of adulthood. Ultimately, this interpretation
is informed by ‘human becomings’ model of childhood, and rejecting this model of childhood
pulls down its normative ground, leaves it without substantial meaning.
The Convention and the Right to Development in ‘General’ International law
The drafting process highlights the gap between the innovative nature of the Convention, as it
comes to the right to development, and ‘general’ international law.As will be discussed in
chapter five, the period when the Convention was drafted – from 1978 to 1989, was also the
time when ‘the right to development’ was being intensively debated in international law.
Moreover, just before India suggested including right to development in the Convention, the
UN General Assembly adopted the 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development.
According to the travaux préparatoires, neither this Declaration nor the meaning of the
‘general’ right to development was ever mentioned by the drafters. I doubt whether this
omission was a result of lack of knowledge about these development in ‘general’
international law. A more plausible explanation is that the unquestioned belief in the ‘law of
growth’ of children124 and the aspiration to protect that growth led the drafters to ignore a
new conception in international law, which had an identical title. Chapters five and six
address this point in details.
Conclusion
The Convention’s drafting process lasted eleven years, and the final text was a considerably
different document compared to the original draft. While the original draft was areplica of the
1959 Declaration, the Convention is much broader in content and scope. The Convention
protects more rights of children, introduces a more complex structure of responsibilities and
duties divided between different duty bearers and creates a monitoring mechanism for its
implementation. However, with respect to children’s development, the final text did not
change the underlying narrative of international children’s rights law concerning the
conception of childhood, and it upholds and embeds the ‘human becomings’ conception in
the Convention. The Convention, in resemblance to the 1924 and 1959 Declarations, attempts
to protect and actively promote children’s development. The novelty of the Convention with
this regard is not the protection it provides to children’s development, but the creation of a
124 See chapter one.
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right to development and the wide protection the Convention gives to a number of elements
of the right, such as physical, emotional, spiritual and cultural development.
In light of the drafting process, this chapter suggested five different ways to interpret the
meaning of the right to development. The most substantive interpretation suggests
understanding the right to development as the right of a child to have her or his materialistic
and non-materialistic needs, which are required for a healthy process of growth, met.
The Convention is not a Declaration, but rather a binding treaty that ought to be implemented
by all of its parties. For this reason, the process of interpretation takes place in parallel to the
implementation process. The next two chapters focus on this dual process by analysing the
jurisprudence of the Convention’s monitoring mechanism - the UN Committee on the Rights
of the Child - on the right to development.
100
Chapter Three: The UN Committee on The Rights of the Child’s
Jurisprudence on the Right to Development
‘The Committee expects States to interpret “development” in its broadest
sense as a holistic concept, embracing the child’s physical, mental, spiritual,
moral, psychological and social development. Implementation measures
should be aimed at achieving the optimal development for all children’ (UN
Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment Number 5)1
Introduction
The next two chapters analyse the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child’s jurisprudence
on the child’s right to development. These chapters aim to understand how the Committee
conceptualises ‘development’ and,subsequently, how it interprets the child’s right to
development. This chapter methodically analyses all the Concluding Observations and
General Comments issued by the Committee between the years 1993 and 2010. The findings
and conclusions of this chapter form the basis of Chapter four. Based on interviews with
members of the Committee, Chapter four seeks to understand how the Committee, as an
institution, perceives the limitations and challenges of implementing the child’s right to
development.
This chapter consists of two parts. The first part describes the normative status of the
Committee, the reporting procedures and methods of work. The second part critically
analyses the Committee’s jurisprudence with regard to children’s development and the right
to development. The main conclusion is that the Committee’s jurisprudence mirrors the
Convention’s conception of children as ‘human becomings’. Therefore, the Committee
utilises non-legal bodies of knowledge, primarily developmental psychology, to scrutinize
States Parties’ implementation of the Convention, and to make recommendations concerning
the care for children’s development and their right to development. The Committee
subjugates most of the Convention’s rights to promote children’s socio-psychological
development, while ignoring the formulation of development as a human right in itself. The
Committee fails to respect children’s agency, and consequently fails to provide a distinct and
concrete interpretation for the child’s legal right to development.
1 UNCRC, ‘General Comment No. 5 – General Measures of Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of
the Child’ (27 November 2003) UN Docs CRC/GC/2003/5, paragraph 12.
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The Convention is the most ratified human rights treaty. As its monitoring body, the
Committee therefore receives information from a wide range of sources and it is the
institution most likely to have a comprehensive perspective about the state of the world’s
children (excluding the 400 million children living in the USA, Somalia and South Sudan,
which have not ratified the Convention).2This mass volume of information enables the
Committee to have a broad perspective and understanding of the challenges and obstacles
faced in implementing the Convention throughout the world, in different cultural, political,
financial and social contexts.3 Over the last twenty years, the Committee has been
systematically engaging with monitoring the Convention’s protection for children’s
development and to a lesser extent, their right to development. Unfortunately, the
Committee’s work has not gained the academic attention it deserves.4
The Committee has defined Article 6 and the right to development as one of the Convention’s
four guiding principles, and asked States Parties to interpret the right as a broad and holistic
concept that embraces ‘the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral, psychological and social
development’.5 Therefore, analysing the Committee’s jurisprudence can have an important
contribution to our understanding of the meaning of right to development under the
Convention.
2 South Sudan was established as an independent state on July 2011. As of July 2012, it did not ratify any
international human rights convention, including the Convention. See Human Rights Watch, South Sudan: Step
Up Urgent Human Rights Reforms (5 July 2012).
3 Gerison Lansdown, 'The Reporting Process Under the Convention on the Rights of the Child' in Philip Alston
and James Crawford (eds) The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge 2000) 113-128. For a comparison between the monitoring processes of other UN treaty bodies see
Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights – Between Idealism and Realism (2nd edition, Oxford University Press,
Oxford 2008) 175 - 191.
4 But see the comprehensive work of Cynthia Price Cohen, Jurisprudence on the Rights of the Child, Volumes 1-
4 (Transnational Publishers, New York 2005); Cynthia Price Cohen and Annemieke Wolthius, ‘The Committee
on the Rights of the Child: 8th Session Reports of States Parties’ (1995) 3 International Journal of Children’s
Rights 263; Annemieke Wolthuis and Denise Allen, ‘Tenth Session of the Committee on the Rights of the
Child: Consideration on State Party Reports’ (1996) 4 International Journal of Children’s Rights 69; Lisa Woll,
‘Reporting to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child: A Catalyst for Domestic Debate and Policy
Change’ (2000) 8 International Journal of Children’s Rights 71; Lukas P. Scherer and Stuart N. Hart,
‘Reporting to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child – Analyses of the First 49 State Party Reports on the
Education Articles of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and a Proposition for an Experimental
Reporting System for Education’ (1999) 7 International Journal of Children’s Rights 349.
5 UNCRC, ‘General Comment number 5’, supra n. 1.
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The Committee’s Normative Status and Methods of Work
The Convention established the Committee on the Rights of the Child as its monitoring
mechanism (Article 43). The Committee is composed of eighteen ‘experts of high moral
standing and recognised competence in the field covered by the Convention’ (Article
43(2)).6Its members are elected by States Parties for a term of four years, and can be re-
elected for another term of four years (Article 43(2)-43(6)). Since the establishment of the
Committee in 1991 and until December 2011, sixty-one people had served as its members.7
According to the Convention, every State Party must report on measures it has ‘adopted
which give effect to the rights recognised herein and on the progress made on the enjoyment
of these rights’ (Article 44(1)). An initial implementation report should be submitted within
two years of the Convention entering into force for the concerned State Party. Following this
initial submission, periodic implementation reports should be submitted every five
years,8structured according to the Committee’s reporting guidelines.9
As we saw in the previous chapter, in addition to Article 6’s protection of the right to
development, five other articles (Articles 18, 23, 27 29 and 32) protect eight domains of
children’s development (physical, mental, moral, social, talents, cultural, spiritual and
personal). Therefore, it is expected that each implementation report would refer to the
measures taken with respect to the promotion of children’s development and the right to
development.10 In 2005, the Committee issued Revised Guidelines for reporting. The new
guidelines seek to frame the implementation process as a ‘holistic’ process that
conceptualises children’s rights as ‘indivisible and interrelated’ rights11.The Revised
Guidelines mention the right to development with respect to the implementation of Article 6
and the right to health (Article 24). However, where the Guidelines specify the type of data
6 Initially, the Committee included ten members. Article 43 of the Convention was amended in 2002 and the
number of members was increased to eighteen. UNGA Resolution 50/155 of 21 December 1995 (entered into
force on 18 November 2002).
7 The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child’s website.
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/members.htm [last checked 20.10.2012]
8 Article 44(1).
9 UNCRC, ‘General Guidelines Regarding Forms and Content of Initial Reports to be Submitted by States
Parties Under Article 44(1)(a) of the Convention’ (30 October 1991) UN Docs CRC/C/5 [‘Initial Guidelines’];
UNCRC, ‘Overview of the Reporting Procedures’ (24 October 1994) UN Docs CRC/C/33 [‘General
Guidelines’]; UNCRC, ‘General Guidelines Regarding the Forms and Content of Period Reports to be
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 44(1)(b) of the Convention’ (29 November 2005) CRC/C/58/Rev. 1
[‘Revised Guidelines’].
10 Initial Guidelines, ibid, paragraphs 13, 19; General Guidelines, ibid, paragraph 5; Revised Guidelines, ibid,
Paragraphs 21, 30-31.
11 Revised Guidelines, supra n. 9, paragraph 3.
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the Committee would like to receive with respect to Article 6, the requested information is
only concerned with threats to children’s right to life (number of deaths of those under 18 as
a result of capital punishment, illness or traffic accidents).12 Thus, States Parties are not
explicitly asked to provide data concerning the implementation of the right to development.
Nonetheless, while this omission does not exempt States Parties from their obligation to
protect this right, and to report about it, the guidelines create a situation where States Parties
might be under the impression that they will not be held accountable for failing toprotect the
right to development.
States Parties’ submission of their implementation reports is the first step in the monitoring
process. This step is then followed by the submission of UN agencies’ reports and NGOs’
shadow reports. On the bases of this information, the Committee holds a pre-sessional
meeting where all the information is reviewed,13 and a list of follow-up questions (‘List of
Issues’) is sent to the relevant State Party.14Afterwards, representatives of each State Party
appear before the Committee, and discuss their report with the Committee. This stage of the
monitoring process ends with the publication of ‘Concluding Observations’.15 The
Concluding Observations include ‘suggestions and recommendations’ about the steps that
need to be taken in order to advance the implementation of the Convention.16The Concluding
Observations do not mark the end of the monitoring process, as they are a stage in an on-
going dialogue between the Committee and each State Party. Each State Party is expected to
follow the recommendations and to report back in five years time on the progress it has made.
In addition to the Concluding Observations, in 2001 the Committee began publishing
‘General Comments’. The ‘General Comments’ address either specific issues or rights that
the Committee considers to be important (for example, the aims of education or the right to
participation)17, or, alternatively, focus on specific groups of children (such as indigenous
12 Revised Guidelines, supra n. 9, paragraph 5.
13 Cynthia Price Cohenet al, 'Monitoring the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: The
Challenges of Information Management' (1996) 18 Human Rights Quarterly 439.
14 General Guidelines, supra n. 9, paragraph 12.
15 Anne. F. Bayefsky, The UN Human Rights Treaty System – Universality at the Crossroads (Kluwer Law
International, The Hague and London 2001).
16 General Guidelines, supra n. 9, paragraphs 18-22.
17UNCRC, ‘General Comment Number 1: The Aims of Education’ (17 April 2001) UN Docs CRC/GC/2001/1;
UNCRC, ‘General Comment Number 12: The Right of the Child to Be Heard’ (20 July 2009) UN Docs
CRC/GC/2009/12.
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children).18Each of these stages needs tofunction well,in order to maximise the possibility for
bringing about change inhuman rights protection at the national level.19
Neither the Concluding Observations nor the General Comments have a formal binding force.
Nonetheless, their normative weight is not without significance, and they are an important
source for interpreting and implementing the Convention.20For the purposes of this research,
the normative status of the Committee’s jurisprudence is not a crucial point of focus. The
Committee’s jurisprudence is analysed because it sheds invaluable light on the theoretical and
operational meanings of the right to development, while its force as a binding treaty is of less
significance.
Methodology
The chapter analyses all 364 Concluding Observations published by the Committee since
1993, when it began reviewing States Parties’ reports, up until 2010, as well as all 13 General
Comments published until 2011. The analysis begins with the connection that the Committee
has made between children’s identity and their personal characteristics, such as gender,
ethnicity and disability, discrimination and the right to development. It continues by
discussing early childhood development, socio-economic conditions, and the connection
between the rights to education and health and development. The analysis ends with the
connection made between child labour and development.
The analysis is informed by three factors: the significance of protecting children’s
development in the Convention;the perception that the child’s right to development should be
interpreted in a broad and holistic manner; and the aim to locate children, their lives and
rights in the centre of attention. Such an analysis is not free from problems, and two are
worth emphasising. First, the analysis presents a summary of the Committee’s jurisprudence,
and, therefore, to some extent ignoreschanges in the Committee’s jurisprudence over the
years. Second, the analysis might not be sensitive enough to nuances of the Committee’s
18 UNCRC, ‘General Comment Number 11: Indigenous Children and their Rights Under the Convention’ (12
February 2009) UN Docs CRC/C/GC/11.
19 John Morijn, ‘Reforming United Nations Human Rights Treaty Monitoring Reform’ (2011) 29 Netherlands
International Law Review 295, 309.
20 On the normative stand of the concluding observations see Michael O'Flaherty, 'The Concluding Observations
of United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies' (2006) Human Rights Law Review 27, 31-36; See also Philip
Alston, 'Conjuring up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control' (1984) 78 American Journal of
International Law 607; Oona Hathaway, 'Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?' (2002) 111 Yale Law
Journal 1935.
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jurisprudence, especially with respect to the perception of children as a homogenous group
with universal characteristics. In order to meet these concerns, where relevant, the analysis
addresses changes and trends in the Committee’s interpretation. But the problems posed by
theassumptions about homogeneity and universality are more important. These postulates are
part of the Convention biases and were not a creation of the Committee’s work.21
Nevertheless, before criticising the Committee for neglecting social, historical, cultural, racial
and political contexts and their potential influence on the interpretation of children’s
development and right to development, there is a need to present the Committee’s
jurisprudence as it is.
From Cradle to Adulthood – The Committee’s Perspective on Children’s Development
and Right to Development
The Committee published its first Concluding Observations in 1993-1994. The right to
development, or Article 6, was not mentioned,22while the issue of children’s development
was referred to only rarely, mostly with regard to cases of births that were not supervised by
qualified health workers,23 or with reference to the impact of insufficient nutritious food on
children’s survival and development.24 In the years that followed, the Committee’s scope
significantly expanded in two ways. First, many of the Convention’s rights were linked to
children’s development. Second, the right to development began to gain attention and was
mentioned as a distinct right of children.
21 Kristina Anne Bentley, 'Can There Be Any Universal Children's Rights?' (2005) 9 International Journal of
Children’s Rights 107; Sonja Grover, 'A Response to K.A Bentley's 'Can There Be Any Universal Children's
Rights?' (2007) 11 International Journal of Children’s Rights 429; Adam Lopatka, 'The Rights of the Child are
Universal: The Perspective of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child' in Michael Freeman and Philip
Veerman (eds) The Ideologies of Children's Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, Dordrecht 1992) 47-52; Roger
Smith, A Universal Child? (Palgrave Macmillan, London 2009).
22 See, for example: UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Sweden’ (18 February 1993) UN Doc
CRC/C/15/Add.2; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Viet Nam’ (18 February 1993) UN Doc
CRC/C/15/Add.3; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Russian Federation’ (18 February 1993) UN Doc
CRC/C/15/Add.4; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Egypt’ (18 February 1993) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.5;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Sudan’ (18 October 1993) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.10; UNCRC
‘Concluding Observations: France’ (25 April 1994) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 20; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Honduras’ (24 October 1994) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 24; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations:
Indonesia’ (24 October 1994) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 25.
23 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Bolivia’ (18 February 1993) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.1, paragraph 10.
24 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Honduras’ (1994), supra n. 22, paragraph 15.
106
Discrimination and Development
The right to non-discrimination is protected by Article 2 of the Convention, And like the right
to development, it is also defined as one of the Convention’s fourguiding principles.25Neither
the text of Article 2,26 nor the drafting process of the Convention,27 suggests a connection
between this right and children’s development or their right to development. Nevertheless,
since 2000 the Committee has made such a connection, concluding that a violation of the
right to non-discrimination leads to the frustrating of children’s development and right to
development alike.
The Committee concluded that discrimination leads to incidents of ‘harassments and hatred’28
and ‘racial hatred and xenophobia’,29and that discriminatory practices deny these children
access to public services, especially housing, health services and education.30On several
occasions the Committee concluded that discriminatory practices have a negative effect on
children’s development,31and violate their right to survival and development.32 These
propositions were not followed with any explanation, and the Committee was satisfied with
the conclusion that elimination of discrimination is, therefore, a vehicle for ensuring the
elimination of obstacles that hinder the realisation of the right to development.
25 UNCRC, General Comment No. 5, supra n. 1.
26 ‘1. States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each child within
their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child’s or his or her parent’s or legal
guardian’s race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin,
property, disability, birth or other status. 2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that the
child is protected against all forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status, activities,
expressed opinions, or beliefs of the child’s parents, legal guardians, or family members’.
27 See chapter one; UNHCHR, Legislative History of the Convention on the Rights of the Child - Volume 1
(United Nations, New York and Geneva 2007) 314-334.
28 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Croatia’ (3 November 2004) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 243, paragraph
21.
29 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Germany’ (26 February 2004) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 226, paragraph
23.
30 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Canada’ (20 June 1995) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 37, paragraph 17;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Senegal’ (27 November 1995) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 44, paragraph 12;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Czech Republic’ (27 October 1997) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 81,
paragraph 15.
31 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Sierra Leone’ (24 February 2000) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 116,
paragraph 40; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Croatia’ (2004), supra n. 28, paragraph 21; UNCRC
‘Concluding Observations: Germany’ (2004), supra n. 29, paragraph 23; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations:
France’ (30 June 2004) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 240, paragraph 16.
32 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Burundi’ (16 October 2000) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 133, paragraph 77;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Cameroon’ (2001), supra n. 34, paragraph 69; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Sudan’ (9 October 2002) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 190, paragraph 46; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Bangladesh’ (1997), supra n. 34, paragraph 79; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: India’
(2004), supra n. 34, paragraph 81; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Myanmar’ (2004), supra n. 38,
paragraph 79; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Rwanda’ (2004), supra n. 38, paragraph 75; UNCRC
‘Concluding Observations: Yemen’ (2005), supra n. 38, paragraph, 81.
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The Committee has expressed concernswith regard to discrimination against several specific
groups of children, including girls,33 children of ethnic minorities,34 aboriginal
children,35indigenous children,36children born out of wedlock,37 children form poorer income
group, rural children, child refugees, working children, displaced children,38 children living
or working on the street, child victims of sexual exploitation,39and stateless children.40
The Committee dedicated special attention to discrimination against three groups of children:
children suffering from gender-based discrimination, children with disabilities and
indigenous children. With respect to gender-based discrimination, the Committee
highlighteddifferent marriage ages for boys and girlsas a practice that has a negative impact
on girls’ ‘health, education and social development’.41A more comprehensive range of
discriminatory practices against children with disabilities can be concluded from the
Committee’s work, and it includes, among others, lack of access to health services,
mistreatment and inadequate diagnostic systems,42inadequate schools43 and education
33UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Sri Lanka’ (21 June 1995) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 40, paragraph 12;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Senegal’ (1995) supra n. 30, paragraph 12; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Angola’ (11 October 2010) UN Doc CRC/C/CO/2-4, paragraphs 53-54.
34 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: United Kingdom’ (15 February 1995) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 34,
paragraph 13; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Czech Republic’ (1997), supra n. 30, paragraph 15; UNCRC
‘Concluding Observations: Bangladesh’ (18 June 1997) UN Doc CRC/15/C/Add. 74, paragraph 15; UNCRC
‘Concluding Observations: Cameroon’ (6 November 2001) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 164, paragraph 69;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Bangladesh’ (27 July 2003) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 221, paragraph 79;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: India’ (26 February 2004) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 228, paragraph 81;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Republic of Serbia’ (20 June 2008) UN Doc CRC/C/SRB/CO/1, paragraph
75.
35 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Canada’ (1995), supra n. 30, paragraph 17.
36 UNCRC ‘General Comment 11’, supra n. 18; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Burundi’ (1 October 2010)
UN Doc CRC/C/BDI/CO/2, paragraphs 78-79; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Guatemala’ (1 October
2010) UN Doc CRC/C/GTM/CO/3-4, paragraph 101.
37 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Sri Lanka’ (1995), supra n. 33, paragraph 12; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Senegal’ (1995), supra n. 33,paragraph 12; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Bangladesh’
(1997), supra n. 34, paragraph 15.
38 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Sri Lanka’ (1995), supra n. 33, paragraph 12; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Myanmar’ (30 June 2004) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 237, paragraph 79; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: India’ (2004), supra n. 34, paragraph 81; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Rwanda’ (1 July
2004) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 234,paragraph 75; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Yemen’ (21 September
2005) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 267, paragraph 81.
39 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Bangladesh’ (1997), supra n. 34, paragraph 15.
40 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Thailand’ (17 March 2006) UN Doc CRC/C/THA/CO/2, paragraph 33;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Dominican Republic’ (11 February 2008) UN Doc CRC/C/DOM/CO/2,
paragraph 77.
41 For example, see UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Nicaragua’ (20 June 1995) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.
36, paragraph 13; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: India’ (2004), supra n. 34, paragraph 60.
42 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Russian Federation’ (10 November 1999) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 110,
paragraph 40.
43 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Estonia’ (17 March 2003) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 196, paragraph 39.
108
programmes,44 and other facilities and programmes that meet their needs.45These
discriminatory practices were often mentioned as having a negative effect on their
‘development’ in general,46and their cultural development in particular.47The Committee
further made a connection between the care for the development of children with disabilities
and their ability to maximize their potential,48their inclusion in society,49 and their
‘enjoyment of a full and decent life and participation in the community’.50The care for these
children’s future development exceeds the usual ambiguous care the Committee expresses for
‘development’, and substantiates it little more. This position links ‘development’ to the
fulfilment of the human potential of these children, which in return is influenced by how they
are integrated in society. It therefore seems, according to the Committee, marginalisation
interferes with the ability of children to develop.
General Comment number 9,51 which is dedicated to the rights of children with disabilities,
includes some further statements about this issue. In this General Comment, the Committee
emphasised that social discrimination and stigmatization leads to the ‘marginalisation and
exclusion’ of children with disabilities, which ‘may even threaten their survival and
development if it goes as far as physical or mental violence against [them]’.52 Later on in the
44 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Sudan’ (2002), supra n. 32, paragraph 46; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Estonia’ (2003), Ibid; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: India’ (2004), supra n. 34, paragraph
81; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Republic on Congo’ (20 October 2006) UN Doc CRC/C/COG/CO/1,
paragraph 56; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Latvia’ (28 June 2006) UN Doc CRC/C/LTC/CO/2,
paragraph 40; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Uruguay’ (5 July 2007) UN Doc CRC/C/URY/CO/2,
paragraph 48; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Republic of Serbia’ (2008), supra n. 34, paragraph 75. A
recent study has found that in schools, children with disabilities are more likely to be victims of violence than
other pupils who are not disabled. Lisa Jones et al, ‘Prevalence and Risk of Violence Against Children With
Disabilities: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis of Observational Studies’ 2012 Lancet (12 July 2012 -
online edition).
45 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Djibouti’ (28 June 2000) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 131, paragraph 39;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Comoros’ (23 October 2000) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 141, paragraph 37.
46 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: New Zealand’ (24 January 1997) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 71, paragraph
5; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Russian Federation’ (1999), supra n. 42, paragraph 40; UNCRC
‘Concluding Observations: Djibouti’ (2000), ibid, paragraph 39; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Comoros’
(2000), ibid, paragraph 37; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Sudan’ (2002), supra n. 32, paragraph 46;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Estonia’ (2003), supra n. 43, paragraph 39; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Congo’ (2006), supra n. 44, paragraph 56; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Latvia’ (2006),
supra n. 44, paragraph 40.
47 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Uruguay’ (2007), supra n. 44, paragraph 48.
48 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: New Zealand’ (1997), supra n. 46, paragraph 5.
49 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Russian Federation’ (1999), supra n. 42, paragraph 40; UNCRC
‘Concluding Observations: Djibouti’ (2000), supra n. 45, paragraph 39; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations:
Comoros’ (2000), supra n. 45, paragraph 37; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Estonia’ (2003), supra n. 43,
paragraph 39; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Latvia’ (2006), supra n. 44, paragraph 40.
50 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Congo’ (2006), supra n. 44, paragraph 56.
51 UNCRC ‘General Comment Number 9 – The Rights of Children with Disabilities’ (27 February 2007) UN
Doc CRC/C/GC/9.
52Ibid, paragraph 8.
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General Comment, the Committee broadened its claim, saying that the ‘spiritual, emotional
and cultural development and wellbeing of children with disabilities are very often
overlooked’,53 and therefore suggested establishing ‘programmes and activities designed for
the child’s cultural development and spiritual wellbeing’.54 However, only at the end of the
General Comment did the Committee mention the right to development, stating that not only
discrimination against children with disabilities poses risk to their development, but can also
result in the violation of numerous rights, including the right to development.55 Nonetheless,
no distinction between the child’s ‘development’ and the child’s ‘right to development’ was
drawn, and no explanations for any of these conclusions were given.
The third group of children is children belonging to indigenous populations. The most
comprehensive discussion about the rights of this group of children can be found in General
Comment number 11.56 At the outset, the General Comment repeated the same comments
concerning discrimination and its impact on children’s development, which had previously
been made with respect to other marginalised groups of children,57 but then it added some
new comments. The novelty of this General Comment is the explicit references to the right to
development that it makes, as opposed to merely referencing the broad, and vague,
‘development’ of the child, as the Committee usually does. For example, the Committee
expressed its concern that due to the particular vulnerability of indigenous children and the
high level of poverty among them, discrimination could not only impact their ‘survival and
development’, but also their right to an adequate standard of living.58 Based on Article 30 of
the Convention, which protects the identity rights of children of indigenous people and
children belong to linguistic, religious or cultural minorities, the Committee placed great
importance on protecting traditions and cultures, ‘particularly with reference to the protection
and harmonious development of the child’.59 The Committee further added that in cases
where the child’s community ‘retain[s] a traditional lifestyle, the use of traditional land is of
significant importance to their development and enjoyment of culture’.60 Therefore, States
53Ibid, paragraph 33.
54Ibid, paragraph 33. See also 2010 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Belgium’ (18 June 2010) UN Doc
CRC/C/BEL/CO/3-4, paragraph 45.
55 General Comment 9, supra n. 51, paragraph 32.
56 General Comment 11, supra n. 18.
57Ibid, paragraph 22.
58Ibid, paragraph 34.
59Ibid, paragraph 35.
60Ibid.
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Parties should guarantee that their policies concerning culture and land ensure ‘children’s
right to life, survival and development to the maximum extent possible’.61
It can be therefore concluded that according to the Committee, protecting the right to non-
discrimination is a precondition for realising children’s development and right to
development. However, the Committee does not sufficiently distinguish, if at all, between the
promotion of children’s development and between the promotion of the right to development.
Birth Registration
Article 7 of the Convention establishes the right of every child to acquire a nationality, to be
registered immediately after birth, and the right to a name. While Article 7 makes no
connection between these rights and the child’s development or the right to development, the
Committee connects the two, determining that having a birth certificate is another pre-
condition for the realisation of the right to development, for two reasons.
First, lack of national birth registration has a negative impact on a child’s sense of personal
identity. Second, in similarity to the argument put forward with respect to the right to non-
discrimination, without being registered at birth, children may be denied ‘entitlements to
basic health, education and social welfare’. Therefore, as ‘a first step in ensuring the rights to
survival, development and access to quality services for all children (Art. 6), the Committee
recommends that States parties take all necessary measures to ensure that all children are
registered at birth’.62
The ways in which the Committee understands what ‘child’s development’ means can be
gleaned from the connection it makes between the child’s knowledge about her origins and
child’s development, and between the important of access to education and health and
development. Without explicitly mentioning it, the Committee is concerned with the child
sense of self, and holds the view that education and health are important for healthy
development and the development of the child’s talents and knowledge. But the Committee
does not delineate whether, if at all, it distinguishes between the support for the child’s
development and the realisation of the child’s right to development.
61Ibid.
62Ibid.
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The Child’s Family
The Convention puts forward the assumption that a child should grow up in a household
headed by two parents,63 and determines that both parents should share the responsibility for
their child’s development.64The discussions about parental responsibilities focus on two
issues that the Committee considers most relevant for children’s development: family
structure and child rearing.
Family structure. The Committee has emphasised time and time again the influence that
family structures have on children’s development (while ignoring the right to development).
Constant references were made to the negative impact that ‘single parenthood’65 and ‘early
parenthood’ have on children’s development.66However, no specific age that qualifies to be
‘too young’ is mentioned.
The Committee also expressed concern with polygamy, asking States Parties to ‘undertake an
in-depth and comprehensive study on impact of polygamy in order to find out whether
polygamy has negative consequences on the upbringing and development of children’.67No
other types of family structures, such as children of same sex couples, children whose
separated parents have a new partner and spend their time in two households, adoption or
children born as a result of using reproductive technologies are mentioned by the Committee.
The Committee also ignores the relationship between children’s development and children
who are being brought up in non-Western family structures. For example, children who are
raised by members of their extended families, and not by their parents. This omission is
63 Articles 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 14, 19, 21, 22, 23, 27, 29 and 40. See, for example, Article 9(3) ‘States Parties shall
respect the right of the child who is separated from one or both parents to maintain personal relations and direct
contact with both parents…’; Article 18 ‘States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the
principle that both parents…’
64 Article 18.
65 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Spain’ (24 October 1994) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 28, paragraph 21;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Barbados’ (24 August 1999) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 103, paragraph 20;
see also UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Tajikistan’ (5 February 2010) UN Doc CRC/C/TJK/CO/2,
paragraph 43.
66 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Spain’ (1994), ibid; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Barbados’
(1999), Ibid; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Tajikistan’ (2010), ibid.
67 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Djibouti’ (7 October 2008) UN Doc CRC/C/DJI/CO/2, paragraph 40.
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rather surprising, taking the Committee’s own terms, and the determination about the
likelihood that these kinds of family structures affect children’s development.
Moreover, if the parent’s age is a relevant factor with regard to the child’s development, as
mentioned earlier, why does the Committee not mentioning ‘late parenthood’ or a
‘maximum’ age to become a parent? One possible explanation is that ‘early parenthood’ is a
practice that was, and still is, common in the non-Western world and therefore can easily be
criticized. While on the other hand, changes in the labour market and increasing use of
fertility treatment by middle class people in the Western world, have created a situation
where more people become parents in later stages of their life. This ‘late parenting’ is socially
acceptable, and, therefore, the Committee did not ask any questions with regard to the impact
of this phenomenon on children’s development. Therefore, the Committee’scultural biases
leads to a situation where the Committee fails to equally implement its conception of
children’s development on all children, including those who live in what the Committee itself
conceives as less common family structures.
Child rearing. The Committee concludes that the child’s mother should be the caregiver and
the child’s father should be the breadwinner. Fathers, in general, should also be ‘involved
enough’ in the upbringing of the child.68 If the mother works outside the home and the child
is left at a nursery, States Parties should provide sufficient resources for child care, or
otherwise the child’s ‘full physical, mental and intellectual development’ may not be
sufficiently supported.69 While the Committee urges States Parties to be active in ensuring
that both parents follow their obligations towards their children, it is also concerned with
States Parties interference with the family unit, stating that it is ‘excessive degree of State
involvement in children to the detriment of the parental involvement, hindering psychosocial
and cognitive development of the child’.70The Committee is not only alarmed bythe intrusion
of the family “privacy”, but also, on the other hand, with the ‘breakdown of families’, since
these situations ‘can have a negative impact on their [children’s] harmonious development’.71
68UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Barbados’ (1999), supra n. 65; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations:
Zambia’ (2 July 2003) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 206, paragraph 35; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations:
Nigeria’ (13 April 2005) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 257, paragraph 40.
69UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Nigeria’ (2005), ibid; See also UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations:
Jamaica’ (15 February 1995) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 32, paragraph 24.
70 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ (1 July 2004) UN Doc
CRC/C/15/Add. 239, paragraph 38.
71 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Paraguay’ (6 November 2001) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 166, paragraph
33.
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Therefore, in cases of separation, States Parties need to assist ‘both parents in the
performance of their child-rearing responsibilities’.72
Child rearing includes a wide-range of activities, but with regard to children’s development,
the Committeefocuses on one aspect: violence against children. While the text of the
Convention is silent on the matter (Article 19), the Committee holds the position that one of
the consequences of violence is a negative effect on children’s development.73
Corporal punishment is only one form of domestic abuse, which can be inflicted by parents,
siblings or members of the extended family. Regardless of any classification of this act, as a
form of discipline, part of cultural or religious practice or an abusive act, from the early days
of its work, the Committee held the view that corporal punishment is prohibited under Article
19, violates children’s right to dignity74 and stands against numerous other rights of children
that are covered by the Convention’s Articles 3, 5, 12, 28, 37, 39 and 6.75In light of this
strong position, theCommitteecalled States Parties to ‘effectively prevent and combat forms
of corporal punishment and ill treatment of children’ within the family, as well as in school or
other institutions where children may be placed.76Due to the wide dispersionof corporal
punishment, and the fact that it is, to varying extents, legal in most Member States (as of
October 2012, only 33 countries have prohibited corporal punishment), the Committee
dedicated two General Comments to this issue: General Comment No. 8 (2008)77 and General
Comment No. 13 (2011).78
72 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Spain’ (1994), supra n. 65, paragraph 21; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Czech Republic’ (18 March 2003) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 201, paragraph 42; UNCRC
‘Concluding Observations: Equatorial Guinea’ (3 November 2004) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 245, paragraph 41;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Paraguay’ (10 February 2010) UN Doc CRC/C/PRY/CO/3, paragraph 30.
73 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Peru’ (22 February 2000) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 120, paragraph 10;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Russian Federation’ (23 November 2005) UN Doc CRC/C/RUS/CO/3,
paragraph 39.
74 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Yemen’ (10 May 1999) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 102, paragraph 21.
75 UNCRC ‘General Comment 8 – The Rights of the Child for Protection From Corporal Punishment and other
Cruel or Degrading Forms of Punishment’ (2 March 2007) UN Doc CRC/GC/8; UNCRC ‘General Comment 13
- The Right of the Child to Freedom from all Forms of Violence’ (18 April 2011) UN Doc CRC/C/GC/13;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Australia’ (10 October 1997) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 79, paragraph 15;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Libya Arab Jamahiriya’ (4 February 1998) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 84,
paragraph 14; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Fiji’ (24 June 1998) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 89, paragraph
16; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Japan’ (5 June 1998) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 90, paragraph 45;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Luxemburg’ (24 June 1998) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 92, paragraph 31;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Yemen’, ibid; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Barbados’, supra n. 65,
paragraph 22; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: New Zealand’ (27 July 2003) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 216,
paragraph 30; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Czech Republic’ (2003), supra n. 72, paragraphs 39-41;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Austria’ (January 2005) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 251, paragraph 40.
76 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Canada’ (1995), supra n. 35, paragraph, 14.
77 UNCRC ‘General Comment 8’, supra n. 75.
78 UNCRC ‘General Comment 13’, supra n. 75, paragraph 15.
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The Committee stated that corporal punishment hinders children’s ‘optimal development’,79
and delineated the ‘developmental and behavioural consequences’ of violence against
children:
‘School non-attendance and aggressive, antisocial, self-destructive and
interpersonal destructive behaviours. [They] can lead, inter alia, to
deterioration of relationships, exclusion from school and conflict with the
law. There is also evidence that exposure to violence increases a child’s risk
of further victimization and an accumulation of violent experiences,
including later intimate partner violence’.80
The Committee’s position is simple: States Parties need to outlaw these practices. States
Parties should take legislative and other measures, such as awareness raising campaigns, to
combatsexual and emotional abuse.81These educational campaigns should be ‘aimed at
promoting positive, non violent forms of discipline and respect for children’s rights to human
dignity and physical integrity’,82and the ‘negative effects of corporal punishment on the
development of children’.83In order to care for the ‘physical and psychological recovery and
social integration’84 of children who suffered from abuse, States Parties have a duty to
establish and to sustain support services for them.
Another form of violence that the Committee extensively referred to are harmful traditional
practices. Article 24(3) of the Convention requires States Parties to ‘take all effective and
appropriate measures with a view to abolishing traditional practices prejudicial to the health
of children’. However, due to a lack of consensus among the drafters, the Convention does
not specify what these practices are.85The Convention does not link these practices to
children’s development, but the Committee has made such a link, while gradually developing
a definite list of these practices.
79Ibid.
80Ibid.
81UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Vanuatu’ (10 November 1999) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 111, paragraph
17; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Peru’ (2000), supra n. 73, paragraph 22.
82UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: New Zealand’ (2003), supra n. 75, paragraph 30.
83UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Australia’ (2005, supra n. 75, paragraph 40.
84 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Vanuatu’ (1999), ibid.
85 UNHCHR, Legislative History of the Convention on the Rights of the Child - Volume 1, supra n. 27, 580-603.
See also Sonia Harris-Short, ‘International Human Rights Law: Imperialist, Inept and Ineffective? Cultural
Relativism and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (2003) 25 Human Rights Quarterly 130, 136-
146.
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In the early years of its work, the Committee addressed ‘traditional cultural attitudes towards
children… [which] may contribute to hampering the implementation of the Convention’86 in
general terms and without defining what these attitudes are or what their implications might
be. Soon after, the Committee began to specify what these practices are. Today, the list
includes dowry87, early marriage,88 forced marriage,89 female genital mutilation (FGM),90
corporal punishment, amputation, scarring, burning and branding, infanticide, violent and
degrading initiation rites, force feeding of girls, fattening, virginity testing,91 ‘honour’ crimes,
accusation of witchcraft and uvulectomy and teeth extraction.92
The Committee concludes that these practices are harmful not only to children’s health,93 as
the Convention states, but also to children’s lives,94 survival and development,95 nutrition96
86 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Nigeria’ (30 October 1996) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 61, paragraph 9.
But see UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Qatar’ (14 October 2009) UN Doc CRC/C/QAT/CO/2, paragraph
55, where the Committee mentions early marriage ‘and other traditional practices harmful to the health, well-
being and development of children’.
87 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Bangladesh’ (1997), supra n. 34, paragraph 15
88 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Cyprus’ (7 June 1996) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 59, paragraph 16;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Bangladesh’ (1997), supra n. 34, paragraph 15; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Republic of Chad’ (12 February 2009) UN Doc CRC/C/TCD/CO/2, paragraph 62; UNCRC
‘Concluding Observations: Qatar’ (2009), supra n. 86, paragraph 55; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations:
Nigeria’ (11 June 2010) UN Doc CRC/C/NGA/CO/3-4, paragraph 65.
89 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Chad’ (2009), ibid, paragraph 62.
90UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Uganda’ (23 November 2005) UN Doc CRC/C/UGA/CO/2, paragraph
56; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Benin’ (20 October 2006) UN Doc CRC/C/BEN/CO/2, paragraph 54;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: United Republic of Tanzania’ (21 June 2006) UN Doc CRC/C/TZA/CO/2,
paragraph 50; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Kenya’ (19 June 2007) UN Doc CRC/C/KEN/CO/2,
paragraph 53; 2010 Nigeria, supra n. 88, paragraph 66. Previously, the Committee used to refer to FGM as a
harmful practice, but without determining that it impacts children’s development. See UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Nigeria’ (1996), supra n. 86 and UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Djibouti’ (2000), supra n.
45.
91 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Benin’ (24 August 1999) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 106, paragraph 16;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Russian Federation’ (2005) Russia, supra n. 73, paragraph 28; UNCRC
‘Concluding Observations: Benin’ (2006), ibid, paragraph 31; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Maldives’
(13 July 2007) UN Doc CRC/C/MDV/CO/3, paragraph 42.
92 UNCRC ‘General Comment 13’, supra n. 75, paragraph 29.
93UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Bangladesh’, supra n. 34, paragraph 15; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: United Republic of Tanzania’ (9 July 2001) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 156, paragraph 51; UNCRC
‘Concluding Observations: Kenya’ (7 November 2001) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 160, paragraph 48; UNCRC
‘Concluding Observations: India’, supra n. 34, paragraph 59; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Uganda’
(2005), supra n. 90, paragraph 56; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Benin’ (2006), supra n. 90, paragraph
54; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: United Republic of Tanzania’ (2006), supra n. 90, paragraph 51;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Kenya’ (2007),supra n. 90, paragraph 54; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Chad’ (2009), supra n. 88, paragraph 62; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Qatar’ (2009),
supra n. 86, paragraph 55.
94 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Maldives’ (2007), supra n. 91, paragraph 42.
95 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Cyprus’ (1996), supra n. 88, paragraph 16; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Central African Republic’ (18 October 2000) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 138, paragraph 33;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: United Republic of Tanzania’ (2001), supra n. 93, paragraph 51; UNCRC
‘Concluding Observations: Kenya’ (2001), supra n. 93, paragraph 48; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations:
India’ (2004), supra n. 34, paragraph 59; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Uganda’ (2005), supra n. 90,
paragraph 56; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Benin’ (2006), supra n. 90, paragraph 54; UNCRC
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and education.97Early marriage and FGM were explicitly defined as being ‘harmful to
physical and psychological well-being of children’.98 Although girls are more likely to be
subject to these practices,99 the Committee nevertheless emphasises that on the whole, these
practices impact on ‘boys as well as girls’.100 Therefore, States Parties need ‘to combat’ these
practices ‘effectively’101, including taking ‘legislative and awareness raising measures to
prohibit and eradicate’102 these practices. These educational campaigns should target ‘the
extended family and the traditional and religious leaders’.103 Recently, States Parties were
also asked to empower girls so they can decide ‘on their own body and their plans for
education and their future and also to make the public aware of girls’ right to be respected,
protected and supported in their personal development’.104
According to the Committee, violence against children violates a number of human rights, is
harmful to children’s psychological development and their well-being, poses a risk to their
mental development and might even cause permanent mental impairments.
Though the Committee does not do so explicitly, it is obvious that the Committee utilizes
developmental psychology when it comments about the influence of family structures and
child rearing practices on children’s development. While the Committee’s choice to adopt a
certain concept of developmental psychology can be criticized, a larger problem liesin the
way the Committee implements its conceptual framework. The Committee’s view of the role
of families and parents in caring for children’s development is relatively clear. However,
‘Concluding Observations: Tanzania’ (2006), supra n. 90, paragraph 51; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations:
Kenya’ (2007) supra n. 90, paragraph 54; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Chad’ (2009), supra n. 88,
paragraph 62; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Qatar’ (2009), supra n. 86, paragraph 55.
96 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Bangladesh’ (2003), supra n. 34, paragraph 15.
97Ibid.
98 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Nepal’ (21 September 2005) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 261, paragraph
68. But see General Comment 3, where the emphasis is on the damage it causes for girls. UNCRC ‘General
Comment Number 3 – HIV/AIDS and the Rights of the Child’ (17 March 2003) UN Doc CRC/GC/3/2003,
paragraph 11. UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Qatar’ (2009), supra n. 86, paragraph 55.
99UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Uganda’ (2005), supra n. 90, paragraph 56; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Benin’ (2006), supra n. 90, paragraph 54; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Tanzania’ (2006),
supra n. 90, paragraph 51; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Kenya’ (2007), supra n. 90, paragraph 54;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Chad’ (2009), supra n. 88, paragraph 62; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Qatar’ (2009), supra n. 86, 55.
100UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Kenya’ (2001), supra n. 93, paragraph 48. UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: India’ (2004), supra n. 34, paragraph 59.
101UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Turkey’ (9 July 2001) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 151, paragraph 32.
102UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Kenya’ (2001), supra n. 93, paragraph 48. UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: India’ (2004), supra n. 34, paragraph 59; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Uganda’ (2005),
supra n. 90, paragraph 56; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Benin’ (2006), supra n. 90, paragraph 54;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Chad’ (2009), supra n. 88, paragraph 62.
103UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Uganda’ (2005), supra n. 90, paragraph 56.
104UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Angola’ (2010), supra n. 33, paragraph 54.
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their role vis-à-vis the right to development of their children has, as this research shows, been
largely ignored.
Deprivation of Family Environment
Over the years, the Committee referred to several groups of children who are deprived of a
family environment, thus further emphasizing the importance of the family environment to
children’s development. These groups of children include children who are abandoned by
their families, children whose parents (one or both) are imprisoned or live in other state
institutions (for example, hospitals or rehab centres), children who are themselves imprisoned
or admitted to a hospital, children who live in prison with their imprisoned parent,
unaccompanied children and children outside their country of origin.
Abandoned children. This category includes children who found themselves deprived of a
family environment for a variety of reasons, including social, economical, and social. For
example, the collapse of the nuclear family, immigration, and runaway children. As a matter
of general policy, the Committee has determined that States Parties have a general duty to
care for these children, which includes taking ‘all available measures to establish alternative
care centres’, and monitoring and evaluating the progress of these children in order to ensure
their ‘adequate development’.105
Furthermore, as a matter of general policy, with respect to any child who is deprived of her or
his liberty, either in prison or in a detention centre due to her civil status (immigrant, stateless
children, asylum-seeking children), States Parties have the duty to take ‘into account the state
of development’ of such children.106 The conditions at detention centres should meet
children’s mental and physical health needs and accommodate their ‘overall development’.107
Children who live in prison with their imprisoned parents. States Parties have the duty to
ensure that their living conditions are ‘adequate for the child’s development’,108 and suitable
105UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Yemen’ (1999), supra n. 74, paragraph 23.
106 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Austria’ (2005), supra n. 75, paragraph 48.
107 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Australia’ (20 October 2005) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 268, paragraph
62.
108UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Bolivia’ (11 February 2005) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 256, paragraph
40; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Islamic Republic of Iran’ (31 March 2005) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.
254, paragraph 52; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Mexico’ (2 June 2006) UN Doc CRC/C/MEX/CO/3,
paragraph 40; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: The Plurinational State of Bolivia’ (16 October 2009) UN
Doc CRC/C/BOL/CO/4, paragraph 65.
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for the child’s ‘needs for the harmonious development of his/her personality’.109 More
specifically, States Parties should ensure that these children are not ‘deprived of their right to
health and education which is inappropriate for their physiological and psychological
development’.110 In the case of small children, these living conditions should be ‘adequate for
the child’s early development’.111 While children of incarcerated parents who live with their
parents get the chance to preserve the connection with their parents, the Committee concludes
that this form of living can also have negative consequences on the development of children.
Therefore, States Parties should establish institutional alternatives, such as foster families, as
an alternative sending these children to live in prison.112 This kind of mechanism requires a
placement process, which should be created and adapted with the aim to care for the child’s
development as well.113 In cases where children do end up being placed with foster families,
they should be allowed to ‘maintain personal relations and direct contact with their mothers
remaining in prison’.114
Imprisoned children and children who live in other institutions. The Committee does not say
much about these children, or about the effect that their family situation has on their
development, and it has been satisfied with calling on States Parties to ensure that the
‘adequate development’ of these children be constantly monitored and evaluated while they
live in institutions.115 Based on its view that children are better off living outside of
institutions, the Committee suggests that States Parties develop alternative institutional care
for imprisoned children or children who live in other institutions such as hospitals or
orphanages. These institutions should be designed and run in a way that promotes the child’s
‘harmonious development and preparation for responsible participation in society’.116
Children who are imprisoned for their own crimes. This is a specific category of children
deprived of a family environment. The Committee divides the care for these children’s
development into two categories: their development while in prison, and the care for their
development upon their release. In light of Articles 37 and 40 of the Convention, the
109UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Nepal’ (2005), supra n. 98, paragraph 52.
110UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Burundi’ (2010), supra n. 36, paragraph 62.
111UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Philippines’ (21 September 2005) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 259,
paragraph 54.
112UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Bolivia’ (26 October 1998) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 95, paragraph 23;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Bolivia’ (2005), supra n. 108, paragraph 40.
113 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Lebanon’ (8 June 2006) UN Doc CRC/C/LBN/CO/2, paragraph 44.
114 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Islamic Republic of Iran’ (2005), supra n. 108, paragraph 52.
115 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Nicaragua’ (24 August 1999) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 108, paragraph
31.
116 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Uruguay’ (30 October 1996) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 62, paragraph 23.
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Committee dedicated significant attention to the rights of imprisoned children,117 including
General Comment number 10 (2007).118 The Committee did not, however, devote significant
attention to the care for the development and right to development of these children.
In the first few comments relating to developmental issues of these children, the Committee
mostly focused on ‘adolescent health issues, including developmental, mental and
reproductive health concerns and substance abuse…’ of imprisoned children.119 Soon after,
the Committee further added that these children should not be ill-treated and that States
Parties should ensure ‘that conditions in detention facilities are not contrary to the child’s
development’.120 In addition, imprisoned children should receive educational opportunities
that will support, inter alia, their ‘full development’.121 These kinds of programmes ought to
be available to children upon their release from prison.122 General Comment 10 (2007)
elaborated on young offenders’ development. The General Comment emphasised the need to
care for children’s development, restating that ‘one of the most important goals of the
implementation of the CRC is to promote the full and harmonious development of the child’s
personality, talent and mental and physical abilities.’123 The Committee also states that ‘it
goes without saying that delinquency has a very negative impact on the child’s
development’.124 Recognizing the importance of development, the Committee further asked
that policies responding to juvenile delinquency are designed in ‘ways that support the child’s
development’.125 In particular, and on the bases of Article 37(a), States Parties should
117 See, for example, UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Madagascar’ (24 October 1994) UN Doc
CRC/C/15/Add. 26, paragraph 22; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Philippines’ (15 February 1995) UN
Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 29, paragraph 8; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Jamaica’ (1995), supra n. 69,
paragraph 17; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Honduras’ (24 August 1999) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 105,
paragraph 35.
118 UNCRC ‘General Comment Number 10 – Children’s Rights in Juvenile Justice’ (25 April 2007) UN Doc
CRC/C/GC/10.
119UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Burkina Faso’ (9 October 2002) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 193,
paragraph 40.
120UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Venezuela’ (5 October 2007) UN Doc CRC/C/VEN/CO/2, paragraph 77;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Sierra Leone’ (20 June 2008) UN Doc CRC/C/SLE/CO/2, paragraph 77;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Chad’ (2009), supra n. 88, paragraph 86; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Argentina’ (11 June 2010) UN Doc CRC/C/ARG/CO/3-4, paragraph 79.
121UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: China’ (24 November 2005) UN Doc CRC/C/CHN/CO/2, paragraph 93;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Mongolia’ (21 September 2005) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 264, paragraph
68; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Jordan’ (29 September 2006) UN Doc CRC/C/JOR/CO/3, paragraph
95; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Kenya’ (2007), supra n. 90, paragraph 68.
122UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: China’ (2005), ibid; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Mongolia’
(2005), ibid; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Jordan’ (2006), ibid; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations:
Kenya’ (2007), supra n. 90, paragraph 68.
123UNCRC ‘General Comment 10’, supra n. 118, paragraph 16.
124Ibid, paragraph 11.
125Ibid.
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consider the ‘very negative consequences for the child’s harmonious development’ that
imprisonment brings.126 Consequently, in order to ensure protection for the child’s ‘physical,
psychological, mental and social development’ professionals like police officers, prosecutors,
judges and social workers should be trained accordingly.127
Unaccompanied children and children that are outside their country of origin. The
Committee’s recommendations concerning these children’s development are similar to those
we previously saw with respect to this category of children. In General Comment 6 (2005),
the Committee determines that separated and unaccompanied children are:
‘vulnerable to various risks that affect their life, survival and development,
such as trafficking for purposes of sexual or other exploitation or
involvement in criminal activities which could result in harm to the child,
or in extreme cases, in death. Accordingly, Article 6 necessitates vigilance
by States parties in this regard, particularly when organized crime may be
involved.’128
The Committee further suggests that States Parties should take ‘practical measures’ in order
to ‘protect children from the risks’129 while taking into account their ‘state of
development’.130 These measures should include, among other things, care for their
accommodation,131 and ensuring an adequate standard of living for their ‘physical, mental,
spiritual and moral development’.132
It is obvious that the Committee is deeply concerned with the impact that deprivation of
family environment has on various developmental aspects (physical, psychological, mental
and social) and forms (‘early’, ‘harmonious’, ‘overall’, and ‘full’ development) of children’s
development. However, none of these concerns, nor their consequent duties imposed on
States Parties, are formulated in terms of caring for children’s right to development. All these
adjectives are vested with psychological jargon and derive from perception concerning the
psychological effect that being deprived from family connection, and to lesser extent being
imprisoned, have on children’s mental health.
126Ibid.
127Ibid, paragraph 40.
128 UNCRC ‘General Comment Number 6 – Treatment of Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside
Their Country of Origin’ (1 September 2005) UN Doc CRC/GC/2005/6, paragraph 23.
129Ibid, paragraph 24.
130 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Austria’ (2005), supra n. 75, paragraph 48.
131Ibid, paragraph 40.
132Ibid, paragraph 44.
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When reading the Committee’s jurisprudence, it is obvious that it upholds developmental
psychology as a normative framework to understand childhood, and to comment on family
structures and child rearing practices. While the Committee’s choice to use developmental
psychology can be criticised, a larger problem liesin the way the Committee implements its
conceptual framework. The Committee’s view of the role of families and parents in caring for
children’s development is relatively clear. However, their role vis-à-vis the right to
development of their children has been largely ignored. The question that should be asked at
this stage, is whether the on-going emphasis on caring for children’s development, while
overlooking the child’ right to development, is a result of a conscious choice, or a result of
conceptual, normative and institutional limitations.
Early Childhood Development
The Committee has found great importance in caring for early childhood development,
deeming this period as a critical moment ‘for realising children’s rights’,133 due to the mental
and social developmental stages that children are in during that time. The issue of early
childhood development has gained significant attention in Concluding Observations, as well
as in General Comment 7 (2005). The Committee’s point of departure is that:
‘Children experience the most rapid period of growth and change during the
human lifespan, in terms of their maturing bodies and nervous systems,
increasing mobility, communication skills and intellectual capacities, and
rapid shifts in their interests and abilities… [they] form strong emotional
attachments to their parents or other caregivers, from whom they seek and
require nurturance, care, guidance and protection, in ways that are
respectful of their individuality and growing capacities…
‘In their early years, children also ‘establish their own important
relationships with children of the same age, as well as with younger and
older children. Through these relationships they learn to negotiate and
coordinate shared activities, resolve conflicts, keep agreements and accept
responsibility for others… [they] actively make sense of the physical, social
and cultural dimensions of the world they inhabit, learning progressively
from their activities and their interactions with others, children as well as
adults’.134
133 UNCRC ‘General Comment Number 7 – Implementing Child Rights in Early Childhood’ (20 September
2006) UN Doc CRC/GC/2006/7/Rev.1, paragraph 6.
134Ibid.
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This statement recapitulates the Committee’s perception about children’s development. The
Committee characterises the time of childhood as a time of growth and change, primarily
which physical and mental developments. It is also evident that John Bowlby’s attachment
theory underpins the Committee’s attitude to this subject.135In a rather unusual manner, the
Committee explained the basis for its position, reaffirming what already has been was
concluded.
‘The Committee notes the growing body of theory and research which
confirms that young children are best understood as social actors whose
survival, well-being and development are dependent on and built around
close relationships. These relationships are normally with a small number
of key people, most often parents, members of the extended family and
peers, as well as caregivers and other early childhood professionals. At the
same time, research into the social and cultural dimensions of early
childhood draws attention to the diverse ways in which early development
is understood and enacted, including varying expectations of the young
child and arrangements for his or her care and education. A feature of
modern societies is that increasing numbers of young children are growing
up in multicultural communities and in contexts marked by rapid social
change, where beliefs and expectations about young children are also
changing, including through greater recognition of their rights. States
parties are encouraged to draw on beliefs and knowledge about early
childhood in ways that are appropriate to local circumstances and changing
practices, and respect traditional values, provided these are not
discriminatory, (article 2 of the Convention) nor prejudicial to children’s
health and well-being (art. 24.3), nor against their best interests (art. 3).
Finally, research has highlighted the particular risks to young children from
malnutrition, disease, poverty, neglect, social exclusion and a range of other
adversities. It shows that proper prevention and intervention strategies
during early childhood have the potential to impact positively on young
children’s current well-being and future prospects. Implementing child
rights in early childhood is thus an effective way to help prevent personal,
social and educational difficulties during middle childhood and
adolescence.’136
In light of this approach, the Committee concluded that the early years of the child’s life ‘are
the foundation for their physical and mental health, emotional security, cultural and personal
identity, and developing competencies’.137 Perhaps more important is the Committee’s claim
that
135 See John Bowlby, A Secure Base: Clinical Applications of Attachment Theory (Routledge, London 1988);
Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, Sonja Goldstein and Albert Solnit, The Best Interests of the Child: The Least
Detrimental Alternative (Simon&Schuster, New York 1996).
136 UNCRC ‘General Comment 7’, supra n. 133, paragraph 7. Emphasis added.
137Ibid, paragraph 6.
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‘children’s experiences of growth and development vary according to their
individual nature, as well as their gender, living conditions, family
organization, care arrangements and education system. Young children’s
experiences of growth and development are powerfully shaped by cultural
beliefs about their needs and proper treatment, and about their active role in
family and community’.138
Referring to Article 6 specifically, the Committee delineates the connection between
development, the right to development and other rights of children.
‘…ensuring survival and physical health are priorities, but States parties are
reminded that article 6 encompass all aspects of development, and that a
young child’s health and psychosocial well-being are in many respects
interdependent... The Committee reminds States parties (and others
concerned) that the right to survival and development can only be
implemented in a holistic manner,through the enforcement of all the other
provisions of the Convention, including rights to health, adequate nutrition,
social security, an adequate standard of living, a healthy and safe
environment, education and play, as well as through respect for the
responsibilities of parents and the provision of assistance and quality
services.139
These statements are interesting for two reasons. First, they are one of the rare occasions in
which the Committee explicitly mentions Article 6 and the need to protect the right to
development, as opposed to the need to protect ‘development’. Second, the Committee
presents a relatively comprehensive perspective concerning various dimensions of the child’s
life, and the relevance of different dimensions of development to the realisation of the right to
development, as well as other Convention’s rights. However, the Committee mixes child
survival, development, well-being and future prospects together, failing to distinguish
between the meaning of these four concepts, or the obligations they impose on duty bearers in
general, and on States Parties in particular. From these statements it is difficult to conclude
what the differences are between these four concepts. But more importantly, despite the
explicit references to the right to development and to the need to realise it in a holistic
manner, it is not clear what, if any, is the added value of protecting the right to development
over protecting other rights of the child, which are linked to children’s development and are
mentioned by the Committee.
138Ibid,paragraph 7.
139Ibid, paragraph 10. Emphasis added.
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In the Concluding Observations, the Committee tries to solidify its general approach, and to
link between early childhood development and some rights of the child, but not the right to
development. Most frequently, the Committee makes general statements about the
significance of promoting early childhood development programmes,140 especially among
low-income households,141and about the need to educate parents about its importance.142
These kinds of programmes should target reducing infant and under-five mortality rates,
providing universal immunization,143 and combating low birth weight144 (though it can be
argued that these are issues governed by children’s rights to life and survival). The
Committee further concludes that early childhood development is threatened by early
childhood diseases, such as acute respiratory infection and diarrhoea,145 chronic
malnutrition146 (which has ‘serious consequences on health and psychological
development’),147vitamin A deficiency,148anaemia, intestinal infectious diseases, bacterial
infection, measles and pneumonia,149malaria,150poor situation of sanitation, insufficient
access to clean and safe drinking water,151 and ‘increasing the usage of effectively treated
mosquito nets’.152 Institutional considerations should include maintaining sufficient numbers
‘of trained health workers’,153 ‘baby friendly hospitals that do not separate new born babies
140UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Jamaica’ (1995), supra n. 69, paragraph 24.
141UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Jordan’ (28 June 2000) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 125, paragraph 54.
142UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Jamaica’ (2010), supra n. 72, paragraph 61.
143UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Nigeria’ (2005), supra n. 68, paragraph 49; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Togo’ (31 March 2005) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 255, paragraph 50.
144 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Hungary’ (5 June 1998) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 87, paragraph 2;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Togo’, ibid, paragraph 50.
145 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: South Africa’ (23 February 2000) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 122,
paragraph 29; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Haiti’ (18 March 2003) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 202,
paragraph 44.
146 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Vanuatu’ (1999), supra n. 81, paragraph 18; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Cameroon’ (2001), supra n. 34, paragraph 42; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Burkina Faso’
(2002), supra n. 119, paragraph 38; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Madagascar’ (27 October 2003) UN
Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 218, paragraphs 47-48.
147 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Pakistan’ (27 July 2003) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 217, paragraph 53;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Togo’ (2005), supra n. 143, paragraph 50; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Djibouti’ (2008), supra n. 67, paragraph 30.
148 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Haiti’ (2003), supra n. 145, paragraph 44.
149 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Nepal’ (2005), supra n. 98, paragraph 60.
150 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Mali’ (2 November 1999) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 113, paragraph 26.
151 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Vanuatu’ (1999), supra n. 81, paragraph 18; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Ivory Coast’ (9 July 2001) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 155, paragraphs 38-39; UNCRC
‘Concluding Observations: Burkina Faso’ (2002), supra n. 119, paragraph 38; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Haiti’ (2003), supra n. 145, paragraph 44; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Swaziland’ (16
October 2006) UN Doc CRC/C/SWZ/CO/1, paragraph 52.
152 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Timor-Leste’ (14 February 2008) UN Doc CRC/C/TLS/CO/1,
paragraph 59.
153 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Vanuatu’ (1999), supra n. 81, paragraph 18; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Marshal Islands’ (19 November 2007) UN Doc CRC/C/MHL/CO/2, paragraph 50.
125
from their mothers after birth’,154 and ensuring equal access to health services, particularly in
remote and rural areas.155
In recent years, the Committee emphasises the important of pre-school educationfor the
promotion of children’s development,156 thus expanding the scope of education beyond the
primary school level included in the Convention.157Pre-school programmes should ‘address
early childhood development holistically’158 and be designed ‘in a culturally sensitive
manner’.159This sort of sensitivity is further stressed with respect to specific groups of
children who need more assistance than other, including minority children, children with
disabilities,160 and ‘children growing up under economic hardship and deprivation’.161
Even though the Committee mostly uses needs discourse, most, if not all of these
recommendations, can be articulated in human rights terms. These recommendations about
early childhood development associate with the respect for the child’s right to health, the
right to social security, the right to adequate standard of living, the right to education, the
right to playand leisure and the right to non-discrimination.162According to the Committee’s
reasoning, promoting these rights will promote children’s early development. In other words,
as in the cases of the right to non-discrimination or the right to have a birth certificate, the
Committee believes that promoting these rights is a precondition to promoting children’s
development.
The Right to Health and Development
Article 24 protects the child’s right to health, and established number of entitlements for
children. These entitlements are equal access to health care services, diminishing infant and
154 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Republic Serbia’ (2008), supra n. 34, paragraph 51.
155 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Hungary’ (1998), supra n. 144, paragraph 18; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Vanuatu’ (1999), supra n. 81, paragraph 18; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Columbia’ (16
October 2000) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 137, paragraph 45; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Ivory Coast’
(2001), supra n. 151, paragraph 38; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Cameroon’ (2001), supra n. 34,
paragraph 42.
156UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Libya Arab Jamahiriya’ (4 July 2003) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 209,
paragraph 39; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Malaysia’ (25 June 207) UN Doc CRC/C/MYS/CO/1,
paragraph 79.
157 Article 28(1)(a) recognizes the right of children to education only from a primary school level.
158UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Bangladesh’ (26 June 2009) UN Doc CRC/C/BGD/CO/4, paragraph 75;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Bolivia’ (2009), supra n. 108, paragraph 68.
159UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Bolivia’ (2009), supra n. 108, paragraph 68.
160UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Bulgaria’ (23 June 2008) UN Doc CRC/C/BGR/CO/2, paragraph 58.
161 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Georgia’ (23 June 2008) UN Doc CRC/C/GEO/CO/3, paragraph 57.
162 UNCRC ‘General Comment 7’, supra n. 133, paragraph 10.
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child mortality, developing primary health care services, combating diseases and malnutrition
and using technology to provide adequate food and clean drinking water, consideration of the
risks of environmental pollution, ensuring pre and post natal health care for mothers,
education and providing information on child health and nutrition, the advantages of
breastfeeding, hygiene and environmental sanitation and prevention of accidents, and
abolishing traditional practices.163Article 24 does not mention children’s development as an
issue of concern, but, as we already have seen, the Committee hasmade a link between the
child’s right to health and children’s development when referring to harmful traditional
practices, and the need to guarantee equal access to health care.
When addressing the issues of child’s health and its connection to child’s development, the
Committee highlighted several environmental hazards that have serious negative
consequences for ‘children’s health and development’. This list includes water
contamination, air pollution and environmental degradation, low availability of sanitation
facilities and problems with industrial waste management.164 However, while the care for
child’s development is emphasised, the right to development is not mentioned in those
remarks. In addition, considerable attention is given to two issues: children with HIV/AIDS
and adolescent health, including dedicating two General Comments to them (General
Comments 3 and 4, respectively).165
Children with HIV/AIDS
HIV/AIDS is a pandemic that affects the health of children who have it, as well as the lives of
children who are born to or live in families where family member or members have
HIV/AIDS. Therefore, the Committee is correctto suggest that HIV/AIDS affects all rights of
children, including ’civil, political, economic, social and cultural’166rights. Therefore, the
163 Article 24(1)-(3).
164 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Bangladesh’ (2003), supra n. 34, paragraph 53. UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Philippines’ (2005), supra n. 111, paragraph 60; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Uzbekistan’
(2 June 2006) UN Doc CRC/C/UZB/CO/2, paragraph 54; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Thailand’ (2006),
supra n. 40, paragraph 55.
165 UNCRC ‘General Comment 3’, supra n. 98; UNCRC ‘General Comment 4 - Adolescent Health and
Development in the Context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (1 July 2003) UN Doc
CRC/GC/4/2003. But see, for example, an exception to this general claim, were the Committee express concerns
about the threat to children’s health and development in Ukraine, due to the ‘negative consequences of the
Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster…‘. UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Ukraine’ (9 October 2002) UN Doc
CRC/C/15/Add. 191, paragraph 6.
166 UNCRC ‘General Comment 3’, supra n. 98, paragraph 5; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: United
Republic of Tanzania’ (2001), supra n. 93, paragraph 30.
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Convention’s four guiding principles, including the right to development, should ‘be the
guiding themes in the consideration of HIV/AIDS at all levels of prevention, treatment, care
and support.’167 In addition to this general statement, the Committee further emphasises the
need to address specific rights. It includes:
‘The right to access information and material aimed at the promotion of
their social, spiritual and moral well-being and physical and mental health
(Article 17); the right to preventive health care, sex education and family
planning education and services (Article 24(f)); the right to an appropriate
standard of living (Article 27); the right to privacy (Article 16); the right
not to be separated from parents (Article 9); the right to be protected from
violence (Article 19); the right to special protection and assistance by the
State (Article 20); the rights of children with disabilities (Article 23); the
right to health (Article 24); the right to social security, including social
insurance (Article 26); the right to education and leisure (Articles 28 and
31); the right to be protected from economic and sexual exploitation and
abuse, and from illicit use of narcotic drugs (Articles 32, 33, 34 and 36); the
right to be protected from abduction, sale and trafficking as well as torture
or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Articles 35
and 37); and the right to physical and psychological recovery and social
reintegration (Articles 39)’.168
The reason for bringing together this long list of rights under the umbrella of providing for
children with HIV/AIDS is that ‘children are confronted with serious challenges to the above-
mentioned rights as a result of the epidemic.’169 Surprisingly enough, and despite the
tendency to link almost every aspect of the child’s life to development, neither development
nor the right to development are included in this long list. Nevertheless, reflecting the
description of Article 6 as representing a life-survival-development’s continuum,170 the
Committee states that ‘children have the right not to have their lives arbitrarily taken, as well
as to benefit from economic and social policies that will allow them to survive into adulthood
and develop in the broadest sense of the word’.171 The end of the process, therefore, could not
be clearer, nor the embodiment of the ‘human becomings’ conception of childhood on the
Committee’s work. Unfortunately, the Committee once again failed to take this as an
opportunity to address the question of how this conclusion can inform the meaning of the
right to development.
167UNCRC ‘General Comment 3’, supra n. 98,paragraph 5.
168Ibid,paragraph 6.
169Ibid.
170 See chapter two.
171UNCRC ‘General Comment 3’, supra n. 98, paragraph 11.
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Adolescence Health and Development
General Comment 4 is dedicated to the issue of ‘adolescence health and development’, thus
emphasising the linkage between health and development. Perhaps more importantly, it is the
attention given the fact that ‘development’ is not only an issue of babies or toddlers, but of
children, adolescence included, in general. Similarly to the way in which the Committee
characterizesthe period of early childhood, the time of adolescenceis also being
conceptualisedusing the ‘becomings’ model. The Committee takes Article 5 and the evolving
capacities principle as an underlying narrative of analysis, describing adolescence as a:
‘Period characterized by rapid physical, cognitive and social changes,
including sexual and reproductive maturation; the gradual building up of
the capacity to assume adult behaviours and roles involving new
responsibilities requiring new knowledge and skills. While adolescents are
in general a healthy population group, adolescence also poses new
challenges to health and development owing to their relative vulnerability
and pressure from society, including peers, to adopt risky health
behaviour…The dynamic transition period to adulthood is also generally a
period of positive changes, prompted by the significant capacity of
adolescents to learn rapidly, to experience new and diverse situations, to
develop and use critical thinking, to familiarize themselves with freedom, to
be creative and to socialize.’172
The adolescent child is therefore situated in a unique mode of transition, from being a ‘child’
to becoming an ‘adult’. This period of ‘dynamic transition’ requires, according to the
Committee, interpreting Articles 6 and 24 ‘more broadly’173 in order to
‘ensure that adolescents do enjoy the highest attainable standard of health,
develop in a well-balanced manner, and are adequately prepared to enter
adulthood and assume a constructive role in their communities and in
society at large’.174
The Committee further stipulates the risk factors to adolescence health and development, and
subsequently, the rights that ought to be protected in order to realise the right to development.
172UNCRC ‘General Comment 4’, supra n. 165, paragraph 2.
173Ibid, paragraph 4.
174Ibid.
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These risk factors are: discrimination;175 early marriage and pregnancy; injuries and death
resulting from road traffic accidents; mental disorders and psychosocial illness, including
depression, eating disorders and self-destructive behaviour (which can sometimes lead to
self-inflicted injuries and suicide);and honour killing.176Guaranteeing adolescents’ right to
health and development requires tackling these risk factors, as well as ‘the promotion and
enforcement of the provisions and principles of the Convention, especially Articles 2-6, 12-
17, 24, 28, 29 and 31.’177The Committee gives no explanations for these determinations,
beyond a few general statements about the importance of respecting a certain right in order to
realise the right to health and development. For example: ‘The right to express views freely
and have them duly taken into account is also fundamental in realizing adolescents’ right to
health and development’.178
Though the Committee did mention the issue of adolescence health prior to the publication of
General Comment number 4,179 it rarely linked it to adolescence’s development.180 However,
following the publication of General Comment 4 in 2003, many of the Concluding
Observations referred to adolescent’s development, but not to their right to development. But
with few exceptions, these Concluding Observations mirror the conclusions of General
Comment 4.181 In the exceptions, the Committee elaborated more about the issue. For
example, the Committee concluded that in realising adolescent health, questions of sex, age
and ‘psychological development’182should be considered, and that the ‘harmful effects of
substance consumption on the physical, emotional and psychological development and
175 ‘Adolescents who are subject to discrimination are more vulnerable to abuse, other types of violence and
exploitation, and their health and development are put at greater risk’. Ibid, paragraph 6.
176Ibid, paragraphs 20-22, 24.
177Ibid, paragraph 14.
178Ibid, paragraph8.
179 See, for example, UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Ecuador’ (26 October 1998) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.
93, paragraph 23; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Kuwait’ (26 October 1998) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 96,
paragraph 27.
180 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Jordan’ (2000), supra n. 141, paragraph 47.
181 See, for example, UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Morocco’ (10 July 2003) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.
211, paragraph 46; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Zambia’ (2003), supra n. 68, paragraph 48; UNCRC
‘Concluding Observations: Antigua and Barbuda’ (3 November 2004) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 247, paragraph
53; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ (2004), supra n. 70, paragraph
52; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Liberia’ (1 July 2004) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 236, paragraph 48;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Rwanda’ (2004), supra n. 38, paragraph 50; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Benin’ (2006), supra n. 90, paragraph 55; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Swaziland’
(2006), supra n. 151, paragraph 55; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Columbia’ (8 June 2006) UN Doc
CRC/C/COL/CO/3, paragraph 70; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Tanzania’ (2006), supra n. 90,
paragraph 47; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Kenya’ (2007), supra n. 90, paragraph 50.
182 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Romania’ (30 June 2009) UN Doc CRC/C/ROM/CO/4, paragraph 69.
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wellbeing of children’183 should be taken into account (those are the rare occasions where the
Committee explicitly refers to psychology). Likewise, mental health issues should also be
taken into account, and assistance should be available to children ‘in order to support their
cognitive, social and emotional developmental needs’.184
The Committee’s emphasis on adolescents’ development is important for several reasons.
Probably the most important one is the Committee’s usage of rights discourse with relation to
development. While the Committee usually speaks about children’s ‘development’ as a
description of children’s organic conditions, in this case the Committee explicitly refers to the
right to development. The Committee utilizes the evolving capacities principle and considers
adolescence as a stage of childhood and, although this stage is not recognised by the
Convention, the Committee analyses the characteristics of adolescence in light of this
developmental stage. Consequently, the Committee specifies what the developmental needs
of adolescents are, especially in relation to their health, and elaborate on what sort of rights
these needs manifest. Once again, the Committee’s reasoning shows that it is mostly
concerned with the child’s future, perceiving the right to development as a vehicle to ensure a
‘healthy’ process of growth, which should result in the creation of a ‘healthy’ adult.
Poverty and Adequate Standard of Living
The child’s right to an adequate standard of living is protected by Article 27, which offers the
most comprehensive description of what ‘children’s development’ stands for. The Article
mandates that the child’s right to a ‘standard of living’ should be adequate for the child’s
physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development’. As such, the right to an adequate
standard of living is not only an important right in itself, but, like other rights, is also
perceived as a vehicle for promoting five dimensions of development.185 In its discussions
about this right, the Committee focuses mostly on the connection between the living
conditions of poor children and the impact these conditions have on development.
183 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ (27 March 2009) UN Doc
CRC/C/PRK/CO/4, paragraph 62.
184 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Mongolia’ (29 January 2010) UN Doc CRC/C/MNG/CO/3-4, paragraph
55.
185 Compare to Article 25 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and Article 11 of the International
Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. These two articles protect the right to an adequate
standard of living and include different specifications and aims. In these articles of ‘general’ international law,
the right includes, inter alia, the right to food, clothing and shelter. The impact of this desirable standard of
living is not manifested in terms of the future benefit that the human person will have.
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The Committee has focused primarily on questions related to malnutrition and housing, and
has been less concerned with intangible aspects of poverty186 (although Concluding
Observations from 2010 onwards may signify a change in this respect).187 Time and again,
the Committee determined that eliminating poverty and malnutrition and improving food
security188 are needed in order to improve children’s rights to survival, healthy development,
education and wellbeing.189 It should also contribute to the child’s ‘full’190 and ‘holistic
development’.191 According to the Committee, the first step that States Parties ought to take
in order to meet this requirement is to define a national poverty line,192 so that policies and
programmes can be designed accordingly.193 On top of these recommendations, the
Committee links children’s material living conditions not only to their development, but also
to their ‘everyday quality of life’ (though it does not specify what ‘quality of life’ stands
for).194On the basis of Article 27, the Committee then obliges States Parties to undertake even
more duties to ensure children’s social security net. Such a social security net should be
available to children and:
‘in light of articles 3, 4, 6, 26 and 27 of the Convention, the Committee
encourages the State party to take all appropriate measures to the maximum
extent of its available resources, in particular at the local level, to support
families in a difficult economic and/or social situation in order to ensure, to
the maximum extent possible, the survival and development of all
children’.195
186For example,UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Norway’ (3 March 2010) UN Doc CRC/C/NOR/CO/4,
paragraphs 46-47.
187See, for example, UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Japan’ (20 June 2010) UN Doc CRC/C/JPN/CO/3,
paragraphs 66-67.
188UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Sierra Leon’ (2008), supra n. 120, paragraph 29.
189UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Honduras’ (1994), supra n. 22, paragraph 15; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Bangladesh’ (1997), supra n. 34, paragraph 21; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Austria’ (7
May 1999) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 98, paragraph 24; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Ethiopia’ (21
February 2000) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 144, paragraph 33; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Kenya’
(2001), supra n. 93, paragraph 27; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Australia’ (2005), supra n. 107,
paragraph 56; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Ireland’ (29 September 2006) UN Doc CRC/C/IRL/CO/2,
paragraph 57; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Venezuela’ (2007), supra n. 120, paragraph 65; UNCRC
‘Concluding Observations: Djibouti’ (2008), supra n. 67, paragraph 71. It is worth mentioning that at the early
stages of its work, the Committee used to ‘express concerns’ about children’s poverty and its impact on their
health and education, but without linking it to their development. See, for example, UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Bulgaria’ (24 January 1997) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 66, paragraph 16; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Ethiopia’ (24 January 1997) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 67, paragraph 12.
190 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Spain’ (29 September 2010) UN Doc CRC/C/ESP/CO/3-4, paragraph
52.
191 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Sudan’ (1 October 2010) UN Doc CRC/C/SDN/CO/3-4, paragraph 60.
192 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Australia’ (2005), supra n. 107, paragraph 56.
193 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Lithuania’ (21 February 2001) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 146, paragraph
42.
194 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Latvia’ (21 February 2000) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 142, paragraph 42.
195 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Latvia’ (2001), ibid; See also UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations:
Georgia’ (27 July 2003) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 222, paragraph 54; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations:
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The Committee links children’s best interests, the duty to realise social and economic rights
gradually, children’s rights to life, survival and development, the right to social security and
the right to adequate standard of living together, in order to ensure children’s ‘survival and
development’. However, like Article 11 of the ICESCR, the Committee mandates States
Parties to support families, rather than support children. Nevertheless, in other comments the
Committee rightly notes that some groups of children might not benefit from the support
given to their families.196However, the Committee does not provide a remedy for this
inequality within the household. It is only in 2010 that the Committee began to promote the
view that poverty reduction strategies should be developed with the active participation of
children,197 a method that not only can could empower children, but also begin a process of
eliminating intra-household discrimination.198
Children who Work and/or Live on the Street
One group of children who obviously do not enjoy the right to an adequate standard of living
are children who live and/or work in the street. These children suffer from a multi-
dimensional violation of their rights. Inter alia, they are deprived of a family environment,
denied their rights to education, health, non-discrimination and freedom from economic
exploitation and abuse (Articles 28-29, 24, 2 and 32 respectively), which further add to the
negative impacts on their development.199 Therefore, the Committee has asked States Parties
to provide these children with programmes that will ‘enhance their living conditions and
improve their development’.200 On a more concrete basis, States Parties should provide for
adequate nutrition, clothing, housing, health care and educational opportunities (including
Jamaica’ (4 July 2003) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 210, paragraph 46; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations:
Angola’ (2010), supra n. 33, paragraph 58.
196UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: France’ (2004), supra n. 31, paragraph 46.
197UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Tajikistan’ (2010), supra n. 65, paragraph 59.
198 This issue is further discussed in chapter six.
199UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Russian Federation’ (1999), supra n. 42, paragraph 12; UNCRC
‘Concluding Observations: Columbia’ (16 October 2000) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 137, paragraph 34; UNCRC
‘Concluding Observations: Turkey’ (2001), supra n. 101, paragraph 64; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations:
Moldova’ (31 October 2002) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 192, paragraph 48; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations:
Zambia’ (2003), supra n. 68, paragraph 69; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Estonia’ (2003), supra n. 43,
paragraph 45; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: India’ (2004), supra n. 34, paragraph 77; UNCRC
‘Concluding Observations: Mongolia’ (2002), supra n. 121, paragraph 63; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations:
Azerbaijan’ (17 March 2006) UN Doc CRC/C/AZE/CO/2, paragraph 64; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations:
Venezuela’ (2007), supra n. 120, paragraph 73.
200 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ (11 June 2010) UN Doc
CRC/C/CO/2, paragraph 72.
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vocational and life-skills training),201 access to rehabilitation services for physical, sexual and
substance abuse, protection from police brutality, services for reconciliation with their
families’,202 and ‘official documents when necessary’.203 All of these services are needed in
order to support the ‘full development’204 of street children. But the Committee neither
elaborates on what qualifies as ‘full development’, nor does it refer to the right to
development of these children.
Nevertheless, the Committee’s jurisprudence concerning adequate standard of living and its
impact on the child’s development is exceptional, since the Committee not only identifies
some institutional situations that interfere with children’s development, but also stipulates
specific aspects of development (with the exception of street children and the care for their
‘full development’). Thisdefinition of an adequate standard of living means that realising this
right serves a greater good, which is the promotion of children’s physical, mental, spiritual,
moral and social development.
Education
The Convention protects children’s right to education and defines the aims of education in
Articles 28 and 29, respectively. The Convention states that the right to education should be
available to all children on the bases of equal opportunity,205 from the stage of primary
education,206 and all the way up to higher education.207 Children’s development occupies a
significant part of the aims of education as set forth in Article 29. Conceiving of the
conception of childhood as a time of change and growth, Article 29(1)(a) defines the first aim
201 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Turkey’ (2001), supra n. 101, paragraph 64.
202 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Turkey’ (2001), supra n. 101, paragraph 64; See also UNCRC
‘Concluding Observations: Kuwait’ (1998), supra n. 179, paragraph 25; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations:
Moldova’ (2002), supra n. 199, paragraph 48; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Zambia’ (2003), supra n. 68,
paragraph 69; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Estonia’ (2003), supra n. 43, paragraph 45; UNCRC
‘Concluding Observations: Mongolia’ (2005), supra n. 121, paragraph 63; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations:
Azerbaijan’ (2006), supra n. 199, paragraph 64.
203UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: India’ (2004), supra n. 34, paragraph 77.
204UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Turkey’ (2001), supra n. 101, paragraph 65; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Moldova’ (2002), supra n. 199, paragraph 48; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Zambia’
(2003), supra n. 68, paragraph 69; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Estonia’ (2003), supra n. 43, paragraph
45; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: India’ (2004), supra n. 34, paragraph 77; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Mongolia’ (2005), supra n. 121, paragraph 63; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Burkina
Faso’ (29 January 2010) UN Doc CRC/C/BFA/CO/3-4, paragraph 71; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations:
Paraguay’ (2010), supra n. 72, paragraph 69.
205 Article 28(1).
206 Article 28(1)(a).
207 Article 28(1)(d).
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of education as ‘the development of the child’s personality, talent and mental and physical
abilities to their fullest potential’. Marking the end of the development process as the
facilitation of the child’s ‘fullest potential’, is the only place in the Convention where a
suggestion about the outcome of development is made.
The Committee’s extensive jurisprudence on education derives from the view that education
is vital to promoting several aspects of children’s development. The Committee recommends
that educational opportunities be available to children as early as possible, writing that ‘the
right to education during early childhood as beginning at birth and closely linked to young
children’s right to maximum development (Article 6.2)’.208 The Committee further adds that
implementing the right to education for young children should be done in ‘a holistic approach
to early childhood development’.209
One of the preconditions for fulfilling the right to education is that children will have access
to schools.210 Therefore, it is the State Party’s responsibility to ensure school attendance of
children, including actively promoting the attendance of girls and other disempowered
groups.211 States Parties should also address school drop-out rates, since absenteeism has a
negative impact on children’s ‘development and future access to employment’.212
Availability of education also requires that education be provided free of cost,213 including
waiver from payment of a ‘voluntary quota’ and/or school’ books or other school material.
States Parties should also provide sufficient support to families with financial problems, so
these families are able to support the ‘adequate educational development of their children’.214
After access and accessibility to school have been established, we can turn to the schools’
environment. In that regard, the Committee concludes that school should be free from
violence, including bullying, since this practice affects children’s ‘psychological health,
educational achievements and social development’.215
208UNCRC, ‘General Comment 7’, supra n. 133, paragraph 28. See also the discussion about early childhood
and development.
209UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: El Salvador’ (17 February 2010) UN Doc CRC/C/SLV/CO/3-4,
paragraph 68.
210 Realizing the right to education requires much more, mainly the four A’s: Availability, Accessibility,
Acceptability and Adaptability. The Committee has addressed these aspects as part of its monitoring the
implementation of Article 28. I refer only to the links the Committee made between the realisation of the right to
education and development.
211UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Brazil’ (3 November 2004) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 241, paragraph 58.
212UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Finland’ (20 October 2005) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 272, paragraph 42.
213 Article 28(1)(a).
214UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Nicaragua’ (21 September 2005) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 265,
paragraph 58.
215 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Australia’ (2005), supra n. 107, paragraph 60.
135
The issue of children’s development, as opposed to their right to development, gained more
attention when the Committee addressed the aims of education. The Committee dedicated its
first General Comment to this subject,216 stating that education should:
‘Promote, support and protect the core value of the Convention: the human
dignity innate in every child and his or her equal and inalienable rights.
These aims, set out in the five subparagraphs of article 29 (1) are all linked
directly to the realization of the child’s human dignity and rights, taking
into account the child’s special developmental needs and diverse evolving
capacities. The aims are: the holistic development of the full potential of the
child …’217
Education, therefore, should be:
‘Designed to provide the child with life skills, to strengthen the child’s
capacity to enjoy the full range of human rights and to promote a culture
which is infused by appropriate human rights values. The goal is to
empower the child by developing his or her skills, learning and other
capacities, human dignity, self-esteem and self-confidence. “Education” in
this context goes far beyond formal schooling to embrace the broad range
of life experiences and learning processes which enable children,
individually and collectively, to develop their personalities, talents and
abilities and to live a full and satisfying life within society.’218
Commenting specifically on the first aim of education, the Committee added that:
‘Insists upon a holistic approach to education which ensures that the
educational opportunities made available reflect an appropriate balance
between promoting the physical, mental, spiritual and emotional aspects of
education, the intellectual, social and practical dimensions, and the
childhood and lifelong aspects. The overall objective of education is to
maximize the child’s ability and opportunity to participate fully and
responsibly in a free society. It should be emphasized that the type of
teaching that is focused primarily on accumulation of knowledge,
prompting competition and leading to an excessive burden of work on
children, may seriously hamper the harmonious development of the child to
the fullest potential of his or her abilities and talents’.219
The aims of the education process are defined in broad terms that establish a strong
connection between education and the child’s ability to enjoy harmonious development, and
realise her fullest potential. The Committee, however, does not link the aims of education to
216 UNCRC ‘General Comment 1’, supra n. 17.
217Ibid. Emphasis added.
218Ibid, supra n. 17.
219Ibid, emphasis added. See also UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Romania’ (18 March 2003) UN Doc
CRC/C/15/Add. 199, paragraph 53. Emphasis added.
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the child’s right to development, but rather it is more concerned with supporting the child’s
psychological development. In similarity to its interpretation to other rights in the
Convention, the Committee interprets the right to education as a vehicle to promote a greater
good. I.e., the full realisation of the child’s potential.
In is with these perceptions that the Committee monitors the implementation of Articles 28-
29. The Committee, by restating Article 29(1), continually emphasizes that education should
be directed towards the development ‘of the child’s personality, talent and mental and
physical abilities to their fullest potential’.220 The Committee adds that school’s curricula
should address ‘all-round development’,221 ‘focus on the personal development and
vocational training’ of students,222 and promote children’s ‘cognitive, social and emotional
development’.223 Nevertheless, while encouraging students to achieve their potential, the
Committee calls schools not to create too competitive atmosphere between pupils, since such
an environment can place ‘additional burdens on children and may hamper the development
of the child to her or his fullest potential’,224 and may also expose children ‘to developmental
disorders’.225 Such an environment, as well as long school hours, can also prevent children
from spending time pursuing ‘leisure, physical activities and rest’, and, therefore, frustrate
their development.226 These statements reinforce the claim that the Committee’s perception of
children’s development is entrenched in mainstream developmental psychology and with
Western perception of childhood. While the Committee asked to advance the development of
children’s potential, it flinched from educational practices that ‘push’ the child too much and
thus, pose a risk to the fragile process of development.
The right to rest and leisure, as protected in Article 31, gains attention in the context of
education. As the Committee does with respect to most of the Convention’s rights, the
implementation of right is also being assessed based on the contribution to children’s
development. For example, the Committee asks States Parties to educate parents about ‘the
220 See, for example, UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Slovakia’ (23 October 2000) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.
140, paragraph 46.
221 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: China’ (2005), supra n. 121, paragraph 77.
222 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Macedonia’ (23 February 2000) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 118,
paragraph 45.
223 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Poland’ (30 October 2002) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 194, paragraph 45.
224 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Thailand’ (2006), supra n. 40, paragraph 64.
225 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Japan’ (1998), supra n. 75, paragraph 22; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Singapore’ (27 July 2003) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 220, paragraph 42; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Republic of Korea’ (18 March 2003) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 197, paragraph 52; UNCRC
‘Concluding Observations: Japan’ (26 February 2004) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 231, paragraph 49; UNCRC
‘Concluding Observations: Thailand’ (2006), supra n. 40, paragraph 65.
226 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Japan’ (1998), supra n. 75, paragraph 22.
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importance of these activities for the development of the child’.227 Alongside the role of
parents, States Parties themselves have a duty to ‘pay adequate attention to planning leisure
and cultural activities for children… taking into consideration the physical and psychological
development of the child’.228 Leisure time programmes should not be limited to playground,
and also include cultural activities, which are needed for ‘the physical and psychological
development of the child’.229 Opportunities to play should be available ‘particularly [to] those
under the age of two years [because such opportunities] have a crucial bearing on the
development of the child’s cognitive abilities and their social and emotional development’.230
Children should have the opportunity to play with other children, as well as with their
mothers, since mother-child activities ‘have a crucial bearing on the development of the
child’s.231 This comment was followed with a more gender neutral one, stating that parent-
children activities,232 and not only mother-child activities, have a crucial bearing on the
development of children.
Another right of children that is linked to their rights to education and leisure time is the right
to information. Article 17 recognises the child’s right to receive information, stating that it is
important for children’s ‘social, spiritual, and moral wellbeing and physical and mental
health’. The Committee asks if any and all kinds of information promote this goal,
concluding that the answer is ‘no’. On the one hand, the Committee denounces States Parties
where the media abuses children to the ‘detriment of their personality and status as
minors’,233 primarily as exposure can injure ‘their wellbeing and development’. States Parties
are therefore required to take measures to protect children from ‘harmful effects of the print,
electronic and audio-visual media, in particular violence and pornography’.234 On the other
hand, the Committee asks States Parties to take measures that will enable children to access
227 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Mauritania’ (6 November 2001) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 159,
paragraph 46.
228 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Benin’ (2006), supra n. 90, paragraph 64; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Lithuania’ (17 March 2006) UN Doc CRC/C/LTU/CO/2, paragraph 59.
229 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Lithuania’ (2001), supra n.193, paragraph 46.
230 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Belize’ (10 May 1999) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 99, paragraph 23.
231Ibid.
232 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Mauritania’ (2001), supra n. 227, paragraph 46.
233 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Nicaragua’ (1995), supra n. 41, paragraph 17.
234 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Federated State of Micronesia’ (4 February 1998) UN Doc
CRC/C/15/Add. 86, paragraph 16; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Canada’ (1995), supra n. 35, paragraph
15; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Trinidad and Tobago’ (10 October 1997) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 82,
paragraph 15; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Lithuania’ (2001), supra n. 193, paragraph 28; UNCRC
‘Concluding Observations: Kazakhstan’ (19 June 2007) UN Doc CRC/C/KAZ/CO/3, paragraph 32; UNCRC
‘Concluding Observations: Mongolia’ (2010), supra n. 184, paragraph 35.
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information, especially in libraries,235 that can promote their ‘development and physical and
mental health’,236 as well as their ‘cultural development’.237
A comprehensive perception of education includes access to education, the aims of education,
school atmosphere, children’s leisure time and the kind of information and messages that they
are exposed to. Most, if not all, of these aspects are linked to children’s rights by the
Committee, as well as to various domains of children’s development. These different aspects
are described as either having an impact on them, or as essential for their realisation. The
Committee perceives education as a fundamental factor in promoting children’s harmonious
development and the realisation of their ‘maximum’ potential. But it is only early childhood
education opportunities that the Committee has linked to the child’s right to development,
while in general it employed the psycho-social development vocabulary, ignoring the
articulation of development as a human rights of children.
Armed Conflicts
Armed conflicts violate number of human rights of all people who are involved in them, both
directly and indirectly, including children. Children can become victims of armed conflicts in
different ways, ranging from being forcibly recruited to armed groups (either by official
states’ army or by other militias), suffering injury or death, or losing family members, to a
secondary consequences, such as not having access to health care or education services.238 In
light of Articles 38-39 of the Convention, the Committee focuses its attention on children
who are victims of wars, including child soldiers. As of 2002, the rights of these children are
primarily discussed as part of the monitoring processes of the Optional Protocol on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict.239Therefore, the Concluding Observations on the
implementation of the Convention published since 2002 give less attention to children in
situations of armed conflict.
235 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: The Democratic Republic of Congo’ (2006), supra n. 44, paragraph 35.
236 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Marshall Island’ (16 October 2000) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 139,
paragraph 34; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Spain’ (2010), supra n. 190, paragraphs 31-33.
237 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Lebanon’ (7 June 1996) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 54, paragraph 36.
238 See, for example, UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Ecuador’ (29 January 2010) UN Doc
CRC/C/ECU/CO/4, paragraph 68.
239 GA Resolution A/RES/54/263 (20 May 2000), entered into force on 12 February 2002.
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In general, the Committee is concerned with the impact that ‘an atmosphere of violence’ has
on children’s ‘development and right to life’,240 as well as with the impact that armed
conflicts have on children’s rights to survival and development.241 The Committee has paid
particular attention to one kind of weapon - land mines – that pose a ‘threat… to the survival
and development of children.’242 Troubled by the ‘psychological trauma’243 that armed
conflicts cause for children, the Committee has asked States Parties to ensure the protection
and rehabilitation of children. Children therefore should receive ‘adequate assistance and
counselling for their rehabilitation, physical and psychological recovery and social
integration’.244 In a highly unusual manner, the right to development of children is mentioned
by name, but no discussion about its meaning follows. A possible explanation to this
omission, is that the Committee’s concern lies with the emotional trauma that such conflict
causes, hence taking for granted the assumption that a discussion about children’s
development uphold psychological definition of this term.
Labour and Exploitation
Article 32 of the Convention protects the right of children ‘to be protected from economic
exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with
the child’s education, or to be harmful to the child’s health and physical, mental, spiritual,
moral or social development’. The article does not define what child labour means, nor does
it protect children from any kind of work other than occupations that might be harmful to five
domains of developmental: physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social. These are the same
five domains that Article 27 names.
240UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Peru’ (2000), supra n. 73, paragraph 18.
241UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: India’ (23 February 2000) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 115, paragraph 63;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Burundi’ (2000), supra n. 32, paragraph 30; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Democratic Republic of Congo’ (9 July 2001) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 153, paragraph 26;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: India’ (2004), supra n. 34, paragraph 68; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Algeria’ (12 October 2005) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 269, paragraph 70; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (10 February 2009) UN Doc CRC/C/COD/CO/2, paragraph
33; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Pakistan’ (15 October 2009) UN Doc CRC/C/PAK/CO/3-4, paragraph
35; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: The Philippines’ (22 October 2009) UN Doc CRC/C/PHL/CO/3-4,
paragraph 32; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Nigeria’ (2010), supra n. 88, paragraph 80.
242UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Iraq’ (26 October 1998) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 94, paragraph 28;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Angola’ (3 November 2004) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 246, paragraph 62;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Jordan’ (2006), supra n. 121, paragraph 77.
243UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Columbia’ (2000), supra n. 199, paragraph 34.
244UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Angola’ (2005), supra n. 241, paragraph 71.
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The Committee does not add much to what is explicitly set out in this clause. In most of the
Concluding Observations that mention child labour, the Committee repeated the language of
the Convention and is content with calling on States Parties to ‘combat economic
exploitation’ that can be ‘harmful to the child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or
social development’.245 Article 32 does not set a minimum age for employment, but in order
to meet its stated aims. The Committee requires States Parties, among other things, to
‘provide for a minimum age or minimum ages for admission for employment’,246 and
regulate the working hours and working conditions of children.
Only in General Comment 11, published in 2009, did the Committee define child labour,
stating that ‘child labour is work that deprives children of their childhood, their potential and
dignity and that is harmful to their physical and mental development’.247 Exploitation or
inadequate working hours and conditions are also an issue for household-type work.
Therefore, the Committee further asks States Parties to pay attention to the ‘conditions of
children working within their families, in order to protect them fully’.248 Similar concerns are
expressed with regard to child domestic workers.249 Long working hours are another source
of concern because they have a negative impact not only on a child’s school attendance, but
also on her ‘development’250 or ‘full and harmonious development’.251
The Committee also calls on States Parties to narrow the gap between the age at which
compulsory education ends and the minimum legal age for access to employment,252 because
this gap opens the door for illegal employment practices, and can lead to situations of abuse
245UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Laos’ (10 October 1997) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 78, paragraph 50;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Federated State of Micronesia’ (1998), supra n. 234, paragraph 39;
UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Fiji’ (1998), supra n. 75, paragraph 42; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Costa Rica’ (24 February 2000) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 117, paragraph 26; UNCRC
‘Concluding Observations: Central African Republic’ (2000), supra n. 95, paragraph 78; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Ukraine’ (2002), supra n. 165, paragraph 65; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Czech
Republic ’ (2003), supra n. 72, paragraph 59; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Ghana’ (17 March 2006) UN
Doc CRC/C/GHA/CO/2, paragraph 65.
246 Article 32(2)(a).
247 UNCRC, ‘General Comment 11’, supra n. 18, paragraph 69.
248UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Fiji’ (1998), supra n. 75, paragraph 42.
249UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Malaysia’ (2007), supra n. 156, paragraph 91.
250UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Central African Republic’ (2000), supra n. 95, paragraph 78; UNCRC
‘Concluding Observations: Cameroon’ (2001), supra n. 34, paragraph 58; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations:
Moldova’ (2002), supra n. 199, paragraph 43; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Madagascar’ (2003), supra
n. 199, paragraph 59; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Nigeria’ (2005), supra n. 68, paragraph 75.
251 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Jamaica’ (2003), supra n. 195, paragraph 51.
252UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Nicaragua’ (1995), supra n. 41, paragraph 14; UNCRC ‘Concluding
Observations: Senegal’ (1995), supra n. 33, paragraph 11; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Iraq’ (1998),
supra n. 242, paragraph 26; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Madagascar’ (2003), supra n. 146, paragraph
59.
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and exploitation. No impact on the right to development is mentioned, nor is any explanation
regarding the connection between labour and various aspects of development given.
Analysis - Much Ado About Nothing
Almost twenty years of monitoring the implementation of the Convention’s protection of the
right to development has resulted in a long and detailed catalogue. This catalogue connects
almost every aspect of the child’s life and most of the Convention’s rights to various domains
of children’s development, and includes only a handful of comments about the right to
development, its connection to other rights of the child or its intrinsic meaning. The extent to
which the Committee emphasises the need to protect children’s development highlights the
absence of a meaningful body of jurisprudence concerning the right to development. Similar
to its treatment in the Convention’s drafting process, the child’s right to development
remained in the shadow of the care for children’s development in the Committee’s
jurisprudence.
The tendency to overlook the right to development while focusing on children’s psycho-
social development or the other two rights protected by Article 6 (the right to life and the
right to survival) is evident in the substance of the Committee’s work, and in the more
technical aspects of its work, which indicate a much deeper conceptual problem. As
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the Committee’s reporting guidelines ask States
Parties to elaborate on the steps taken for implementing the Convention’s guiding principles,
including the rights to life, survival and development. Likewise, the Concluding Observations
and General Comments use formats that include a section concerning the implementation of
those general principles. Indeed, most of the Concluding Observations and General
Comments do refer to Article 6, but only a handful of them refer to the right to development.
Even the headlines used for the section about Article 6 illustrate the on-going ignorance of
the right to development. While the majority of the 364 Concluding Observations reviewed in
this research use the title ‘Article 6 – the Right to Life, Survival and Development’, the
subsequent section does not refer to the right to development at all. A few of the headlines
read ‘Article 6 – the right to life’ only, omitting the right to development. Only a few dozens
of the Concluding Observations refer to the right to development in both the heading and the
content. I believe that this pattern is not arbitrary, but rather reflects a conceptual failure to
engage with the right to development.
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There is a lack of conceptual clarity with regard to the meaning of ‘children’s development’
in the Committee’s jurisprudence. Not only does the Committee never explain how it
understands this term, it is evident from this analysis that the Committee does not hold a clear
and coherent understanding. The Committee refers to different domains of children’s
development, such as mental development, physical development, social development, as
well as to more descriptive terms such as ‘full’ or ‘harmonious’ development. But it does not
explain their meaning or how they relate to human rights language, discourse and tools.
When the Committee refers to children’s development, it does so either to highlight the risk
factors that can damage these domains of development, or in order to suggest how they
should be supported. This is where the conceptual ambiguity, which the Committee shares
with the Convention’s drafters,253 arises: the meaning of these domains of children’s
development is not self-evident, and different disciplines understand them differently.
Moreover, even within a single discipline, such as psychology, there can be different
understandings of what ‘development’ means. As noted in previous chapters, Freud’s
understanding of children’s development, for example, is different from Piaget’s, thought
they both speak about developmental psychology. Needless to say, the difference in meaning
leads to different means required to support ‘development’. Therefore, when the Committee
speaks of the need to support children’s mental development, the discussion is only valid as
the validity of the stream of psychology it employs. But the Committee does not say what
stream of psychology it employs, nor how it understands the term ‘children’s development’ in
general.
The Committee interprets most of the Convention’s rights in one of two ways. The
Committee either takes protection of right X, for example the right to non-discrimination, as a
precondition necessary for protecting one or more aspects of children’s development. Or,
alternatively, the Committee views the protection of right X, for example the right to
education, as a necessary part of protecting one or more aspects of children’s development.
Neither of these two approaches provides a distinct meaning for the right to development.
Where the Committee does refer to the right to development, it is very difficult to draw any
conclusions regarding the meaning of the right. The Committee does not clarify what the
right to development should stand for, what it protects (the process of development, the
outcome of it, or maybe both?), what its aims are, or what, if any, are its added values in
comparison to other rights of the Convention. This ambiguity is the result of two factors. The
253 See chapter two.
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first has already been mentioned, and it is the conceptual ambiguity of the term
‘development’. The second factor is because by in large, the Committee’s work is dominated
by the traditional binary conception of childhood as a time of ‘becomings’, and therefore the
Committee is unable or unwilling to divert from this ‘romantic developmentalism’254
approach. As the Committee’s approach is embedded with this conception of childhood, in its
jurisprudence it cares for children’s future and, thus, subjugates most of the Convention’s
rights to support ‘children’s development’.
Another implication of employing the ‘human becomings’ approach is the denial of
children’s agency. While the Committee links most of the Convention’s rights to children’s
development, including rights not mentioned in the Convention such as the right to freedom
of movement,255 it ignores two of the Convention’s rights: the right to freedom of expression
and the right to participation (Articles 13 and 12, respectively).256 The Committee neglects
these two rights, one of which is a guiding principle of the Convention,257thus contributing to
the perpetuation of the image of children as passive human beings with only one goal in life -
to grow up and become adults.258
The perception of childhood as time of ‘becomings’ also explains the Committee’s fixation
with expanding the protection for children’s development as a means to protect their ‘full’
development. For the Committee, it seems only natural to interpret the Convention’s
protection for children’s development in such a broad manner. This narrow approach not only
reflected in the care for the emotional, physical, social, mental, psychological, aspects of
children’s development, but also for the conception of development itself. The desire to
provide as broad a protection to children’s course of growth as possible has led the
Committee, as it led the Convention’s drafters, to mix the protection of ‘development’ with
the protection of children’s ‘well-being’ and ‘fulfilling the potential’ of children. The
Committee confuses these three concepts together, although all three have different (with
some potential overlaps) meanings. This approach creates a broad protection for a narrow
254 Alison Diduck, Law’s Families (Lexis-Nexis, London 2003) 79.
255 UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: United Kingdom’ (20 October 2008) UN Doc CRC/C/GBR/CO/4,
paragraph 35.
256 With the exception of but stating the ensuring the right to participation is needed ‘in order to empower
children to their fullest development and dignity’. UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Dominic Republic’ (21
February 2000) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 150, paragraph 25. Similar statement can be found in General
Comment 12. UNCRC, ‘General Comment 12’, supra n. 17.
257 The right to participation. See UNCRC, ‘General Comment 5’, supra n. 1.
258 This conclusion also meets the interpretation of the right to development concluded from the drafting
process of the Convection. See chapter two. The Committee has many failures with respect to the right to
participation. See Aoife Nolan, ‘The Child as a Democratic Citizen’ (2010) 4 Public law 767, 782.
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concept of development that leaves no need to develop an understanding of the right to
development itself.
Another difficulty in the Committee’s jurisprudence is its usage of the right to development
as one of the Convention’s guiding principles; or, perhaps more aptly, the lack of its use as
such. The right to non-discrimination, for example, is interwoven into the Committee’s
interpretation. It is evident that all of the Convention’s rights should be implemented without
discriminating against any group of children. Likewise, all of the Convention’s rights should
be implemented while enabling children to express their views. Unfortunately, thus far the
Committee has failed to recognise the importance of this aim.
The question that should therefore be asked is, is there any real substance to the right to
development? Perhaps, due to the Convention’s aim to support children’s course of growth,
the Committee is right in subjugating the Convention to support as many domains of
children’s development as possible. Such a conclusion not only ignores the existence of this
right as a distinct right, but also the potential it has for supporting this line of interpretation.
While it is possible to perceive ‘development’ in ‘the right to development’ in psycho-
sociological terms, and interpret the right accordingly, other options are available as well.
Conclusion
As with the Convention, the Committee’s jurisprudence does not sufficiently distinguish
between children’s development and their right to development. The Committee provides
broad protection for children’s development, while it does not explicitly clarify what
children’s development means, and its jurisprudence lacks any coherent interpretation of the
child’s right to development. Derived from a range of psycho-sociological conceptions of
‘development’, the Committee’s jurisprudence amounts to a detailed, but nevertheless biased,
catalogue of how to raise a child while caring for her development.
The long and detailed nature of the catalogue creates the impression that it is also substantial.
But the Committee finds it difficult to translate its desire to protect children as becoming
human beings, and, therefore, their development, to the actual protection of their legal right to
development.Despite its clear intentions, as expressed time and again over the years, the
Committee’s interpretation does not provide any holistic concept of the right to development,
but rather constitutes, at most, a very detailed catalogue about the steps necessary to protect
the elusive concept of ‘children’s development’.
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The committee is failing to accomplish what has been recently described by its former
chairperson, Japp Doek, to be its ‘core activity’259 – to monitor the implementation of the
Convention. After reviewing hundreds of States Parties’ implementations reports, it is very
disappointing that the Committee has yet to produce a coherent jurisprudence of one of the
core components of the Convention.
Based on a series of in-depth interviews with members of the Committee and an analysis of
the Committee’s ‘chain of monitoring’, the next chapter continues the analysis of the
Committee’s work. More specifically, it focuses on member of the Committee’s perspectives
on their own jurisprudence, and their views about the feasibility to change.
259 Japp E. Doek, ‘The CRC: Dynamics and Directions of Monitoring Its implementation’ in Antonella
Invernizzi and Jane Williams (eds) The Human Rights of Children (Ashgate Falmer, London 2011) 99-116, 99.
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Chapter Four: The Perspective of Members of the UN Committee on the
Rights of the Child on the Right to Development
‘I can tell you that the Committee doesn’t know what to do with this right
to development’ (Member of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child)
‘In relation to article 6 and the right to development, I have to agree that we
have neglected development‘ (Member of the UN Committee on the Rights
of the Child)
Introduction
This chapter asks two questions. First, why the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child’s
jurisprudence on the right to development does not amount to a coherent interpretation?
Second, what changes are needed so the Committee will be able to fulfil its role as a
monitoring body, and create such a coherent interpretation of the right to development of
children? Answering these two questions, the chapter will illuminate theoretical and practical
limitations that so far have prevented the realisation of the child’s right to development.
The chapter is based on a series of in-depth interviews with members of the Committee, and
on an analysis of the Committee’s ‘chain of monitoring’. The interviews provide the
interviewees’ explanations for the gap between the importance of the right to development on
the declaratory level, and the Committee’s jurisprudence in practice. The second issue the
interviews address is the changes needed so the Committee will be able to articulate its own
understanding of the child’s right to development and thus, effectively monitor its
implementation on the ground. The second source – the Committee’s ‘chain of monitoring’ -
provides important complimentary perspective on the impact that the monitoring process
itself has on the Committee’s jurisprudence.
The chapter has three sections. The first section addresses the grounds for the Committee’s
unimpressive jurisprudence on the right to development. Four explanations can be drawn
from the interviews: the right to development lacks conceptual clarity; States Parties provide
insufficient information about the measures they took with respect to the child’s right to
development and, therefore, the Committee cannot monitor their actions; the Committee, as
an institution, simply forgot that this right even exists; and the last explanation is a
disciplinary gap concerning the understating of the term ‘children’s development’ restricts
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the Committee from interpreting it. The second section analyses empirical evidence of the
Committee’s ‘chain of monitoring’, taking the year 2010 as a case study,in order to challenge
two of those four claims. The section examines whether and how States Parties refer to the
right to development in their periodic implementation reports, and the Committee’s counter
responses. Evidence indicates that the Committee takes a passive role, and that it is most
likely to address the right to development only if a State Party mentions this issue. The last
section turns back to the interviews with the members of the Committee, and asks what is
next? This section focuses on the changes in the Committee’s work, perceptions and modes
of interpretation that are necessary for making a change in its interpretation of the right to
development.
Methodology
The chapter is based on two sources. The first source is a series of in-depth, semi-structured
interviews1 with nine members of the Committee (one former member and eight current
members). These nine people are part of the sixty-two people who served as members of the
Committee since it was established in 1991, and until 31 December 2011.2
One of the interviewees served at the Committee for eight years, two interviewees served for
six years, three interviewees served for three years and three interviewees were at the
beginning of their term, having served less than a year.Two of interviewees have served, or
were serving, as the Committee’s Chairpersons or vice-Chairpersons at the time of the
interviews.
The interviews were held in June and September 2011 at Palais des Nations in Geneva, where
the Committee holds its sessions. The interviews were conducted in English and lasted
between half an hour and two hours. Six interviewees consented to have the interview
recorded, while the other three preferred that only notes would be taken. Every interviewee
received the interview’s transcript or notes, and had the opportunity to make any comments
or amendments. All comments received were accommodated. To ensure fluency of the
1 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (3rd edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 191-214, 230-
251, 435-470; see also Herbert M. Kritzer, ‘”Research Is a Messy Business” – An Archeology of the Craft of
Sociolegal research’ in Simon Halliday and Patrick Schmidt (eds) Conducting Law and Society Research
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009) 264-285.
2 According to the original Article 43(2) of the Convention, the Committee was composed from tem member. In
2002 the Article was amended and the number of members was increased to eighteen. UNGA Resolution 50/155
of 21 December 1995 (entered into force on 18 November 2002).
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interviews’ texts, minor linguistic amendments were made. Though none of the interviewees
have asked to remain anonymous, I have decided to use pseudonyms. I made this decision
mainly because I do not seek to criticise (or compliment) any of them personally, but rather
to focus on the institutional dimensions of their work. Unfortunately, the pseudonyms do not
adequately reflect the identities and backgrounds of the interviewees, and might create an
impression of lack of diversity. This is not the case.
An effort was made to diversifythe disciplines, countries of origin and professional
backgrounds. Two of the nine interviewees are lawyers (Mark and Nick);two are diplomats
with backgrounds in either humanities or law (Theresa and David) or in sociology and
psychology (Cary);one is an early childhood expert (Brenda);one is a medical doctor
(Donna); and two are economists who specialize in early childhood policy (Alicia and
Grace). In terms of geographical background, one interviewee came from Africa, two from
the middle east, one from the Gulf, three from Europe and two from the far east.
The second source is an analysis of the Committee’s ‘chain of monitoring’, taking the year
2010 as a case study. According to the Committee’s Reporting Guidelines,3 the ‘chain of
monitoring’ includes States Parties implementation reports,the Committee’s follow up
questions (‘Issues of Concerns’) and the twenty-three Concluding Observations that followed
and were published in 2010 during the Committee’s 53-55 sessions. The research excludes
reports submitted by UN agencies and non-governmental organizations’ shadow report,
which are part of the ‘chain of monitoring’ as well. These reports were not part of my
research as my focal point is the Committee.
The Interviews - Between Lack of Awareness and Conceptual Challenges
This section focuses on the reasons for the Committee’s unsatisfactory jurisprudence on the
right to development. If there was one issue that all the interviewees agreed upon, it was that
a major gap exists between the Committee’s rhetoric on the importance of protecting the
child’s right to development, and the Committee’s jurisprudence on this right. The
interviewees were unanimous in their opinion that thus far, the Committee’s engagement with
the right has produced insufficient results. The different reasons the interviewees gave can be
divided into three categories. The first category includes committee members who see the
3 UNCRC, ‘General Guidelines Regarding the Forms and Content of Period Reports to be Submitted by States
Parties Under Article 44(1)(b) of the Convention’ (29 November 2005) CRC/C/58/Rev. 1.
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root cause in States Parties lack of reporting about the right to development.4 The second
category of reasoning places the blame on the Committee itself, claiming that since it has
consistently failed to engage with the right to development for a variety of reasons. The third
category is what I term as ‘the discipline gap’. Mentioned by two of the interviewees, they
argue that lawyers do not sufficiently understand the term ‘children’s development’, and
therefore cannot adequately interpret it as a human right.
States Parties Ignore the Right to Development
This explanation situates the Committee as a passive actor in the monitoring process, and
allocates the responsibility for the Committee’s unsatisfactory jurisprudence on States
Parties. The interviewees who held this position claimed that if an issue, like the right to
development, is not being raised by a State Party, then the Committee cannot develop its own
jurisprudence on that matter. Alicia, for example, claimed that ‘development is not mentioned
very often by States Parties’, and therefore the Committee is bound to ignore it as well.
However, as the second part of this chapter shows, even when States Parties ignore the right
to development, the Committee does not address this omission, either by asking States Parties
to address the right to development, or by flagging the lack of attention to this right in the
Concluding Observation. Moreover, when the Committee wants to raise awareness to an
issue that it deems important, it can take the initiative and write a General Comment about it.
Thus far, the Committee chose not to do so with respect to the right to development.
The question that followed was why States Parties ignore the right to development. The
answers given to this question can be divided into three. The first explanation was that States
Parties ‘do not know what development means’, as Donna said, adding that ‘sometimes
States just do not understand what they need to do. But I think that the child’s Convention is
the easiest one to understand and to implement’. This is rather ironic comment, considering
the Committee’s own failure to articulate the meaning of this right. Nonetheless, David
agrees with Donna, adding that ‘the issue of the right to development still needs further
clarification for States Parties’.At this point, it was only David who employed the term ‘right
to development’, whilst the other interviewees kept using the term ‘children’s development’.
4 A similar claim is made with respect to the UN human rights treaties system in general. John Morijn,
‘Reforming United Nations Human Rights Treaty Monitoring Reform’ (2011) 29 Netherlands International
Law Review 295, 303.
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The lack of distinction between these two terms persisted during most of the interviews with
all of the interviewees.
A second explanation emphasised the impact of politics. Grace claims that States Parties’
political considerations prevail over human rights and lead to a situation where children’s
development is ignored. Speaking in general terms, she claimed that ‘the political situation in
the state, the public opinion and education about it are the reasons for mentioning, or not
mentioning, development directly.’ These considerations lead some States Parties to try to
evade their duty to respect children’s development by challenging the Committee’s mandate.
She continues:
‘When I ask states about the right to development, some of them answer my
questions but some don’t. They think that this question is not part of our
mandate, but part of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
rights. But of course, it is within our mandate, because everything that
relates to children is part of our mandate.’
Grace further suggested that beside the political manoeuvres to avoid the duty to respect and
report about the right to development, States Parties may perceive children’s development as
an issue related to economic policy or socio-economic rights, rather than an issue of the
individual’s right to development, and consequently beyond the Committee’s jurisdiction.
She also implies that while the Committee views children’s social welfare rights as an issue
within its mandate, some countries do not share this view. Grace’s comment conceals an
argument that States Parties are being asked about children’s development during the oral
sessions. This suggestion was not supported in any of the sessions that I attended during this
research.5 Not only the Committee’s members did not raise the issue of the right to
development, but even when the Committee reviewed the implementation of Article 6, the
Chairperson stated time and again that the discussion is dedicated to ‘Article 6’ in abstract, or
more often to ‘Article 6 and the right to life’, ignoring the right to survival and the right to
development. Subsequently, the Concluding Observations that were published following
these discussions did not refer to the right to development.
A third reason was the gap in expectation between the Committee and States Parties. David
claimed that the Committee’s failure to address the right to development over the years,
which was fed by States Parties lack of reporting, has created vicious circle. Since States
5 The Committee’s 58th session, held in September 2011.
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Parties ‘depend on the issues that we [the Committee] have highlighted before’, and due to
lack of criticism of States Parties for not providing sufficient information about measures
taken to promote the right, States Parties do not feel the need to address this right.
The Committee Ignores the Right to Development
The second line of explanations centres on the Committee, holding it responsible for not
adequately engaging with the right to development. Different justifications were given to this
failure, ranging from amnesia to problems in understanding the meaning of the right.
Brenda made the boldest statement, admitting that ‘in relation to Article 6 and the right to
development, I have to agree that we have really neglected development’. Grace added that
the Committee did not adequately define the meaning of the right to development, due to
practical and conceptual reasons.
‘The reason that you cannot find a modern definition of the right to
development in our work until this day, after twenty years of implementing
the Convention, is because we are still struggling to make States Parties
implement the basic principles of the Convention on the ground.’
Grace’s suggestion that other rights are more important than the right to development
contradicts the Convention and the Committee’s own position on the subject.6 Nevertheless,
this view may be an indication of the Committee’s real priorities concerning the right to
development vis-à-vis other rights. Alicia seems to agree with Grace’s claim, but she has a
different perspective. Alicia claimed that ‘paying attention to the right to life and the right to
survival is obvious, but the right to development is still debated’.
Another reason for the Committee’s reluctance to directly engage with the right to
development is, according to Mark, practicality.
‘In our Concluding Observations, we have to be practical. This is not a
place for making general comments, and we are not in a place to educate or
to teach a lesson. We need to give practical suggestions on specific
issues.We need to highlight the obstacles for implementing the Convention.
However, in the introductory paragraph of the Concluding Observation, we
do highlight general issues, such as development of the child. But in the
specific paragraphs, we will deal with specific rights.‘
6 The Convention’s Preamble; See also UNCRC ‘General Comment 5 – General Measures of Implementations
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (27 November 2003) UN Doc CRC/GC/5/2003.
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On the one hand, Mark claimed that development is not a specific right but rather a ‘general
issue’, which should be interpreted as such. On the other hand, at a later stage of the
interview, Mark restated Alicia’s claim, suggesting that ‘although development is an integral
part of Article 6, in the discussions we have had on this Article so far, we have focused on the
right to life and the right to survival.’ Brenda shared his views, adding that
‘we always implemented only the first two components of Article 6. We
were concerned with the right to life in relation to mortality rate, the death
penalty, choosing the gender of a baby, etc., and also survival, but we did
not discuss development.’
Brenda was also willing to admit that the Committee did not fulfil its role to substantiate
Article 6 and the right to development.
‘The right to development is one of the four guiding principles of the
Convention, but we did not discuss it so far in an open forum such as “day
of discussion” or in a General Comment. Since 2003, when I joined the
Committee, we were planning to have a day of discussion or a general
comment about the issues. It became evident for us that we did not pay
enough attention to the four guiding principles, including the right to
development.’
Nick agreed with some of Brenda’s comments, saying that: ‘I don’t think that we have asked
states to bring this data to us’. Mark has suggested looking at the Committee’s jurisprudence
from a different perspective, asking to distinguish between its operational roles in monitoring
the implementation of the Convention, and its role as a commentator.
‘In relation to General Comments - I have to say that I was not aware of the
fact that we were not using development so far. The General Comment on
Article 12 is a juridical one, while the others are more protective. The spirit
of them is protective. In the juridical one, you will not find development,
but in the General Comments about health or education you will find
development. ‘
Mark’s analysis is not very accurate. In practice, children’s development is mentioned in
number of General Comments, including General Comments 4 on adolescent health and
development, General Comment 1 on the aims of education, and in General Comment 12 on
children’s participation. On the conceptual level, the distinction between judicial work and
protection is not very clear. The protection of children’s development applies equally to all
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the three domains that Mark mentioned: education, health and participation. While the first
two are rather distinct domains in the child’s life, the right to participation ought to be
protected, according to Article 12 of the Convention, with regard to ‘all matters affecting the
child’. This sort of explanation is, to say the least, unsatisfying.
The Discipline Gap
The third explanation shifts the attention from the Committee or States Parties to the
members of the Committee themselves. Though Brenda already suggested that ‘the
committee’ as an institution has neglected the right to development, this line of reasoning is
different. Cary has emphasised this point, arguing that there is a need to better comprehend
the conception of ‘development’ in order to be able to analyse the right to development. It is
interesting to note that only Cary and Brenda, neither of whois a lawyer, shared this issue. In
Cary’s words:
‘I come from a sociology and developmental psychology background, and
in my profession we have an idea what development is. And most of the
disciplines, which are represented on the Committee, don’t have an idea of
(individual) development.‘
Cary realises that those who come from other professional backgrounds might not share his
understanding as a psychologist of the meaning of ‘children’s development’. Cary’s claim is
that different professional backgrounds influence the Committee members’ perceptions of the
right to development, the need to engage with it, its meaning and its relationship with
children’s development and other human rights. This is where what I call the ‘the discipline
gap’ lies. Cary rightfully argued that a key explanation for this gap could be traced back to
the Convention.
‘I also think that the drafters of the Convention did not know precisely what
development means. Nobody can deny that a child is a developing human
being. So they said that somewhere we have to refer to child’s development
in the Convention. ‘
Cary pointed his finger at one of the main problems with the Convention already discussed in
chapter two, namely the Convention’s desire to protect children’s development without
clarifying what it actually means, or what is the significance of Article 6. Caryfurther claimed
that while he served as a Committee member, he had tried to draw the attention of his
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colleagues to the right to development, but for number of reasons, those attempts failed.
‘I can tell you that the Committee doesn’t know what to do with this right
to development. Sometimes, when we were writing a Concluding
Observation, I told my colleagues that we better change the heading of the
respective paragraphs and not call it “life and survival” because there is
nothing about development in our recommendations. Usually it is all about
survival, child mortality, and nothing about development and consequently
we should not mention development in the heading…
‘Did the Committee ever address such issues? No, I cannot remember such
a discussion. I do not know whether there were any developmental
psychologists on the committee before Brenda and myself were members.
We both reminded the colleagues on the committee several times that we
are neglecting the issue of development, and our colleagues agreed. But our
time schedule is so tight that we did not find the time to have a thorough
debate on this issue. ‘
These observations concerning the oversight to refer to the right to development coincide
with the findings of this research. The strains between disciplines are predominantly
expressed between the lawyers and the non-lawyers. The lawyers, according to Cary, just do
not understand the importance of development or its meaning. While Cary referred to the
term ‘right to development’ time and again during the interview, when he turned to speak
about psychology, the human rights rhetoric suddenly vanishedand he began using the term
‘children’s development’ instead.
Brenda however claims thata different professional background is only a partial explanation
for this gap.
‘I understand development to have several meanings, which vary depending
on the context. For those who are coming from a psychological
background, development has a certain meaning. But for those who are
coming from the international community, people from the UNDP for
example, development has a different meaning. They hold a different
conception of development. This gap might be the reason for neglecting this
component of Article 6…I think that the confusion is still there. Until now,
we were not truthful about the fact that there is confusion, and we never
asked what does the right to development in Article 6 mean.’
This statement best summarises the Committee’s approach to the right to development. As
Brenda admits, the Committee simply never asked what Article 6 and the right to
development mean. All the other reasons that focus the attention on the difficulty to
understand the right to development, or on States Parties’ failure to engage with this right
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seem minor. It is, after all, the Committee’s role to monitor the implementation of the
Convention. It is the Committee that needs to guide States Parties, and not the other way
around.
The next section addresses the relationship between the Committee and States Parties,
through analysing the Committee’s ‘chain of monitoring’.
Analysing the Committee’s ‘Chain of Monitoring’
The importance of the ‘chain of monitoring’ and its influence on the Committee’s ability to
fulfil its functions as a monitoring body became evident during this research. This section
challenges two claims made during the interviews. First, the claim about States Parties’
failure to report about the measures they took with respect to the right to development.
Second, the claim concerning the Committee’s active role with respect to the implementation
of the right to development. This section takes 2010 ‘chain of monitoring’ as a case study,
and analyse the 23 Concluding Observations that the Committee issued that year, reviews the
relevant States Parties’ implementation reports, and the Committee’s ‘List of Issues’. I was
looking to see how States Parties relate to the right to development in their reports, and how
the Committee handles these reports. The aim is to understand where the monitoring process
fails with respect to the right to development.
The findings shows that State Parties’ implementation reports can be classified into two
categories: indirect engagement with the child’s right to development and no engagement
with the child’s right to development. In this sample of implementation reports, there was not
even a single report that directly and explicitly referred to the child’s right to development.
The Committee’s response to each of these two categories is similar: the Committee is
passive. In general, and regardless whether a State Party relates to the child’s right to
development in its implementation report or not, the Committee will not ask any question
about it in the ‘List of Issues’, nor will it highlight this omission in the Concluding
Observations.
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Indirect Engagementwith the Right to Development
Most of the twenty-three implementation reports in the sample are included in this category.
These reports do not explicitly mention the child’s right to development. However, they do
mention or refer to children’s development when addressing other rights, and make different
links between children’s development and promoting children’s rights. These links are made
mostly with respect to the right to health, the right to adequate standard of living and the right
to education. This pattern mirrors, and probably is a result of, the Committee’s emphasis on
the connection between promoting these rights and promoting children’s development.
Spain’s implementation report is a good example of an ‘indirect engagement’ type of report.
In its report, Spain referred in greater detail to children’s development on a number of
occasions, including mentioning Article 6 as a source for obligations towards children’s
development. It further described new legislation thatsets prevention of damage to children’s
development as a guiding principle for public authorities, adding that governmental policies
‘should be mainly aimed at the full development of their [children’s] different
personalities’.7The report also mentions the need to support children’s ‘maximum’ and
‘proper’ development with relation to education, health and children’s standard of living. The
right to development is not explicitly mentioned in this report.8 Another good example is
Japan’s implementation report. The section about Article 6 in its implementation report does
not refer to the right to development or children’s development, and focuses only on the right
to life. Children’s development is mentioned with relation to other aspects of the child’s life,
two of them being youth online activities and children’s welfare.9
The implementation reports of El Salvador, Mongolia and Grenada are other examples. These
reports do not include a section dedicated to the implementation of Article 6, but a wide-
range of children’s developmental domains are referred to when reporting on the
implementation of other rights. For example, El Salvador’s report rapidly refers to the
‘National Policy for the Full Development of Children and Adolescents’10. It mostly
emphasises health, education or media regulation. Children’s ‘psycho-motor development’ is
7 UNCRC, ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 44 of the Convention – Spain’
(20 November 2009) UN Docs CRC/C/ESP/3-4 [30 May 2008], paragraph 58.
8Ibid.
9UNCRC, ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 44 of the Convention – Japan’
(25 September 2009) UN Docs CRC/C/JPN/3 [22 April 2008].
10 UNCRC, ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 44 of the Convention – El
Salvador’ (23 July 2009) UN Docs CRC/C/SLV/3-4, 7 [21 February 2008].
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mentioned with regard to tackling anaemia and nutrition during pregnancy.11In Mongolia’s
implementation report, children’s development is referred to when reporting on the expansion
of the national medical insurance, the establishment of a national children’s development
plan, and various legislative amendments in the area of family law (parental responsibilities),
health and education that were carried with the aim to protect and contribute to children’s
development.12 Grenada’s implementation report elaborates on children’s development when
addressing Articles 28-29 of the Convention, stating that the national curriculum is aimed ‘at
promoting the spiritual, moral, cultural, intellectual and psychical development of students
and preparing students for the opportunities, responsibilities and experience of adults’ life’.13
Burkina Faso’s implementation reportrepresents another version of an ‘indirect engagement’
type of report. Though the report includes a section titled ‘The Right to Life, Survival and
Development’, it does not address tothe right to development itself.14 Throughout the rest of
the report, children’s development ismentioned with regard to the health and well-being of
children, mainly in relation to improving public health services ‘in the context of sustainable
human development’.15 Children’s ‘intellectual’ development is also mentioned in the context
of the ‘cultural excellence contest’,which was held in the country.16 Furthermore, Burkina
Faso claimed that one of the aims of its education system is to promote children’s
psychomotor, cognitive, social and emotional development.17
Belgium’s report is an exception to this sort of reports. While the section dedicated to Article
6 focuses on the right to life, children’s development is mentioned with regard to the
implementation of other rights such as the right to education (student counselling centres
were established in order to promote ‘students’ welfare and development’, and activities that
were established with the aim of promoting children’s ‘cultural development’);18 the right to
play and to leisure (‘broad range of initiatives devised by the youth organizations in Flanders
11Ibid, paragraph 36.
12 UNCRC, ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 44 of the Convention –
Mongolia’ (9 June 2009) UN Docs CRC/C/MNG/3-4 [31 March 2008].
13 UNCRC, ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 44 of the Convention –
Grenada’ (7 August 2009) UN Docs CRC/C/GRD/2 [26 May 2008].
14 UNCRC, ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 44 of the Convention –
Burkina Faso’ (30 March 2009) UN Docs CRC/C/BFA/3-4 [21 June 2008], paragraphs 25-26.
15Ibid, paragraph 50.
16Ibid, paragraph 84.
17Ibid, paragraph 86.
18Ibid, paragraph 52.
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contribute to children’s general development’);19 policy issues such as media regulation (A
new domestic law classifies television content in order to protect ‘minors against
broadcasting likely to harm their physical, mental or moral development’);20 and a smoking
prevention campaign that includes the aim of promoting children’s development.21 After
presenting this long list of issues relating to children’s development, the report mentions the
right to development at its very end, under the section dedicated to ‘difficulties and future
objectives’. Belgium states that:
‘The current trend in medicalization to make children “normal” to fit in
with the model most convenient for adults (a good and clever child) must
be called into question. Every child has the right to develop his or her
personality, subject to respect for the rights of others. The competent
governments will continue to ensure that measures in respect of children are
taken in the light of their personal development and not exclusively for the
benefit of adult society.’22
This comment is interesting, not only because it explicitly mentions the right to development.
Though it refers to the right of the child to develop her personality, it relates to it as a
conditional right, subjecting it to respect of the rights of others. In light of Article 5 of the
Convention, it states that realising the right to development should be conditioned according
to the child’s evolving capacities. This view will be further discussed in the next two
chapters, but in the context of this chapter, this comment is important if only for referencing
to the child’s right to development.
These reports attest to the claim that States Parties rarely mention the right to development in
their reports, or ignore the connection between children’s rights and children’s development.
It is worth paying attention to another point, which is the different meanings given to
children’s development by different States Parties. These differences not only reflect division
between disciplines with regard to the meaning of this concept, but also highlight the
significance of politics and culture on interpreting human rights. Nonetheless, while States
Parties mostly ignore the right to development, the question that still remains open is how the
Committee react to this report.
19 UNCRC, ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 44 of the Convention –
Belgium’ (4 December 2009) UN Docs CRC/C/BEL/3-4 [15 July 2008], paragraph 46.
20Ibid, paragraph 63.
21Ibid, paragraph 108.
22Ibid, paragraph 128.
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With the exception of Japan and El Salvador, the Committee responded to these reports with
silence. No questions concerning the implementation of the child’s right to development or
other domains of development were asked, and States Parties’ failure to address the right to
development was not mentioned either.23 The Concluding Observations that followed also
failed to engage with the issue of the right to development, though in most cases, take Angola
and Belgium as examples, the Concluding Observations did refer to the other three guiding
principles of the Convention.24 The Committee does not condemn States Parties for ignoring
these issues. Thus, the Committee does not seize the opportunity to develop its jurisprudence
on the right to development.
Having said that, the case of El Salvador is worth a brief consideration. The follow-up
questions did not explicitly refer to children’s development, and the questions about the
implementation of Article 6 touched upon issues relating to the right to life.25 Nevertheless,
the right to development was mentioned in the Concluding Observation when the Committee
addressed the right to adequate standard of living.26
Ignoring the Right to Development
This category includes States Parties’ implementation reports that fail entirely to refer to the
right to development or children’s development. Sudan’s implementation report is a good
example for this kind of reports. In its report, Sudan declared that the State’s constitution is
‘in line’ with the need to protect children’s ‘survival and development’, and a reference was
made to a section in the ‘national programmes on survival and development’ relating to
children’s health.27But under what may be seen as a promising headline, the report described
Sudan’s efforts to reduce infant, child and mother mortality rate, its legislation concerning
23 UNCRC, ‘List of Issues Concerning Additional and Updated Information Related to the Consideration of the
Combined Second to Forth Periodic Reports of Angola’ (18 June 2010) UN Docs CRC/C/AGO/Q/2-4; UNCRC,
‘List of Issues Related to the Consideration the Third and Forth Periodic Reports of Belgium’ (8 March 2010)
UN Docs CRC/C/BLG/Q/3-4; UNCRC, ‘List of Issues Related to the Consideration the Third Periodic Reports
of Japan’ (5 February 2010) UN Docs CRC/C/JPN/Q/3.
24 UNCRC, ‘Concluding Observations – Angola’ (11 October 2010), UN Docs CRC/C/AGO/CO/2-4, 6-7;
UNCRC, ‘Concluding Observations – Belgium’ (18 June 2010), UN Docs CRC/C/BEL/CO/3-4; UNCRC,
‘Concluding Observations: Japan’ (20 June 2010), UN Docs CRC/C/JPN/CO/3.
25 UNCRC, ‘List of Issues Related to the Consideration the Third and Fourth Report of El Salvador (2
November 2009) UN Docs CRC/C/SLV/Q/3-4.
26 UNCRC, ‘Concluding Observations: El Salvador’ (17 February 2010) UN Docs CRC/C/SLV/CO/3-4.
27 UNCRC, ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 44 of the Convention – Sudan’
(24 February 2010) UN Docs CRC/C/SDN/3-4 [27 June 2008], paragraph 19.
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children’s right to immunization, and increasing measures taken to ensure food safety.28 The
child’s right to development is not mentioned with respect to Article 6 or any of these
programmes. Without undermining the importance of these steps, and though the report uses
the term ‘children’s development’ number of times, it seems that these steps can be classified
as efforts to promote children’s right to life and right to survival, and not their right to
development. Although, as I argued before,29 the border-lines between the three rights is
sometimes blurred, it is rather easy to make this distinction in this case.
The Committee’s response to this report did not include any request for additional
information about the right to development.30 This right was also not mentioned in the
Concluding Observations.31 Children’s development, however, was mentioned with regard to
early childhood development programmes and adolescent health,32 and the right to an
adequate standard of living.33
Conclusion
In light of this evidence, the question of who is responsible for the lack of engagement with
the child’s right to development – States Parties or the Committee – seems as a question of
the chicken or the egg. What is evident here is that a key reason for the Committee’s failure
to monitor the implementation of this right is the Committee’s own approach. The
Committee’s systematic disregard of the right feeds into and perpetuates the on-going lack of
attention given to it. The Committee has the responsibility to scrutinise States Parties when
they fail to address the right. States Parties’ role should not be undermined, but their lack of
compliance is not a reason for neglecting the right to development.
The last part of this chapter continues with the interviews, and outlines how the Committee’s
members understand the right to development. Despite the Committee’s failure to monitor the
implementation of this right, some of its members have a relatively developed understanding
of this right.
28Ibid, paragraph 33-57.
29 See chapter two.
30Ibid.
31 UNCRC, ‘Concluding Observations: Sudan’ (1 October 2010) UN Docs CRC/C/SDN/CO/3-4.
32Ibid, paragraphs 53-54.
33Ibid, paragraphs 60-63.
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How The Committee Should Approach the Right to Development?
The first section of this chapter demonstrated that the common view among members of the
Committee is that the right to development is an important right, which in light of the
Committee’s record requires some more attention. This section asks for their opinions about
the measures ought to be taken in order to change the Committee’s engagement with this
right.
The section begins with an introduction of the interviewees’ general perception of children’s
development and right to development. It continues by presenting the different opinions of
the Committee members about the future of the right to development. The section includes
relatively long quotations, in order to provide as comprehensive and accurate account as
possible of the Committee members’ views.
In general terms, the main differences between the Committee members’ suggestions lie with
their profession. The gaps between different disciplines, which were previously described as
a source of problems, were in this point predominantly seen as a source of strength, because it
provides some useful insight about the potential meaning of ‘children’s development’ and
‘right to development’. However, all interviewees, except for one, were primarily concerned
by their own professional vocabulary. Each of the suggested interpretationsderives from the
ways in which every discipline conceptualises children, childhood and children’s
development. Therefore, while the lawyers emphasised the general significance they see in
protecting the right to development (and the connection between this right and other rights of
the Convention), none of them were able to articulate the meaning of ‘development’ and
therefore of ‘the right to development’. Those members of the Committee with a professional
background in psychology, education or social welfare were much more comfortable with
speaking about ‘development’ and ‘children’s development’, while struggling to articulate
these concepts in human rights terms.
Bridging the Discipline Gap
Today, the Committee inexplicitly employs developmental psychology as its underline
narrative when referring to children’s development. In doing so, the Committee ignores the
diverse interpretation of this term at the discipline of developmental psychology itself, let
alone the meaning of this term in other disciplines like pedagogy. Therefore, there is a need
to raise awareness to the different options available to interpret the meaning of the term
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‘children’s development’. And as Cary pointed out, adopting any interpretation of
‘development’ inherently includes normative decisions.
‘I think that one of the essential features of children is that they develop.
Many people think that speaking of development means that developmental
psychologists indicate at which age a child has developed which
competence to which degree. In fact, this is not the main objective of this
discipline, since the progress in developing capacities varies remarkably. It
is much more interesting for developmental psychologists to better
understand on which factors the development of children is depending.‘
Cary has no doubts about the meaning of childhood and the meaning of development that
follows it. For Cary, the main aim of children is to grow up, and the Convention in general,
and Article 6 in particular, should be interpreted to support this goal. What needs to be
decided is what constitutes this process of ‘development’. According to this approach, Article
6 should be interpreted in a way that accommodates a wide range of developmental factors.
‘You need article 6 as an umbrella principle, so you keep it in mind when
the implementation of other articles of the Convention is at stake. You have
to know that you need to reflect on article 6, you need to explain why any
step supports the development of the child better than any other step. And
for doing so, you need to know what development means and under which
conditions development of children flourishes.’
This approach reflects the understanding of Article 6 as an interpretation tool, rather than as
an article that protects a concrete and distinct human right of children, called the right to
development.
‘Developmental psychologists believe that development will proceed if
what they call ‘normal living conditions of children’ are given. They
believe in the spontaneous activity of the child, which will find in a 'normal'
family context what she/he needs for development. So if we care for child’s
protection, we do all for development what has to be done. But meanwhile,
we think that development is based on the interaction of the child and the
social and the material context of the child. And we can point certain
conditions that must be guaranteed so development will be able to take
place. And then we come to the relationships that the child needs, we come
to a standard of living that is necessary for development, you come to more
stimulation, to motivations and then you move to the field, where also
lawyers can understand and pay attention to conditions, which have to be
guaranteed. This is difficult. In order to really implement the second half of
article 6, lawyers will need an idea of circumstances, of opportunities, of
factors, which influence development. Such a list can be provided by
science.‘
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Like other developmental psychologists, Cary is convinced that he knows what children’s
development means, and what is required in order to enable the child to grow up in a healthy
manner. It is therefore only natural to him to advise legal scholars to learn from psychologists
what children’s development means and what factors influence it. This perspective takes the
view that only then lawyers become fully equipped to interpret Article 6 in a way that
protects and promotes the ‘true’ meaning of children’s development.
This approach is far from new. It follows traditional conceptions of childhood and children’s
rights, claiming that the role of society is to protect children’s socio-psychological
development. It utilizes law (international human rights law in this case) to fulfil the social
aspiration of facilitating children’s growth and transformation into ‘full’ or ‘healthy’ adults.
Between a Distinct Right and a Guiding Principle
David supports Cary’s views, reaffirming that that for him also Article 6 does not stand as a
distinct right of the child.
‘you cannot isolate the development of the child from the actual tools of
how to develop a child. The question is how you approach Article 6. I don’t
think that Article 6 can be implemented in isolation from other Articles,
because they all should be taken as one unit. The purpose is to protect
children and to provide them with their rights. And if you do so, you
develop the child in an appropriate manner.’
This method of interpretation suggests adopting the protection for children’s development as
the prominent guiding principle of the Convention and, to some extent, subjugating the
Convention to this principle. This approach is much different than the one expressed in
General Comment 5, which specified four guiding principles of the Convention. Arguably,
this does not differ substantially from the Committee’s practice today, thought it is much
narrower. This approach actively rejects the possibility of developing a distinct meaning for
the right to development.
Theresa also thinks that the child’s right to development should be understood as an inclusive
concept. However, in order to protect children’s development, she thinks that there is a need
to realise that ‘education, health and all the other provisions are complementary to each other.
We cannot look at them separately.’ Theresa’s views are in line with the Committee’s current
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jurisprudence, not only because she claims that promoting children’s development requires
realising other right, but also because she does not perceive Article 6 as providing stand-
alone protection for a right to development.
Grace shares the view that sees the right to development as an integrated concept. Using the
example of the right to health, Grace explains how all the Convention’s rights are interrelated
to support children’s development.
‘Now we are planning to make a General Comment on Article 24, where
we will make the connection between health and development…But health
is not everything, because when we are speaking about the right to health
and the right to be heard, it means that we also speak about development. In
order that children will be able to participate, you need to work hard and to
develop them. When we are speaking about education, when we are
speaking about leisure, when we are speaking about non-discrimination,
and when we speak about every right in the Convention – they are all
related and should be bound to development.’
This approach provides no distinct meaning for Article 6, and arguably makes the article
meaningless. This interpretation further leads to a conclusion that children’s development is
sufficiently protected under the Convention, and that Article 6 has no added value other than
as an inspiration or a guiding principle. None of the interviewees related to the potential
contribution that the right to development could have in the promotion and protection of
children’s development when articulating it as a distinct human right.
Against this approach, Mark and Donna suggested understanding the right to development as
an overall concept, and not as a summary of the protection of other rights of the child. The
way in which Mark, a lawyer by training, understands the right to development supports
Cary’s claim about the need to bridge the gap between disciplines. According to Mark,
although ‘development is the objective of all the rights of the Convention’, there is more
substance to the right.
‘It [the Convention] allows reaching the autonomous development of the
child, it allows to promote children’s rights. With regard to all of the rights,
we need to promote development. When you look at education, standard of
living or any other rights, you ought to think whether their implementation
facilitates children’s development…Development is not an isolated
concept, but a parameter in a list.
‘Article 6 has an added value. It is a general principle, and when we
examine a state’s report, when we look at each right, we also ask how a
specific policy or legal provision impacts children’s development. All four
guiding principles are in our minds when we examine each right. This is
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why without Article 6 it would have been difficult to speak about
development with relation to some of the rights, unless it was mentioned
explicitly.’
This approach perceives the protection of children’s development as an aim of the
Convention (or ‘The’ aim of the Convention). While it does not ascribe a distinct meaning to
Article 6 and the right to development, it does assign an added value to the Article. Mark
recognises that without Article 6, subjugating most of the Convention’s rights to the
protection of children’s development would not have been possible. On a different level, this
approach exemplifies the extent to which the perception that children’s development ought to
be protected, is embedded in the Committee’s members views.
Donna, a medical doctor who specialises in public health, suggests employing the concept of
‘holistic’ development, which is probably the most common description used to describe
children’s development, in interpreting Article 6. According to Donna,
‘Article 6 must be looked at from a holistic angle. This is the difference,
that children have the right to development. You cannot say – let the child
be born and then let him grow or not…’
All of these views share some similarities. Predominantly, they all leave the right to
development at the margin. They all articulate the protection of children’s development as the
aim of the Convention, ascribing Article 6 with the role of a guiding principle. Like their
predecessors at the Committee, as well as the Convention’s drafters, they all were satisfied
with the current interpretation of ‘children’s development’. The only point about the meaning
of development that was often mentioned was the question, or more accurately the tension,
between universalism and cultural relativism. Some concerns were raised with regard to the
question of whether children’s development is a universal concept with a universal meaning,
or whether it should be interpreted in a contextually sensitive manner.34
What Does ‘Children’s Development’ Mean?
Two approaches concerning children’s development prevailed during the interviews. The first
approach emphasised the physical similarity between children, which in turn dictates a
similarity in the process of development. The second approach argued that a distinction
34 On universalism, cultural relativism and pluralism in the context of children’s rights see Michael Freeman,
‘The Morality of Cultural Pluralism’ (1995) 3 International Journal of Children’s Rights 1.
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between different kinds of children’s development ought to be drawn on the basis of their
emotional needs, their family, society and the impact of the latter two on the child’s
development, and was less concerned with biology. Nick’s approach best represents this line
of argument, as he claimed that while physical development among children is identical, their
moral development diverges in different cultural and social contexts.
‘The right to development has an intrinsic nature to this biological human
being that is called a child. The child should develop, and development has
so many ingredients. It relates to the holistic nature of the Convention. For
example, I would like to see [in States Parties’ reports] references to the
right to play, because a child without play will not develop. I would like to
see references to development when addressing the right to health, because
if there is no health provision then the child will not develop. I would
expect to see a good family atmosphere, because the child cannot develop
outside the family…The health and physical development of the child is
universal. But the social or moral development could vary by
circumstance...’
Though Nick does not use human rights terms, most of his examples can be formulated as
Convention’s rights.
The Committee implements somewhat linear attitude that links certain activities to specific
domains of development. Donna employs her professional vocabulary to explain the
influence of activities and social contexts on children’s development.
‘The point about development of children is that it is very age specific. The
rate of development changes and the needs to develop in terms of fulfilling
the child’s full potential and capacity varies according to the scale of
development.
‘Development is based on your five senses. It is touch, sight, smell, sound
and taste. This is how the child develop. The newborn child cannot talk, but
his senses should be stimulated and this changes during his life. Later on,
there are other stimulations for development. For example, education is
stimulation – music and sports activities are related to development. My
interpretation is that development is very age specific, you cannot have the
same set of criteria for development when the child is a new born and when
the child is one year old or at other critical moments in the child’s life
cycle.’
Donna makes an important observation concerning how the Convention should be
interpreted. Shifting between the individual and the collective, this approach derives from the
view that the physical development of children is a universal process, which requires a
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certain set of stimulations. These stimulations, she argues, will have the optimal impact on
children’s development only if they are implemented in a child-centred manner. While Donna
also does not use human rights terminology, her argument can be articulated in this language
as well. Namely, in order to promote children’s development, their rights to education, play
and leisure should be realised on the basis of the evolving capacities principles. This
approach might also imply the need to have a right to a significant other, and to the
stimulation of senses. The latter two are not recognised rights under the Convention or by
international human rights law in general, but they can be read into the right to development.
Nevertheless, this approach assumes a certain understanding of development and therefore
preserves itself, since it takes the child’s status of development (‘age specific’) as a parameter
to determine what the necessary stimulations for her further development are.
The second approach, best represented by Grace, does not focus on the child’s physical
characteristics, and takes a more communitarian approach. Grace’s approach is dialectic, as
she is mostly concern with the relationship between the child’s development and social
conditions, between social conditions and the freedom of other members of the family and
subsequently, the impact these freedoms will have on children.35
‘Development is not only related to material life, but also to values,
traditions and social life. For example, discrimination and development –
when you plan how you can free girls from discrimination, you are helping
the development of the entire family. Because then the mother will feel
free, and she will be able to work, to study, to travel and more. And it all
leads to development, and these factors are not the same in every country.
There are also differences within states, differences within regions within a
state. And governments should be aware of these differences and put their
efforts into the most needed areas.‘
Grace is the only interviewee who mentioned the political science concept of ‘development’.
She departed from the psycho-social discourse and focused on the development of society
and social mobilization. According to this approach, development should help remove social
barriers that in turn will generate ‘development’.
These two approaches provide rather clear understandings of ‘development’, but their
relevance, if any, to the right to development requires further clarification. There is still a
need to ask whether the right to development can be interpreted as having a meaning distinct
from the concept of ‘development’, and if so, how. As David articulated that question, we
should ask ‘how you develop a child, what are the criteria [for development]?’ Indeed, David
35 The relationship between development and freedom will be discussed in the next chapter.
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uses the term ‘right to development’ but only as a figure of speech, while the content of his
statement refers only to ‘development’.
‘The right to development is a huge thing, because everything and anything
is in it. Everything that concerns the child is part of the right to
development…It has to do with everything that is related to the child and
with anyone who is related to the child – governments, parents and NGO’s.
They all have a role to play in the development of the child…
‘How do you develop a child, what are the criteria, from birth, to the age of
18 years old? From the moment the child is born, you need good health care
for him or her and for the mother as well. Then you reach the stage when
the child starts to understand things. It raises the issue of pre-primary
education. And above all, the child’s family environment is important in
these early stages. Then you move on to continue educating, to health and
family unity.‘
It seems that David is keen to interpret the Convention in a way that provides everything
needed for children to develop, taking the right to development as a useful instrument that
can fulfil this aim in two ways. It brings us back to the question whether the right to
development is a distinct right or a guiding principle only. The right to development can
provide ‘an umbrella principle’ for the numerated and unnumerated rights in the Convention
that have the potential to impact children’s development. The right to development can also
create obligations for different actors (parents, society, state and the international community)
to ensure protection of children’s development. Like others, David comprehends the right to
development as an interpretive tool more than a substantive human right.
What is Next?
Theresa is the one that had the most practical suggestion about the steps that the Committee
should take to change its attitude towards Article 6. She suggested that the first step should be
holding States Parties accountable for violating Article 6.
‘When there is no accountability of states, when states cannot do
assessment and evaluations –it is also a violation. We see a major role to
accomplish the right to development and this is why there is a need for a
monitoring mechanism.’
An apparent response to this statement will be to ask why the Committee did not execute its
power, and duty, as a monitoring body? However, as obvious and simple as this suggestion
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might be, it can only be implemented once the Committee develops its understanding of the
right. Only then the Committee will be able to expect States Parties to follow it, and to
implement the Convention accordingly. Donna asked to meet the challenge of developing
monitoring tools by suggesting to create indicators of implementation.
‘We need to develop indicators to understand the meaning of the right to
development, so we will also be able to implement it…You need to decide
about development’s indicators. All human beings share the same genetic
code, except for chromosomes X for women and Y men and a number of
genes. The human potential for development, in the biological sense, does
not vary. But what varies is the family, the culture, the social conditions –
poverty, living in a village or a city, etc.‘
These kinds of indicators already exist, for example UNICEF’s State of the World Children
or the UN Development Agency Human Development Report, and they will be discussed in
the next chapter. At this point there is a need to say, that in order for the Committee to be able
to develop indicators or employ those already in existence, it first needs to develop its
understanding of the meaning of the right to development. The creation of indicators should
come after.
Alicia suggested a more modest step as a first measure for changing the Committee’s
approach, one that can be implemented rather more easily. She suggested requiring States
Parties to take children’s development into account when making long-term policy plans.
According to Alicia:
‘States’ approaches are not concerned with the individual child, but rather
with the future of the country. But there is a need to balance the individual
needs and the collective ones. Take, for example, the right to play. If you
take it seriously and invest money in it, it contributes to children’s
development and in the end it contributes to the economy. But opening
schools for after-school activity, to provide music or sports lesson, or
summer camps, costs money. And I always ask state’s representatives if
they consider doing these things, as they are the best youth crime
prevention measures as well. It is simple cost analysis, but the problem is
that any government that will invest this money now, will not be in power
to see the fruits of its policy. This is why they are not doing so. There is no
long term policy for children’s development….If we take the Convention
seriously, than there is a need to talk about children’s long term
development, regardless of other interests. Children are the rights holders. ‘
Nonetheless, Alicia is aware of the fact that States Parties would rather not bind themselves
with this kind of commitment.
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‘I am not naive anymore, and I cannot make this kind of argument with
states’ representatives. It is not enough. Policy makers ask for more rational
reasons for investing in children. Policy makers say - we are not in a
position to take care of children’s development. But if they don’t take into
consideration the rights of every child, you will end up with no citizens or
tax paying people. This is the most depressing thing for me, because even
the rational, economical arguments, arguments from political perspectives,
do not drive them for action.’
This observation is worrying. It implies that Alicia, an experienced member of the
Committee, thinks that States Parties pay nothing more than lip service to the care of
children’s development, but in fact do not want to make a change in children’s lives.
Even more alarming is her observation that this pattern will not change.
Cary shares Alicia’s view, saying that the Committee should ask States Parties to take into
consideration the impact that its policies have on children’s development.
‘The committee urges governments to make sure that a judicial or
administrative process, in which the best interests of the child is taken into
account of, is documented, so that a child or her/his representative may ask
for redress and revision if the outcome does not satisfy the expectations of
the child. The committee should ask for the same transparent proceedings
when the development of the child is affected by decisions of adults or
institutions.
Maybe the most useful suggestion was Cary’s advice to take it one step at a time, focusing on
issues that everyone agrees upon.
‘We need to develop article 6 by stating step by step what the essential
things are. Maybe, we start with one component on which the child rights
experts and the developmental research community agree. Perhaps it is the
mother (primary caretaker)-child relationship, which has to be protected in
all decisions and measures, as this relationship is so crucial for the child's
development (parental leave in the first months or year). One of the first
steps should also be the availability of early care institutions for groups of
children who do not have a reliable caregiver at home. Or facilities for the
promotion of the evolving capacities should be guaranteed. Another
specification of this right could be the establishment of awareness-raising
campaigns informing parents about the remarkable development of
children's cognitive, social and emotional capacities in the early years and
what they should to do so that these "windows of development" are not
missed and are used. Maybe it is children's play opportunities (not only
indoor; planning of the communities is needed). Other things may be added
later. Some of these issues are addressed by the committee, but usually with
reference to other articles (parental responsibility, article 18, or right to
play, article 31’
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It will be appropriate to end this section with the most ambitious suggestions of all. Alicia,
who formally expressed some despair from States Parties’ unwillingness to care for the
child’s right to development, suggests creating a new mechanism in every Member State.
‘In each state, a holistic mechanism for children’s human rights is required.
It requires an inter-sectorial cooperation that will work for the children’s
development and will harmonize all the different treaties. Countries need to
assemble a committee of experts that will build a complex system for the
implementation of all the treaties, and that implementation will be an
organic part of human rights protection. Then they will also be in a better
position to report. It will drive the government less crazy.‘
The Committee can implement most of these measures easily, immediately and with no
added cost. It requires awareness and will.
Conclusion
The chapter examined the institutional and conceptual reasons that can explain the UN
Committee on the Rights of the Child’s jurisprudence concerning the right to development, as
the members of the Committee themselves sees it. The chapter also asked for the opinions of
members of the Committee about the steps the Committee should take, in order to further
engage with the child’s right to development. Seven main conclusions can be drawn from the
interviews and the analysis of the Committee’s ‘chain of monitoring’.
First, the Committee members agree that it is immensely important to protect and promote
the right to development. Second, thus far the Committee has not provided a satisfactory
interpretation of this right, and therefore has not fulfilled one of its primarily roles as a
monitoring body. Third, the Committee’s jurisprudence about the right to development
should be further developed. Fourth, in order to change the current jurisprudence about the
right to development, the Committee needs to be active by asking States Parties to provide
more information about the measures taken to comply with their obligations under Article 6.
Fifth, the Committee does not actively monitor the implementation of the Convention’s right
to development. Whether a State Party relates to the right to development or not in its
implementation reports, the Committee will most probably not ask for more information, or
condemn the State Party for neglecting. Sixth, the Committee’s members share the ‘human
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becomings’ conception of childhood, overlooking the child as a ‘human being’. This in turn
dictates and limits the scope of their interpretations of the right to development, and
perpetuates of the lack of sufficient attention to the issue of agency. Seventh, and probably
most important, there is a need to articulate the meaning of ‘children’s development’ before
plugging the gap between disciplines and surely before addressing the meaning of ‘the child’s
right to development’.
The interviews demonstrate the problem to distinguish between the concept of ‘children’s
development’ and ‘the right to development’. Regardless of whether the interviewees were
asked about ‘children’s development’ or ‘the right to development’, most of them employed
the term ‘children’s development’ and ignored the legalistic, human rights perspective of the
question. Even when asked specifically about the right to development, most of the
interviewees replied using the term ‘children’s development’. It was only the lawyers who
were comfortable to address the child’s right to development, but they struggled to articulate
the meaning of this right. Lack of sufficient understanding of what ‘children’s development’
stands for is, I argue, the reason for this difficulty.
The common perception of childhood that the interviewees hold is, without a doubt, the
‘human becomings’ perception. Time and again during the interviews it was argued that the
main characteristic of children is to develop and to grow up. The perception of children as
‘human being’ was neither mentioned nor utilized as a concept for analysis. For this reason,
the child’s right to participation was mentioned only once at the interviews, as a relevant right
to the process of realizing children’s development and the right to development.
The next chapter tackles three of the main shortcomings of the current interpretation of the
child’s right to development, as identified thus far. Namely, the narrow conception of
‘children’s development’ that derives from a psychological perspective, lack of recognition of
children’s agency and difficulties in concretising the right.Using comparative analysis, the
next chapter analyses the potential meanings of ‘development’ and the ‘right to development’
according to the right to development in ‘general’ international law and the Capability
Approach, and their potential relevance to the interpretation of the child’s right to
development. The chapter asks how such definitions can be implemented and measured.
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Chapter Five: Comparative Analysis of Human and Children’s
‘Development’
‘Giving temporary freedom to a child does not always mean that the child
will have freedom in future, and similarly, restricting the temporary
freedom of a child may well expend the freedom that the child will have in
the future. We, therefore, have to consider the freedom for a child in a
lifelong perspective’1
Introduction
This chapter addresses three issues that are vital for the analysis of the child’s right to
development. The first is the meaning of the term ‘children’s development’, the second is the
lack of respect to children’s agency when discussing the issue of promoting children’s
development, and the third is the challenge of concretising the term ‘children’s development’
and articulating it in human rights terms.
The chapter has three sections. The first section analyses the right to development as
protected in ‘general’ international law,2 presenting the conceptualisation of ‘human
development’ under this legal regime. I suggest adopting key elements of it, including the
distinction between the protection of the process of development and its outcome, and the
respect for people’s agency, when analysing the child’s right to development. The second
section studies the Capability Approach, presenting the concept of ‘development as freedom’,
and the significance of agency and capabilities to the realisation of ‘human development’. I
suggest that children, as adults, should be conceived as entitled to develop in the Capability
Approach’s sense of the word. I discuss the feasibility to adapt the Capability Approach into
the legal analysis of the child’s right to development, and the compatibility of basic
capabilities lists to children. The third section focuses on the Child Indicator Movement’s
conceptualising and measuring children’s development and well-being. I discuses the ways in
which ‘children’s development’ is perceived and quantified, and ask whether these ideas can
be framed in children’s human rights terms.
1Madoka Saito, ‘Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach to Education: A Critical Exploration’ (2003) 37 Journal of
Philosophy of Education 17, 26.
2 I use the term ‘general’ international human rights law to refer to human rights instruments such as the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights or the 1966 Covenants, which are not group specific (unlike the
UNCRC or CEDAW). In this chapter, and unless mentioned otherwise, whenever the term ‘the right to
development’ is mentioned, it refers to the ‘general’ right to development and not to the child’s right to
development.
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The comparison between legal and non-legal regimes is carried out with the necessary
caution and awareness of its limitations. With respect to the ‘general’ right to development,
although this right shares the same title as the child’s right to development, these two rights
were created against different backgrounds, and with different images of their potential right
holders (i.e adults and children). Children, as discussed later, were not recognised as rights
holders of this ‘general’ right to development. Therefore, the comparative analysis accounts
for the differences between these two legal regimes. A different caution is required when
analysing the potential usage of the Capability Approach in the interpretation of the
children’s legal right to development, primarily because of the conceptual gaps between
moral theories and a legal frameworks.3 This chapter, as well as the next one, takes these
limitations into considerations.
The general right to development and the Capability Approach were created, to different
extent, as responses to traditional political conceptions of ‘development’, which envisaged
‘development’ in terms of poverty elimination and bringing prosperity to the
‘underdeveloped’ world.4Based on theories of economic liberalism, ‘development’ was
conceived as synonymous with increase in Gross National Product per capita, advancing the
approach that economic growth will trickle downand improve the economic conditions of all
segments of the population.5 ‘Development’ was the corner stone of Western international aid
programmes since the end of the Second World War, channelling billions of US Dollars to
‘underdeveloped’ countries.6It was criticised for focusing on systems rather than people,
perceiving the latter as means rather than ends. Feminist critique suggested that this theory
was also gender biased, since it ignores women’s role in society in general, and in economy
in particular.7More radical approaches claimed that ‘development’ and ‘aid’ constitute new
forms of imperialism and colonialism.8
3 On comparative analysis between legal instruments and other disciplines see Alan Watson, ’Comparative Law
and Legal Change’ (1978) 37 Cambridge Law Journal 313; Otto Kahn-Freund, ‘On Uses and Misuses of
Comparative Law’ (1974) 37 Modern Law Review 1; Pierre Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of 'Legal Transplants'
(1997) 4 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 111; Rodolfo Sacco, ‘Legal Formants: A
Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law’ (1991)39 American Journal of Comparative Law 1. Compare to
David Kennedy, ‘New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and International Governance’ (1997)
2 Utah Law Review 545.
4 As described by Harry Truman, the president of the United States, in his inaugural address on January 20th,
1949.
5William A. Lewis, The Theory of Economic Growth (Routledge, London 2007. Original published in 1950) 9-
10, 420-421.
6 David Hulme and Mark Turner, Sociology and Development (Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York 1990) 3-5;
Ameda Obiora, ‘Beyond the Rhetoric of a Right to Development’ (1996) 18 Law & Policy 355, 361.
7 The first feminist critique on development was published in 1970 by Ester Boserup. See Ester Boserup,
Women’s Role in Economic Development (Earthscan, Revised Edition 2007. Originally published in 1970); Also
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The Right to Development in ‘General’ International Human Rights Law
This section analyses the right to development in ‘general’ international law. It starts by
briefly introducing the process by which the right to development was created, and then it
moves on to focus on four issues: the meaning of the term ‘development’; the distinction
between protecting the process of development and protecting its outcome; the respect for
people’s agency and right to participation as an integral part of realising their right to
development; and the differences between a collective and an individual right to
development.
The Creation of the Right to Development
The suggestion to create a right to development in international human rights law was first
introduced in 1972 in a speech given by Keba M’baya, the former vice president of the
International Court of Justice.9 This innovative idea was born in light of an ‘on-going
experience of decolonialization’10 in Africa and other parts of the world, and the recognition
of ‘third world’ legal scholars that existing human rights instruments, mainly the two 1966
Covenants, did not provide the necessary normative grounds to support collective rights,11
especially the right to self-determination. Another reason was that professionals who worked
in international aid programmes (which where part of international development
programmes), felt that grounding their work on the good will of governments was far from
sufficient, and that a legal structure would solidify their efforts.12
see Jane S. Jaquette and Kathleen Staudt, ‘Women, Gender and Development’ in Jane S. Jaquette and Gale
Summerfiled (eds), Women and Gender Equality in Development Theory and Practice (Duke University Press,
Durham and London 2006) 17-52; Naila Kabber, Reserved Realities – Gender Hierarchies in Development
Thought (Verso, London 1994) 76-77; Janet Mason, Gender and Development (2nd edition, Routledge, London
2011) 11; Cecile Jackson, ‘Rescue Gender from the Poverty Trap’ in Cecile Jackson and Ruth Person (eds),
Feminist Vision of Development – Gender Analysis and Policy (Routledge, London 1998) 39-64, 43-36.
8Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1995); See also Uma
Kothari who describes the transition from colonial to development administration. Uma Kothari, ‘From Colonial
Administration to Development Studies: A Post-Colonial Critique on the History of Development Studies’, in
Uma Kothari (ed) A Radical History of Development Studies (Zed Books, New York 2005) 47-66; William
Easterly, The White Man’s Burden (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006); See also Cheryl McEwan,
Postcolonialism and Development (Routledge, New York 2009); Ivan D. Illich, Celebration of Awareness
(Calder&Boyars, London 1969).
9 Arjun Sengupta, ‘Realizing the Right to Development’ (2000) 31 Development and Change 553, 555; Peter
Uvin, Human Rights and Development (Kumarian Press, Sterling Virginia 2004) 40-41.
10 Paul H. Brietzke, ‘Consorting with the Chameleon, or Realizing the Right to Development’ (1985) 15
California Western International Law Journal 560, 582.
11 Uvin, supra n. 9, 40-42.
12 Paul j. Nelson and Ellen Dorsey, ‘At the Nexus of Human Rights and Development: New Methods and
Strategies of Global NGOs’ (2003) 31 World Development 2013.
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M’baya, therefore, suggested creating the right to development as a means to integrate ‘an
emancipatory ideal of development into international human rights law’.13 Five years later in
1977, M’baya, by then acting as the Chairperson of the UN Commission on Human Rights,
continued to roll what Peter Uvin termed the ‘snowball’of the right to development,14 leading
the Commission to launch a study about the ‘international dimensions of the right to
development as a human right’.15 This study recommended creating this right, as part of the
wave of third generation of human rights that emerged during the 1960’s and 1970’s.16 This
study, as Jack Donnelly suggests, essentially led to the creation of the right,17 although some
argued that this right was not created out of thin air, but rather reflects the normal course of
development in international human rights law, which sought to promote solidarity and
cooperation since the 1948 UDHR.18
The Commission on Human Rights’ study did not pass without attention, and debates about
the meaning of the right to development, its connection to the social policy of ‘development’,
and its relationship to other human rightsbegan to take place.19 On the positive level, these
debates resulted in the adoption of the Declaration on the Right to Development by the
General Assembly in 1986 (‘The Declaration’).20 The adoption process, as well as the many
academic debates that occurred around that time, took place in parallel to the drafting process
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Despite the coincidence in time, children were
neither considered as right holders, nor as beneficiaries of the general right to development,21
13Ibid.
14 Uvin, supra n. 9, 40.
15 UN Commission on Human Rights Resolution 4 (XXXIII) of 21 February 1977.
16On third generation human rights see Philip Alston, ‘A Third Generation of Solidarity Rights: Progressive
Development or Obfuscation on International Human Rights Law?’ (1982) 29 Netherlands International Law
Review 307.
17 Jack Donnelly, ‘In Search of the Unicorn: The Jurisprudence and Politics of the Right to Development’
(1985) 15 California Western International Law Journal 473, 478.
18 Philip Alston, ‘The Shortcomings of a “Garfield the Cat” Approach to the Right to Development’ (1985) 15
California Western International Law Journal 510; See also Dinah Shelton, ‘A Response to Donnelly and
Alston’ (1985) 15 California Western International Law Journal 524, 526. The understanding development as a
commitment of international solidarity is reflected by Article 4 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child as
well. See Wouter Vandenhole, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the CRC: Is There a Legal Obligation
to Cooperate Internationally for Development?’ (2009) 17 International Journal of Children’s Rights 23.
19 See, for example, Philip Alston, ‘Making Space for New Human Rights: The Case of the Right to
Development’ (1988) 1 Harvard Human Rights Yearbook 3; Stephen Marks, ‘The Human Right to
Development: Between Rhetoric and Reality’ (2004) 17 Harvard Human Rights Journal 137, 138-141; See also
Margot Salomon, Global Responsibility for Human Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007) 64-109;
Daniel J. Whelan, Indivisible Human Rights (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2010) 167-168.
20 Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 41/128 of 4 December 1986.
21Noam Peleg, ’What Do We Mean When We Speak About Children’s Right to Development?’ in Farhad
Malekiam and Kerstin Nordlöf (eds) The Sovereignty of Children in Law (Cambridge Scholarly Publishing,
Cambridge 2012) 134-156.
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and the Declaration is silent concerning children. From the perspective of international
children’s rights law, even after India suggested including a right to development in the
Convection on the Rights of the Child,22 neither this Declaration nor the debates on the right
were raised in the drafting process of the Convention. The two rights have been debated,
developed and created in parallel. In 1993, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action,
which was adopted at the end of the World Conference on Human Rights, reaffirming the
1986 Declaration recognition of development as a human right.23 This time, children were not
ignored and the Vienna Declaration explicitly acknowledged children as right holders of the
general right to development.24
The Meaning of ‘Development’ in the ‘Right to Development‘
The Declaration expands the meaning of the right to development beyond its original purpose
as an instrument of solidarity,25 defining it as
‘an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all
people are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic,
social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and
fundamental freedoms can be fully realised’ (Article 1(1))
This definition refers to four domains of development: Economic, social, cultural and
political. All four are connected to societies and states and, unlike the developmental domains
protected by the Convention on the Rights of the Child, are not intrinsic aspects of the
individual. Russel Barash asserts that the difficulty in understanding this definition of
development comes from the interrelated dimensions it includes, and the uncertainty about
the identity of the right holder or holders.26 Keeping these two difficulties in mind, a textual
reading suggests that the right to development can be understood as a right to enjoy the
22See chapter two.
23UNGA, Vienna Declaration and Program of Action (12 July 1993), UN Doc A/CONF.157/23; See Obiora,
supra n. 6, 379-380.
24 See Articles 18, 21, 29 and 45-53.
25 Hans-Otto Sano, ‘Development and Human Rights: The Necessary, But Partial Integration of Human Rights
and Development’ (2000) 22 Human Rights Quarterly 734, 736; See also Allan Rosas, ‘The Right to
Development’ in Asbjørn Eida et al (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2nd edition, Kluwer
International, The Hague 2001) 119-130, 123-124.
26 Russel L. Barash, ‘The Right to Development as a Human Right: Results of the Global Consultation’ (1991)
13 Human Rights Quarterly 322, 322.
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outcome of four domains of collective development, whereas during the process of
development all the rights and freedoms of individuals should be ‘fully realised’.
‘Development’ is further defined by the Declaration as ‘the constant improvement of well-
being of the entire population and of all individuals…’ (Article 2(3)), thus emphasising the
importance of non-discrimination and inclusion.27 The right to development therefore reaches
beyond the ‘notions of economic growth to the expansions of opportunities and capabilities to
enjoy those opportunities’.28Donnelly rejects this line of interpretation, claiming that
‘individual development is a likely (although not a necessary) consequence of respect for
economic and social right[s]’.29
Critics of the right to development described it a ‘hopelessly utopian’,30 as an ‘entirely
pointless’ idea within the framework of international human rights law, or claimed that it is
nothing more than an ‘umbrella concept’ lacking any distinct meaning.31 Arjun Sengupta, the
former UN Independent Expert on the Right to Development, responded by saying that the
right should neither be seen as a title that joins civil and political rights with social and
cultural rights,32 nor should it be perceived as the summary of a set of rights. All human
rights, he asserted, are interrelated and interdependent under the right to development, and all
are essential foundationsfor the realisation of the right to development.
According to this approach, the right should be perceived as an integrated whole,33 which
means the right to 'exercise of the full range of rights; as a goal it is the self-actualization of
people through the exercise of their rights'.34This interpretation goes beyond the immediate,
inherent benefit of realising different human rights, preferring a more abstract conception of
self-actualization’.35 This idea reflects the original ideas of emancipation that led to the
creation of this right, which is also reflected by the Declaration, which states that the right
‘also implies the full realisation of the right of people to self-determination which includes
27 Arjun Sengupta, ‘The Human Right to Development’ (2004) 32 Oxford Development Studies 179, 180.
28 Sengupta, ‘Realising the Right to Development’, supra n. 9, 566.
29 Donnelly, supra n.17.
30 Richard Warren Perry, ‘Rethinking the Right to Development: After the Critique of Development, After the
Critique of Rights’ (1996) 18 Law & Society 225, 228.
31 Rosas, supra n. 25, 129.
32 Arjun Sengupta, ‘Implementing the Right to Development’ in Nico Schrijver and Friedl Weiss (eds)
International Law and Sustainable Development – Principles and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden
2004) 341-377, 343.
33Ibid, 343.
34J. O'Manique, 'Human Rights and Development’ (1992) 14 Human Rights Quarterly 78, 101.
35Ibid.
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their inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources’ (Article
1(2)).
An alternative, but related, approach to the articulation of this right as an integrated right is to
conceptualise the right to development as a vector. According to Sengupta, analysing the
right to development as a vector right means that it should be seen:
‘as a composite right, where all the rights are realised together, recognizing
their interdependence, not just their aggregation. The whole is greater than
the sum of the parts… the component rights are related in a non-linear way
with positive feedback… it is a composite of all the human rights
implemented in an integrated manner as a part of a development program in
the context of the growth of resources’.36
Donnelly argues that even according to this interpretation, ‘development’ is the objective of
human rights as a whole, and not a standalone concept.37 He might be too harsh. A meaning
of ‘development’ in ‘the right to development’ can be concluded in light of the Declaration.
‘Development’ refers to emancipation, growth and prosperity. As a human right, it means that
people have the right to growth, which is assisted by the realisation of all of their other
human rights. I return to these ideas, including the conceptualising of the right to
development as a composite right, in the next chapter.
Distinguishing Between The Process of Development and Its Outcome
The general right to development asks to differentiate between two aspects of development:
the process of development and its outcome. The Declaration’s preamble states that ‘the
human person is the central subject of the development process’. The goal of the
developmental process is to constantly improve the ‘well-being of the entire population and
of all individuals’ (Article 2(3)). According to Sengupta, both the process and the outcome of
development are equally important.38Thus, the two should not be differentiated, and the
process should not be seen as a means to an end. At this point Lesley Obiora adds that the
process of development itself is important as it enables people to exercise their human
rights.39 According to this line of reasoning, the process of development should be seen as
36 Sengupta, ‘The Human Right to Development’, supra n. 27, 183.
37 Donnelly, supra n.17, 484.
38 Sengupta, ‘The Human Right to Development’, supra n. 27, 183.
39Obiora, supra n. 23, 389.
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serving an end in and of itself. Treating the process of development as intrinsic in its own
right,therefore, ensures respecting people’s human rights, dignity and agency throughout the
process, and not only in its end. Following the same logic, O'Manique suggests not to see
these two aspects in polarised terms, proposing to understand the differences between them
from the perspective of the right holders. From this perspective, the right to development can
be understood as a right that protects both the process and the outcome of development, while
actualizing the ‘human potential as defined by the individual and his or her community'.40
This analytical distinction between the outcome and process of development is valuable when
thinking about children. Under the ‘human becomings’ paradigm, the concern is placed on
the end result of the development process. The expectation is to see children transform into
adults, and only then gain agency. Whereas according to the ‘human being’ paradigm the
process of maturation is respected; the child is perceived as a right holder and the inherent
importance of the maturation process is acknowledged. A question that should be asked is
whether the child’s right to development protects the process of development (i.e the process
of growing up) or the outcome of this process, namely the transformation of the child into an
adult.
Respect for People’s Agency and Their Right to Participation
A key aspect of the right to development is the recognition and respect of people’s agency
and promoting their right to participation. Article 1 of the Declaration expresses this ideal
clearly, stating that ‘every human person…[is] entitled to participate in, contribute, and enjoy
economic, social, cultural and political development’. The Declaration further adds that
individuals ‘should be active participants’ of the right to development (Article 2(1)), since a
‘meaningful participation’ of people is essential to the realisation of the right to development,
and it should be ensured while the process of development takes place (Article 2(3)).
Respecting people’s agency is the reason for, as well as the outcome of, respecting their right
to self-determination.41 Participation can have a positive effect on the elimination of
exclusion and community mobilization efforts.42 Granting people the right to participate
(where the right to vote is only a partial expression of participation) enhances democratic
40J. O'Manique, 'Development, Human Rights and Law' (1992) 14 Human Rights Quarterly 383, 384.
41Alston, ‘The Shortcomings of a “Garfiled the Cat” Approach to the Right to Development’, supra n. 18, 512;
Arjun Sengupta, ‘The Human Right to Development’ supra n. 27, 180-181.
42 Barash, supra n. 26, 329.
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values43 and empowers people. Therefore, participatory processes should be ‘centred around
the concept of equity and justice’,44 and ‘decisions have to be taken with the full involvement
of the beneficiaries, keeping in mind that if this involves a delay in the process, that delay
should be kept to a minimum’.45
The principle of participation conforms to the perception of people as the end rather than
means of development. Participation gives people a voice, and transforms them into active
agents of change, instead of being passive targets of economic development policy or
political oppression. In that sense, there is an important similarity between the right to
development and the protection of children’s right to participation in Article 12 of the
Convention, and the ‘human beings’ conception of childhood. As we saw in chapter three, the
Committee tends not to link the protection for children’s development and their right to
development with the right to participation, as part of its failure to respect children’s agency
with respect to their development.
Between an Individual and a Collective Right
As mentioned earlier, the origins of the right to development lie in the emancipatory ideas of
the 1960’s and 1970’s. Therefore, the right protects the collective idea of self-determination
and economic development, perceiving people as active objects and not as means to an end.46
The Declaration states that people should enjoy the right both as individuals and as a
collective. Article 1(1) states that it is the right of ‘every human person and all people’.
People ‘individually and collectively’ (Article 2(2)) are responsible for development, though
states bear the ‘duty to formulate appropriate national development policies that aim at the
constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population’ (Article 2(3)).
In other clauses, the Declaration divides the right holders according to different goals of
‘development’. For example, as a collective right, people are the ones who enjoy the right to
self-determination as part of the right to development (Article 1(2)). Individuals, on the other
hand, are the central subjects of development (Article 2(1)). However, Obiora rightly claims
43Salomon, supra n.19, 181.
44 Sengupta, ‘Realising the Right to Development’, supra n. 9, 566.
45Ibid, 568.
46 Shelton, supra n. 18, 525.
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that such an approach first requires reconciling the ‘antitetical and hierarchical’ relationship
between the two dimensions,47 as reflected in the Declaration itself.
According to Obiora’s analysis, states have the duty to respect this right for the benefit of
their people, but they are not the right holders.48 Obiora further suggests that ‘the assumption
is that the satisfaction of the collective right and the right to development in particular is a
necessary condition for the materialization of the individual right’.49 Donnelly asserts that the
individual dimension of the right prevails and, therefore, the right to development should be
interpreted as
‘a right to pursue full personal development along all major dimensions of
human life. If all human rights aim at the further development of the human
person, then a right to full personal development can stand as a summary of
traditional rights’.50
To a large extent, this definition is aligned with the way in which the child’s right to
development is currently interpreted. Nonetheless, this approach undermines the
categorization of the right to development as an independent right that has a distinct meaning.
Paul Brietzke views the right to development as a right of individuals that can only be
realised through a collective effort. Brietzke asserts that every person should be perceived as
a right holder, but the right will not be realised by the actions of an individual alone. Each
and every right holder should be located ‘at the beginning and at the end of the [development]
process’, while ‘the middle of the process, the implementing of the right to development
through a broadly-defined production, can only be achieved collectively and through
interdependent domestic sectors and, ultimately, the international community’.51 This
perspective echoes the original ideas of collective mobilization as a vehicle to fulfil
individual development. This approach assumes that a collective development will be the
means to facilitate the realisation of the personal right to development. This point is further
developed by the Capability Approach, as will be discussed below.
Sengupta approaches this tension from a different perspective, claiming that the right
‘incorporates personal rights’, but nevertheless ‘has to be implemented mainly by collective
47 Obiora, supra n. 23, 359.
48 Brietzke supra n. 10, 566.
49Obiora supra n. 23, 389.
50 Donnelly, supra n. 17, 501.
51 Brietzke, supra n. 10, 593.
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actions’.52 But even Sengupta eventually admits that the right ‘aims at the constant
improvement of the well-being of the entire population on the basis of their active, free and
meaningful participation and the fair distribution of benefits resulting from,’53 further
emphasising the importance of economic growth as ‘both an objective and a means’ for
development.54 This comment suggests that the tension between the collective and individual
dimensions of the right to development leans toward favouring collective progress as a means
of facilitating personal emancipation. But this approach advances the view that only
economic progress can create the necessary material condition for every human being to
enjoy the full scale of human rights. To some extent, this conclusion undermines the view
that people are at the centre of development. It also ignores other domains of development,
such as emotional development and psychological development, which are effected by
personal relationships (for example between family members) and not only by materialistic
conditions of living.
Conclusion - What Can the Right to Development Contribute to the Analysis of the Child’s
Right to Development?
The main challenge in using the ‘general’ right to development in analysing the child’s right
to development, is resolving the contrasting aims of these two rights. These two rights share
the yardstick of growth: one of growth in economy and the other of personal growth. While
the current interpretation of the child’s right to development focuses on the process of
maturation of the individual child, the ‘general’ right to development holds a more complex
notion of ‘development’. The idea of development of the latter combines a collective progress
with an emphasis on economic growth, while equally valuing personal emancipation. This is
where the two rights meet, since they both essentially seek to enable every human being to
fulfil her or his human potential.
The analysis of the child’s right to development can benefit from this specific articulation of
‘development’, and the thematic distinction between the process of development and its
outcome. It appears that thus far, the interpretation of the child’s right to development seeks
to protect the outcome of the process – enabling the child to ‘become’ an adult. But if the
process of development is deemed important as well, it will reaffirm the significance of the
52 Sengupta, ‘Realising the Right to Development’, supra n. 9, 569.
53Sengupta, ‘Implementing the Right to Development’, supra n. 32, 346.
54Ibid, 347.
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time of childhood, respect the child as a right holder and respect the child’s agency and the
child’s right to participation. In other words, it will enable to channel the ‘human beings’
model into the interpretation of the child’s right to development.
The relevance of the differentiation between the collective and individual aspects to the
analysis of the child’s right to development will be discussed in more details in the next
chapter.
The Capability Approach and the Child’s Right to Development
This section analyses the Capability Approach’s conception of development, its emphasis on
respecting people’s agency and the potential contributionsof this approach to the analysis of
the child’s right to development. The section begins by describing the background that led to
the creation of theCapability Approach. It follows with a discussion about the concept of
‘human development’, delineating the understanding of ‘development’ as ‘freedom’, and its
nexus with the concepts of agency and capabilities. The third part analyses how these
conceptions can be used to analyse the child’s right to development. Some of the concepts
and terms that this section discusses overlap with the concepts and terms employed in the
previous section about the ‘general’ right to development. This overlap is unavoidable due to
the interrelatedness between the two, and influence on each other.
I argue that utilising Capability Approach in the interpretation process of the child’s right to
development can help overcome two of the shortcomings in the current approach to this right,
namely the lack of recognition of children’s agency and the difficulties in concretising
children’s development. Similarly to the contribution that the ‘general’ right to development
made with respect to agency, the Capability Approach provides even further theoretical
justifications, as well as practical implications that follow, for the respect of children’s
agency.
The Capability Approach (or ‘approaches’)55 is based on the seminal work of Amartya Sen
and Martha Nussbaum.The Capability Approach has constituted a paradigm shift in the
understanding of ‘development’ in economics and political science, suggesting that
‘development’ should not be thought of only in terms of promoting economic growth as a
55It has also been suggested that it should be called ‘the capability creation’. Des Gasper, ‘What Is the
Capability Approach? Its Core, Rationale, Partners and Dangers’ (2007) 36 Journal of Socio-Economics 335,
346.
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means of eliminating poverty and satisfying people’s ‘basic needs’.56But rather,
‘development’ should be comprehended as a process that facilitates people’s ability to live
lives worth living.57 Development, in a nutshell, is ‘freedom’.58 Thus far, children have been
largely left out of the debates concerning the Capability Approach, and only handful of
studies touches upon this issue.59Most recently, in 2012, Martha Nussbaum and Rosalind
Dixon joined this emerging trend, and have argued that the Capability Approach can be used
to justify recognition of children’s human rights.60 Dixon and Nussbaum’s arguments will be
discussed in detail later, but for now it is important to note that their discussion on children’s
rights overlooked the right to development. This thesis will not exhaust all questions that the
relationship between the Capability Approach, children and children’s rights raises. It focuses
on two of themonly: should the Capability Approach’s conception of development be
employed in analysing the child’s right to development, and if the answer is affirmative, then
how.
The Meaning of ‘Development’ According to the Capability Approach
The Capability Approach rejects the focus on economic growth, as the traditional conception
of development suggests,61 nor does it focus, like international children’s rights law, on
personal domains of development like psychological development. Rather, the Capability
Approach aims to advance people’s quality of life and well-being by expending their
capability to increase their ‘real opportunities’, in order to enable people to have a stake
inshaping their own lives.62 The Capability Approach also looks beyond one’s capabilities,
and draws attention to structural implications of disability, social exclusion, chronic poverty,
democratic values and human dignity, considering the influence of these factors on one’s
56 Gustavo Esteva, ‘Development’ in Wolfgang Sachs (ed) The Development Dictionary (Zed Book, London
1992) 6-25; Paul Streeten and Shahid Javed Burki, ‘Basic Needs: Some Issues’ (1978) 6 World Development
411; On women’s basic needs see Ingrid Palmer, ‘Rural Women and the Basic Needs Approach to
Development’ (1977) 115 International Labour Review 97.
57 Andrew Moore and Roger Crisp, ‘Welfarism in Moral Theory’ (1996) 74 Australian Journal of Philosophy
598; Lawrence Hamilton, ‘A Theory of True Interests in the Work of Amartya Sen’ (1999) Government and
Opposition 516.
58 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1999).
59Flavio Comim et al, ‘Introduction – Theoretical Foundations and the Book’s Roadmap’ in Mario Biggeri et al
(eds) Children and the Capability Approach (Palgrave, Hampshire 2011) 3-21, 6.
60 Rosalind Dixon and Martha Nussbaum, ‘Children’s Rights and a Capability Approach: The Question of
Special Priority’ (2011-2012) 97 Cornell Law Review 549.
61On that aspect of development see Steven Pressman and Gale Summerfield, ‘The Economic Contribution of
Amartya Sen’ (2000) 12 Review of Political Economy 89.
62 Dixon and Nussbaum, supra n. 60, 557.
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freedom.63 According to Sen, freedom to choose is ‘both the primary end’ and ‘the principle
means of development’.64 Expanding the freedoms that people have enriches their lives,65and
‘allows them to be fuller social persons, exercising our own volitions and interacting with -
and influencing - the world in which we live’.66 Poverty, according to the Capability
Approach, is not lack or materialistic needs, but rather a capability deprivation. Being poor is
being in a position where you cannot make meaningful choices about your own life.
‘Unfreedom’ is a deprivation of capabilities, such as famine or being under nourished, having
little access to social services such as health care or functional education, access to clean
water, or having no economic and social security. ‘Unfreedom’ can also be manifested in
broader terms, as an inequality ‘between women and men [and] denial of political liberty and
basic civil rights’.67
Sen argues that social exclusion and heterogeneity are two key factors in generating
inequalityand unfreedom. He asserts that social, political, economic and cultural power
structures constitute the core causes of unfreedoms, since they prevent the marginalised from
benefiting from economic prosperity, thus neutralizing the ‘trickle down’ effect. A related
issue is household inequality. Sen claims that increasingthe family income as a means of
eliminating household poverty is false, since it is based on the perception of ahousehold
equality, where welfare is distributed fairly. This perception ignores realitiesof many women,
children and the elderly, where decisions are being taken for them on the bases of patriarchal
order, which means that they are less likely to have their needs met (and girls are usually
discriminated against more then boys).68
The Capability Approach further challengesthe perception of people, mainly poor people, as a
homogenous group, claiming that the perception of homogeneity ignores gender, disabilities,
age or illness as relevant factors to the levels of income and accessibility to social services
necessary to maintain similar standard of living. For example, a person with disability spends
a larger percentage of his income on buying medications and treatments (and he also need
more access to health care services),in comparison tothe percentage that a person without a
disabilityand a same level of income spends on his health. Therefore, in order to ‘develop’
63 Sen, Development as Freedom, supra n. 58.
64Ibid, 16.
65Sabina Alkire, ‘Using The Capability Approach: Prospective and Evaluative Analyses’ in Flavio Comin et al
(eds) The Capability Approach (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008) 26-50, 28.
66Sen, Development as Freedom,supra n. 58, 14.
67Ibid, 15.
68Ibid, 70-71.
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and to maintain a similar standard of living, these two people need different resources. The
same logic applies to children. Children also have their own unique needs that ought to be
met, in order to be able to live dignified lives.69
Three concepts are vital to understanding the Capability Approach: agency, functions and
capabilities. Respecting people’s agency and the idea that people should live their lives
according to their own wishes, instead of being bound by a set of choices determined by
others,70 is one of the main innovations of the Capability Approach. Similar to the ‘general’
right to development, the Capability Approachsees the individual as ‘someone who acts and
brings about change, and whose achievements can be judged in terms of her own values and
objectives, whether or not we assess them in terms of some external criteria as
well.’71Participation of people is the best way to realise those personal preferences.
Participation guarantees people’s freedoms since it ‘enhances the ability of people to help
themselves and also to influence the world… the concern here relates to what we may call the
‘agency aspect’ of the individual’.72Preventing people from having the ability to choose not
only denies their agency but also, according to Nussbaum, ‘makes life not worthy of human
dignity’.73
Functions are ‘the various things a person may value being and doing’.74 Functions include,
for example, having a job and being healthy, as well as more abstract ideas, such as
happiness. The Capability Approachdoes not offer one definitive set of these types of
preferences,75as every person should define her or hisfunctions subjectively. A precondition
to being able to define a set of functions and live accordingly is having the necessary
capabilities. Sen uses the availability of food as an example to illustrate the connection
between functions and capabilities. If a person does not eat, it might be because he simply
does not have food, or because he has decided to fast or to go on a diet.76 While the latter is a
matter of choice (function), the former is a matter of lack of capabilities.
69 Dixon and Nussbaum, supra n. 60, 556-563.
70Amartya Sen, Inequality Re-examined (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1992) 39.
71 Sen, Development as Freedom, supra n. 58, 18-19.
72Ibid, 18.
73Martha C. Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities – The Human Development Approach (Harvard University Press,
Cambridge 2011) 31.
74Sen, Development as Freedom, supra n. 58 75.
75Amartya Sen, ‘Human Rights and Capabilities’ (2005) 6 Journal of Human Development 151, 157-160.
76 Sen, Inequality Re-examined, supra n. 70.
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Capabilities are therefore ‘the range of options a person has in deciding what kind of life to
lead’,77which ‘represent the various combinations of functioning (being and doing) that the
person can achieve’,78 and as such constitutes one’s freedom. Nussbaum defines capabilities
in slightly different terms, claiming that capabilities are what enable people to execute their
human functions.79 Capabilities should, therefore, be understood as 'what people are actually
able to do and to be'.80 According to Nussbaum, all human beings ought to have the freedom
to choose whether they exercise these capabilities and in which ways they do so, while the
role of the state is to establish the 'material and institutional environment so people are
actually able to function'.81Whereas Sen’s ideas remain in the abstract, as he does not define
the types of capabilities needed in order to be free, Nussbaum suggests a list of ten
capabilities that she qualifies as concrete, universal, inseparable and essential to the
realisation of human development. The ten capabilities are: life, bodily health, bodily
integrity, sense, imagination and thought, emotions, practical reason, affiliation, other species
and play and control over one's environment.82 Nussbaum asserts that this list is intentionally
slightly ambiguous in order to leave a room for every society to elaborate and interpret this
list differently, based on its own traditions and histories.83
Distinguishing between internal capabilities and substantial freedoms can help to flush out
the meaning of ‘freedom’ and ‘capabilities’ a bit more. Internal capabilities are the person’s
intellectual and emotional capacities, fitness and health, learning skills etc. Substantial
freedom is the ability to make a choice, which depends on personal capacities as well as the
political, social and economic environment as combined capabilities. Based on this
distinction, it is argued that if a society would like to promote human capabilities, it ought to
support the development of internal capabilities ‘through education resources to enhance
physical and emotional health, support for family care and love, a system of education and
77Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen, India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity (Oxford University
Press, Oxford 1995) 10.
78Sen, Inequality Re-examined, supra n. 70, 4.
79Martha Nussbaum, 'Women's Capabilities and Social Justice' (2000) 1 Journal of Human Development 219,
242.
80Ibid, 222-223.
81Ibid, 235.
82Ibid, 230-233. Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities – The Human Development Approach, supra73, 33-34.
83Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities – The Human Development Approach, supra73, 40. See Robeyns’ claim
that such a list should be rejected as it narrows down Sen’s approach. Ingrid Robeyns, ‘An Unworkable Idea or
a Promising Alternative? Sen’s Capability Approach Re-examined’ (1993) Center of Economic Discussion on
Paper 00.30. University of Leuven, Mimeo.
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much more.’84 This distinction clarifies how society can enable production of internal
capabilities, while reducing or eliminating the options of people to function in accordance
with those capabilities. For example, people can be given access to education in order to
develop their capability to express themselves. But if soon after they are denied the right to
freedom of expression, it means that their combined capability is denied.85 Society, therefore,
cannot provide and produce combined capabilities ‘without producing internal capabilities’.86
This distinction is vital with respect to children, as will be furtherelaborated in the next
section.
Another aspect of capabilities that should to be taken into consideration is what Jonathan
Wolff and Avner De-Shalit describes as ‘Capability Security’. Wolff and De-Shalit claim that
providing people with capabilities alone does not fulfil the goal of extending freedom,
because people need some level of certainty about their future in order to enjoy the ability to
choose. The ‘Capability Security’ means that issues concerning the length and time in which
each capability will be protected, and the extent of which it will be protected, must be
addressed. Wolff and De-Shalit suggest that having a capability protected (for example the
right to education) in a constitutional document, which cannot be easily amended, provides
sufficient protection and security, in comparison to having capabilities guaranteed in law, in
administrative acts, in customs or not guaranteed at all.
In light of this approach, Nussbaum is right to ask what new roles, if any, this concept
ascribes to states and to courts.87 After all, even this kind of constitutional instrument does
not provide the necessary protection, if a person lacks access to courts or does not have
confidence in the judiciary.88 For children, as will be discussed later, capability security is
important due to their lack of the political influencerequired to make capabilities accessible
and available (which influence their combined capabilities).
84Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities – The Human Development Approach, supra73, 21.
85Ibid, 23.
86Ibid.
87Ibid, 43.
88Jonathan Wolff and Avner De-Shalit, Disadvantage (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007). See also
Sano,supra n. 25, 749-750. To some extent, this argument is similar to the connection that some, like David
Kennedy, make between the rule of law, access to justice and development). David Kennedy, ‘Laws and
Development’ in John Hatchard and Amanda Perry-Kessaris (eds) Law and Development: Facing Complexity in
the 21st Century (Cavendish, London 2003) 17-26.
190
Comparative Analysis – The Capability Approach and the Child’s Right to Development
In this section I argue that childrenshould be perceived as entitled to develop in the
Capability Approach’s sense of the word. Utilising the Capability Approach’s conception of
development with regard to the child’s right to development can remedy two shortcomings in
the current interpretation of this right: lack of recognition in children’s agency and ignorance
of their right to participation; and insufficient concretization of the right. It can also enableus
to re-define the meaning of ‘children’s development’ and thus of their right to
development.First, I will address the preliminary questions concerning the adaptability of the
Capability Approachto international human rights law, and the nexus between the Capability
Approachand children.
The role of children in the Capability Approach has been rarely addressed by either Sen or
Nussbaum, until very recently. I argue that one of the main reasons for this silence isSen’s
adoption of the ‘human becomings’ model to childhood, denoting that children will have to
enjoy their freedoms in the future, when they become competent adults.89 The ‘opportunities
children have today and will have tomorrow’, Sen writes, are ‘in line with what they can be
reasonably expected to want, is a matter of public policy and social programmes’.90
Competency, therefore, is the key difficulty that Sen sees in linking between children and the
Capability Approach. Madoka Saito expresses a similar concern, when he asks ‘how can we
apply the Capability Approach to children, since children are not mature enough to make
decision by themselves?’91 Likewise, Biggeri et al assert that the ‘Capability Approach
obviously implies the individual’s capacity for self-determination, which may not apply to
children’.92
The questions of children’s competence and capacity to choose are not unique to this context.
These questions are at the heart of the debates concerning children’s rights, and are being
asked with respect to almost every aspect of the child’s life, including, for example, consent
to medical treatment,93the age of criminal responsibility,94 or the right to vote.95 The debates
89Saito, Supra n. 1, 25.
90Amartya Sen, ‘Children and Human Rights’ (2007) 1 Indian Journal of Human Development 235, 241.
91Saito, Supra n. 1, 25.
92Mario Biggeri et al, ‘Children’s Agency and the Capability Approach: A Conceptual Framework’, In Mario
Biggeri et al (eds) Children and the Capability Approach, supra n. 59, 22-45, 24.
93A leading UK case is Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112. See Michael
Freeman, ‘Rethinking Gillick’ (2005) 13 International Journal of Children’s Rights 201.
94Different countries subscribe different age of criminal responsibility, ranging from the age of 7 to the age of
18. Angela Melchiorre and Ed Atkins, At What Age Are School-Children Employed, Married and Taken to
Court? (Right to Education Project, London 2011) 30-32.
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with respects to these issues are relevant in our context as well. Predominantly, it is a matter
of conception concerning children’s entitlement, and not ‘empirical’ capacity, to choose.
Therefore, I suggest that the Capability Approachshould be deemed as relevant for children
for all the reasons that it is relevant to all people, including the elderly and the disabled
person, and for the most marginalised groups in particular. Claiming that Capability
Approachis not relevant to children based on the claim that children lack the capacity to
chooseundermines the core principle of the Capability Approachitself. One cannot advocate
for respecting the human dignity and agency of people, who formerly were at the margins of
their societies, were perceived as lacking of (certain) capacities, and at the same time deny
this universal principle from children, by using the very same arguments. The unsubstantiated
repeated proposition that children lack required capacity is a self-fulfilling prophecy, leading
to a situation where children are also denied the opportunity to challenge this presumption,
perpetuating their denial of agency.96 This attitude creates a vicious circle that excludes
children from the ability to develop, in line with the Capability Approach’sconception of
development as freedom.
Nussbaum’s definitions of internal capabilities and combined capabilities of children deny
children the opportunity to ‘develop’ in the Capability Approach’s sense of the word as well.
A change in this attitude will happen if children’s internal capabilities are developed,
primarily by education, and if they begin to be seen as active agents. Recognising children’s
agency is a theme that keeps reappearing in every analysis concerning the child’s right to
development. Therefore, we first need to discuss the relationship between the Capability
Approach and human rights law in general.
Sen distinguished between the conceptual idea of human rights and human rights law,
claiming that the moral strength of the former does not require the existence of the latter. On
practical levels, Sen asserted that human rights law is a good rhetorical tool for creating and
imposing obligations on states to provide the capabilities necessary for human
development.97Referring to the structure of international human rights law, Séverine
Deneulimasserts that employing the Capability Approach’sconception of development
95 Marc Jans, ‘Children as Citizens’ (2004) 11 Childhood 27; John Wall, ‘Can Democracy Represent Children?
Towards a Politics of Difference’ (2012) 19 Childhood 86; Jeremy Roche, ‘Children: Rights, Participation and
Citizenship’ (1999) 6 Childhood 475; Aoife Nolan, Children’s Socio-Economic Rights, Democracy and the
Courts (Hart, Oxford 2011) 43-92.
96On this point see Katherine Hunt Federle, ‘Rights Flow Downhill’ (1994) 2 International Journal of
Children’s Rights 343.
97 Amartya Sen, ‘Capabilities and Well-Being’ in Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (eds) Quality of Life
(Oxford University Press, Oxford 1993) 30-53.
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enables to ‘look at the institutional framework that allows that right to be fulfilled’.98
According to this approach, human rights analysis does not employ Capability
Approach’sconception, but rather utilises the Capability Approachin order to define social
structures. By focusing on social instruments and law, both approaches ignore the human
right holders as human subjects.Nussbaum is much more in favour of connecting the
Capability Approach and human rights, including children’s rights, than Sen.99 As noted
earlier, most recently Dixson and Nussbaum argued that the Capability Approach provides
further justification for recognising children as human rights holders, and for giving
children’s socio-economic rights a priority.100 Furthermore, they argued that children’s
entitlement to their human dignity justifies recognising ‘a range of rights for children with
sensitivity both to children’s welfare needs and to children’s agency’.101 In their discussions
about children’s competence and agency, Dixon and Nussbaum compare children’s rights to
the rights of people with intellectual disabilities, arguing that recognition of children’s rights
is based on a similar ‘moral claim of all human beings to be afforded full human dignity,
regardless of their capacity for rational or reasoned participation in public or civil life’.102
Therefore, taking the Capability Approach perspective, they claim that children’s
‘vulnerability’103 (or a ‘cost effective analysis’)104 justifies affirmative action policies toward
children, which aim to provide children the necessary capabilities to be free.
The distinction between capacities and respect for human dignity and human rights is
important, but nevertheless problematic because children are once again being measured
against adult-tailored standards.Thus, perpetuating the notion that a competent adult is the
threshold that children must meet. The comparison to people with intellectual disabilities
contradicts the perception of childhood as a mode of change. While children are ‘developing’
and, therefore, capable of change, the common perception of adults with intellectual
disabilities is that their disability is static (that until medical science will solve the relevant
neurobiological problems).
98Séverine Deneulim, ‘Ideas Related to Human Development’ in Séverine Deneulim and Lila Shahani (eds) An
Introduction to the Human Development and Capabilities Approach (Earthscan, London 2009) 49-70, 60.
99 Martha Nussbaum, ‘Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings’ in Martha Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover
(eds) Women, Culture and Development: A Study on Human Capabilities (Oxford University Press, Oxford
1995) 61-104; Martha Nussbaum, ‘Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Global Justice’ (2003) 9
Feminist Economics 33.
100 Dixon and Nussbaum, supra n. 60.
101Ibid, 553.
102Ibid.
103Ibid, 573-578.
104Ibid, 578-584.
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Biggeri has a more practical suggestion, claiming that ‘human rights can be used as the main
argument for defending a list of relevant capabilities for children’,105 and that the Capability
Approach‘can become a framework for normative evaluation and policy implementation.
Therefore, it seems that the libertanian-inspired human rights approach and the Capability
Approachcan dialogue and complement each other quite well’.106Ballet et al take this idea
forward, suggesting aconcrete mode of operation.
‘in the case of children, on the one hand human rights can be used as the
main argument for defending a list of relevant capabilities for children, and
on the other the Capability Approach can become a framework for
normative evaluation and policy implementation.’107
I suggest adopting this conclusion with only one change: in the case of children, the
Capability Approachcan inform the interpretation and implementation of the Convention in
general, and the right to development in particular. I will return to this idea in detail later,
when discussing the contribution of the Capability Approachto concretising the child’s right
to development.
Polly Vizard claims that despite Sen’s reservations concerning employing human rights
terminology with respect to the Capability Approach,international human rights law can help
to generate ‘a minimal list of central and basic capabilities with universal coverage’.108
Likewise, Deneulim suggests that both the Capability Approachand human rights are based
on ‘the maxim that individuals should not be treated as a means but as an end… the human
rights approach enhances human development with its stronger focus on obligations and
duties, while the latter remains an evaluative framework for assessing states of affairs’.109 A
different, more substantive issue, with regard to employing the Capability Approachin the
context of human rights framework, is the question of equality and discrimination. While the
recognition of diversity among people and the impacts that disadvantages have on people’s
development is central to the Capability Approach, Deneulim claims that ‘the human rights
approach does not necessarily take such differences into account’,110 and, therefore, will not
105 Mario Biggeri et al, ‘Children’s Agency and the Capability Approach: A Conceptual Framework’, In Mario
Biggeri et al (eds) Children and the Capability Approach, supra n. 59, 22-45, 39-40.
106Ibid, 39-40.
107Ibid.
108 Polly Vizard, ‘Specifying and Justifying a Basic Capability Set: Should the International Human Rights
Framework be Given a More Direct Role?’ (2007) 35 Oxford Development Studies 225, 235.
109 Deneulim, supra n. 98, 60.
110Ibid, 61.
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fulfil the Capability Approach’sgoals. The problem with this liberal analysis is that it ignores
the notion of substantive equality and affirmative action.
Human rights law does not ignore differences between people; on the contrary, it respects
these differences and factors them in. The 2007 Convention on the Rights of People with
Disabilities serves as a good example of this approach.111Similarly, the differences between
children and adults can and should be recognised under an equality and non-discrimination
analysis. Such an approach upholds the child’s right to non-discrimination and takes into
account relevant differences.
Fostering The Recognition of Children’s Agency and Participation
An important contribution of the Capability Approachto the analysis of the child’s right to
development is fostering the recognition of children’s agency, both of the individual childand
of children as a collective group. Such recognition will place children at the heart of the
process of development, and will ensure that their right to participate and to enjoy both the
process and outcome of development is realised. In that respect, the argument shares
similarities to the conclusions of the analysis of the ‘general’ right to development.
As chapters one-three have demonstrated,the lack of recognition of children as agentshas led
in the pastto a perception of children as their father’s property (and unfortunately is some
cases this perception is still valid today), as passive members of the family who are
subjugated to the control of others, and as passive beneficiaries of welfare policies.
Furthermore, despite claims that a paradigm shift in childhood studies has happened,
insufficient respect for children’s agency underpinned the drafting process of the Convention
on the Rights of the Child’s right to development, and dictated, to a large extent, the UN
Committee on the Rights of the Child’s interpretation of this right.
The justifications and practical implications of recognising children’s agency have been
previously discussed in this chapter and in the Introduction of the thesis.But in the context of
the Capability Approach, particular attention should be given to children’s right to
participation in shaping their future. If children articulate their view concerning their own
freedom, it will break the dichotomous distinction between the ‘human becomings’ and
‘human beings’ conceptions. Comim claims that in the context of the Capability Approach,
111 See Dixon and Nussbaum’s discussion about people with disabilities and US constitutional law. Dixon and
Nussbaum, supra n. 60, 585-586.
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children usually ’are not consulted in the meaning of an active actor in society,112thought this
sort of treatment ignores the fact that ‘children would probably define the meaning of being
an active actor or citizen differently’.113While Comim flags this latter point as a potential
argument against realizing children’s participation, I argue that this argument is in fact an
excellent example why children should participate. Their unique point of view is the reason
for giving children a voice, rather than a reason to continue to silence them.
Adopting the view that children, even toddlers, can and should express their preferences
enables us to overcome the main barrier for implementing the Capability Approachin
analysing the child’s right to development. Adopting a more progressive view about
childhood and children’s capacities, like Korczak’s approach was suggesting, can lead to the
conclusion than children should play an active role in realizing their self-determination, and
express their preference about their own future. Saito is alarmed by this kind of suggestion,
and warns us that
‘giving temporary freedom to a child does not always mean that the child
will have freedom in future, and similarly, restricting the temporary
freedom of a child may well expend the freedom that the child will have in
the future. We, therefore, have to consider the freedom for a child in a
lifelong perspective’.114
This concern for the child’s future is well-placed. However, one should not disregard or
underminethe value of the child’s life in the present, and its manifestation in the right to
participation. The unconditional preference for safeguarding the child’s future undermines
the recognition of children as rights holders, depriving them of agency and voice. It is based
on an assumption that sacrificing children’s freedom now will lead to a greater freedom in the
future, once the child becomes an adult. As Dixon and Nussbaum claim: ‘we ought to support
capabilities that will best promote a long-term future of full capabilities’.115 Ensuring
freedoms in the future should not justify denying all freedoms in the present; rather, the
contrary is true. Arguably, ensuring freedoms in the present will enable children to fulfil their
potential and pursue lives worth living in the future. For this reason, children’s voices and
opinions should not be silenced or dismissed, but rather amplified.
112Comim et al, supra n. 59, 7.
113Ibid.
114Saito, supra n. 1, 26.
115 Dixon and Nussbaum, supra n. 60, 555.
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Utilising the Capability Approach to Concretise ‘Children’s Development’
The second contribution of the Capability Approach to the analysis of the child’s right to
development is its contribution to concretising the term ‘children’s development’. In light of
the idea of development as freedom, we saw that Nussbaum has suggested a list of ten
capabilities (life, bodily health, bodily integrity, sense, imagination and thought, emotions,
practical reasons, affiliation, play and control over one’s environment), which she deemed as
a minimum universal that are necessary in to be free. According to Vizard, these basic
capabilitiescan be seenas grounds for a ‘human rights based capability framework’,116mainly
because they resemble the basic universal rights that are protected by the HDHR and 1966
Covenants as universal human rights.117
This list of capabilities is relevant for children for two reasons. First, it meets their needs and
cannot be challenged on the basis of a pre-requirement for capacities. Second, many of these
capabilities are already defined as children’s human rights by the Convention,118 which
means that their universal acceptance has already been established (if only by the almost
universal ratification of the Convention). Therefore, taking the Capability Approach’s
perspective, these rights can be understood as substantial to the realisation of the child’s right
to development. Although at first glance this list of rights might resemble the Committee on
the Rights of the Child’s jurisprudence, in the context of the Capability Approach these rights
serve a different purpose. Here, these capabilities – and the corresponding rights –support the
child’s freedom, while for the Committee these rights are needed in order to enable the child
to become an adult.
Mario Biggeri and Santosh Mehrotra suggest a different list of capabilities, which they deem
as even more relevant to children. Their list has fourteen capabilities: life and physical health;
love and care; mental well-being; bodily integrity and safety; social relations; participation;
education; freedom from economic and non-economic exploitation; shelter and environment;
leisure activities; respect; religion and identity; time autonomy; and mobility.119In similarity
to Nussbaum’s list, most of the capabilities in this list, nine to be exact, can be conceptualised
in terms of children’s rights under the Convention (Articles 6, 24, 12, 28, 29, 32, 27, 31, 14,
116 Vizard, supra n. 108, 234-235.
117Ibid.
118 The convention protects the child’s right to life, the right to health, bodily integrity, affiliations, and right to
play in Articles 6, 24, 19, 7, 8, 9, 11 and 31, respectively.
119Mario Biggeri and Santosh Mehrotra, ‘Child Poverty as Capability Deprivation: How to Choose Domains of
Child Well-being and Poverty’, In Mario Biggeri et al (eds) Children and the Capability Approach, supra n. 59,
46-75, 51.
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30, 7 and 8, respectively). The remaining capabilities, such as love and care, social
relationship and respect, are not considered as rights of the child under the Convention, since
these issues are traditionally issues seen as beyond the power of law to regulate (Thoughit
was suggested that children do have the right to be loved, and the right to ‘time
autonomy’).120Biggeri and Mehrotra further claim that using the Capability Approachas a
‘framework for normative evaluation and policy implementation’121with regard to children
provides normative and positive grounds for promoting these capabilities. Looking at this list
from the perspective of the right to development and by employing the Capability
Approach’sterminology, it can be argued that realizing these rights means providing the
necessary capabilities for the child to be free.
Conclusion
I discussthe question of whether the Capability Approach can contribute to the analysis of the
child’ right to developmenton the affirmative. Children, like adults, should be able to live
lives worth living. The departure point this discussion should be conceptualising children as
active agents in shaping their own life, and respecting that they value different functions and
utilise different capabilities than adults do. Incorporating the Capability Approach’s
understanding of development into the framework of child’s right to development can help
expand the meanings of ‘development’ beyond the psycho-social conception and the child’s
right to development beyond the right to become an adult. The Capability Approach also
suggests how this idea of ‘human development’ could be realised in reality, delineating what
the necessary capabilities are.
I have reviewed two sets of capabilities, withonly one of them formulated explicitly with the
intention to meet children’s needs. These lists show that ‘children’s development’ can be
translated into human rights terms, but a more contextualized list should be further developed
in order to fit to different children in different circumstances. The suggested capabilities can
later be articulated in human rights terms, using the universal credibility of the Convention as
a positive source.
120See chapter one.
121 Mario Biggeri et al, ‘Children’s Agency and the Capability Approach: A Conceptual Framework’, In Mario
Biggeri et al (eds) Children and the Capability Approach, supra n. 59, 39-40.
198
Measuring Capabilities - the Human Development Report
Measuring capabilities is a challenging task. It requires having a conceptual clarity of what
human development stands for, what is it composed of, and only then the relevant factors and
variable that can measure ‘development’ can be identified. The two lists of capabilities
mentioned before are two examples of efforts to concretise human development. But these
lists still require further development so they can be operational, certainly with respect to
children.
Measuring capabilities not only reflects a certain conception of human development, but it
can also give an indication about the status of ‘human development’ in a given geographic
location, or of a specific segment of the population. These indications can inform decision
and policy maker about their success and failures to promote human development. This
section presents the UN Development Program’s ‘Human Development Report’ (HDR),
which has been published annually since 1990. The HDR is the most ample effort to
concretise and measure ‘human development’. I argue that the complexity of the HDR
signifies the feasibility to concretise what children’s right to development stands for.
The HDR, which includes the Human Development Index, employs an economic critical
point of view andexplores ‘the relationship between economic growth and human
development’.122As such, it corresponds to the Capability Approach, adopting and adapting
most of the Capability Approach conceptions of ‘human development’. Similarly to the
Capability Approach, the HDR takes the view that ‘income is not the total sum of human
life’123 and, therefore, conceptualises ‘the real objective of development’ as ‘enlarging
people’s options’.124 The Human Development Index that follows is a comparison tool that
measures key capabilities by relative levels in every country. Nevertheless, as the first HDR
acknowledges, this index only captures ‘a few of people’s choices and leaves out many that
people may value highly’.125 According to Mahbub ul Haq, thecreator of the HDR, ‘the
objective of development is to create an enabling environment for people to enjoy long,
healthy and creative lives’.126 Ul Haq explains this approach in similar terms to those
employed by Nussbaum and Sen, saying that development is more than economic well-being,
122Mahbub ul Haq, Reflections on Human Development (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1995) 26.
123UNDP, Human Development Report 1990 (Oxford University Press, New York 1990) 9.
124Ibid, 25.
125Ibid, 16.
126Ul Haq, supra n. 122, 14.
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and includes ‘knowledge, health, a clean physical environment, political freedom and a
simple pleasures of life’.127He further adds that
‘It is fair to say that the human development paradigm is the most holistic
development model that exists today. It embraces every developmental
issue, including economic growth, social investment, people’s
empowerment, provision of basic needs and social safety nets, political and
cultural freedom and all other aspects of people’s lives. It is neither
narrowly technocratic not overly philosophical. It is a practical reflection of
life itself.’128
The question is whether ul Haq indeed succeeded in providing a coherent and meaningful
interpretation of what he defines as a ‘holistic’ concept of development.The first HDR states
that the index
‘emphasizes the development of human choices… it is reflected in
measuring development not as the expansion of commodities and wealth,
but as the widening of human choices’.129
Consistent with the Capability Approach, the HDR, therefore, defines the essential
components of development as equity, sustainability, productivity, and empowerment.130
Accordingly, it defines threeelements of human development: people to be placedat the
centre of attention, as both a means and end of development; ‘development’ is a process of
forming human capabilities and enabling people to acquire them; economy is not the only
segment that drives development forward.131Subsequently, the index measures human
development according to three key components: longevity (life expectancy at birth),
knowledge (adult literacy and years of schooling) and income (defined as ‘up to the cut-off
point as having full value… the premises is that people do not need an infinite amount of
income for a decent life’).132
While this perception of human development seems to be broad and comprehensive, the
index measures only a fraction of human’s life experiences. The index was also criticized for
being ‘conceptually weak and empirically unsound, involving … measurement errors and
127Ibid, 14-15.
128Ibid, 23.
129UNDP, Human Development Report 1990, supra n. 123, 1.
130Ul Haq, supra n. 122, 16-20.
131Ibid, 16.
132UNDP, Human Development Report 1990, supra n. 123, 49.
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biases’.133Another weakness of the index, according to Anands and Sen, is the ‘problematic’
and ambiguous quantification of human development it upholds.134These measurement
errors, according to Mark McGillivray and Howard White, undermine its ambitionto provide
a comparative tool to evaluate development.135 Proponents of liberal-market approaches
claim that both the HDR and the index misunderstand the importance of growth and its
impact,136 and fail to measure human development because the selection of functionings they
measure.137Claims have also been made concerning the index’s lack of cultural and social
sensitivity.138 A critical approach that follows Arturo Escobar139accused the HDR for posing
as natural and value-free, but nevertheless carrying ideological baggage, making itculturally
biased. Ambuj Sagar and Adil Najam went as far as claiming that the index has lost touch
with the world it is attempting to portray.140Likewise, Amanda Perry-Kessaris recently
claimed that the HDR’s indictors are a new form of ‘economics imperialism’.141
Arguably, the HDR is also age-biased. While the index contains some variables that relate to
children, such as primary school enrolment rates, children or children’s development is not
explicitlyreferred to as a distinct category in either the HDR or the index. Even ‘general’
issues, such as poverty, do not address children’s unique position in the economic order.
Overlooking children is further evident by another example: Each of the HDR’s published in
the last twenty years were dedicated to a specific issue, such as power and poverty (2006),
gender (1995), human security (1994) or participation (1993), but none of the reports were
dedicated to children.
One HDR that is worth paying attention to in this context is the Human Rights and Human
Development report from 2000.142This report mirrors the human rights approach to
133Thirukodikaval Nilakanta Srinivasan, ‘Human Development: A New Paradigm or Reinvention of the
Wheel?’ (1994) 84 AEA Papers and Proceedings 238, 241.
134Sodhir Anands and Amartya Sen, ‘The Income Component of the Human Development Index’ (2000) 1
Journal of Human Development 83, 99.
135Mark McGillivray and Howard White, ‘Measuring Development? The UNDP’s Human Development Index’
(1993) 5 Journal of International Development 183.
136Martin Ravallion, ‘Good and Bad Growth: The Human Development Reports’ (1997) World Development
631, 637.
137Saito, supra n. 1, 22.
138Ibid, 23.
139Escobar, supra n. 8.
140Ambuj D. Sagar and Adil Najam, ‘The Human Development Index: A Critical Review’ (1998) 25 Ecological
Economy 249.
141Amanda Perry-Kessaris, ‘Prepare Your Indicators: Economic Imperialism on the Shores of Law and
Development’ (2011) 7 International Journal of Law in Context 401.
142UNDP, Human Development Report – Human Rights and Human Development (Oxford University Press,
Oxford and New York 2000).
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development,143 stating that ‘the divide between the human development agenda and the
human rights agenda is narrowing’.144 The report asserts that human rights provides a
framework of accountability for the human development paradigm and that ‘human
development is essential for realizing human rights, and human rights are essential for full
human development’.145 This statement aligned with Senguptak’s approach to the right to
development, which emphasises the role of human rights in realizing human development.
This statement is also an answer to those, like Biggeri et al, who cast doubts regarding the
contribution and usability of human rights in promoting human development.
Nonetheless, this Report includes the same few indicators concerning children as the previous
reports, but neither children’s development nor children’s right to development receive
significant attention. Children were once again left at the margins of this Report and are
mentioned only twice. The first instance is in a table titled ‘realizing the right to primary
education in India’146 and the second is in a section titled ‘the rights of the child – turning
words into actions’.147 These two references offerlittle substance concerning the rights of
children. More troubling is that children are not viewed as subjects of rights or as active
members of society.
To conclude, The HDR is an example for concretizing a theoretical conception of human
development in human rights terms. Although variables concerning children’s development
are not part of the HDR or the index, the HDR does have a limited potential for telling us
which rights of children need to be protected in order to support children’s development. For
example, the HDR informs us about the connection between school enrolment as an indicator
for protection and promotion of the right to education and the right to non-discrimination. But
because the HDR is more concerned with children’s futures and children’s lives during their
childhoods are rarely addressed, its contribution is as limited as any of the other instruments
that employ the ‘human becomings’ conception of childhood. The HDR is a perfect example
143 Andre Cornwall and Celestine Nyamu-Musembi, ‘Putting the ‘Rights-Based Approach’ to Development into
Practice’ (2004) 25 Third World Quarterly 1415, 1420; Sengupta, ‘The Human Right to Development’, supra n.
27, 181;Urban Jonsson, ‘A Human Rights-Based Approach to Programming’ in Paul Gready and Jonathan
Ensor (eds) Reinventing Development? (Zed Books, London 2005), 47-62, 47; Robert Archer, ‘The Strengths of
Different Traditions: What Can Be Gained and What Might Be Lost By Combining Rights and Development?’
(2006) 4 The International Journal of Human Rights 81; Mary Robinson, ‘What Rights Can Add to Good
Development Practices?’ in Philip Alston and Mary Robinson (eds) Human Rights and Development (Oxford
University Press, Oxford 2005) 25-41.
144UNDP, Human Development Report – Human Rights and Human Development, supra n. 142,2.
145Ibid, 2.
146Ibid,104.
147Ibid,116.
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to how exclusion of children from theory leads to their exclusion from practice. A better
placed to concretise children’s development and the child’s right to development is an index
that focuses on children.
ConcretisingChildren’s ‘Development’ – The Child Indicators Movement
This section studies how the child indicator movement conceptualises ‘children’s
development’ and ‘children’s well-being’ and fragments these concepts. I argue that these
indexes further show that ‘children’s development’ should not be seen only as an abstract
concept, but rather as a concrete concept that can, and should, be articulated in human rights
terms.
The Child’s Indicators Movement, a title describing a range of projects that attempt to
measure children’s development and children’s well-being, dates back to the 1920’s.148 Since
these two concepts – development and well-being - are used conjointly, conclusion about the
child’s right to development should be drawn with caution. Today,the movement consists of a
large number of indices that gather information from local, regional, national or international
levels, concerning various segments of the child’s life, including education, health, contact
with peer-groups, family environment, etc.149
The conception of children’s development employed by the movement has changed over
time, mainly due to changes in the perception of childhood. The early child indicators indices
perceived children as ‘human becomings’, and consequently, children’s development and
children’s well-being were measured on the basis of negative factors, such as mortality rate,
in order to try topredict children’s life expectancies, and future prospects as adults. The
emergence of the ‘human beings’ paradigm, the normative influence of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, and the emergence of new theories of children’s development changed
the ways in which childhood was conceived and, consequently, how children’s development
and well-being were measured.150 These changes are reflected in the increasing numbers of
variables being measured, and the subsequent creation of more complex indices. The new
148Asher Ben-Arieh, ‘The Child Indicators Movement: Past, Present, and Future’ (2008) 1 Child Indicator
Research 3, 3. Laura H. Lippman, ‘Indicators and Indices of Child Well-Being: A Brief American History’
(2007) 83 Social Indicators Research 39.
149 Lippman, Ibid, 46-47.
150Ben-Arieh, ‘The Child Indicators Movement: Past, Present, and Future’, supra n. 148.
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indices include indicators such as school attendance and dropout rates151 (similar to the
Human Development Index), children’s ‘health, socioemotinal status and functioning, moral
and ethical attitudes and behaviour, intellectual status and functioning, and other capacities,
such as music, art, mechanical and athletic’.152Most recent indices also factor in children’s
own perspectives on their life.153 The importance of the latter cannot be overstated. As
claimed earlier, asking children for their perspective respects children’s agency, and adds an
important and often overlooked factor, which is children’s experiencesand perspectives on
their own lives.
In recent years, a new goal for the movement was established, and children’s quality of life is
being measured, alongside their development and well-being (thus suggesting that these
concepts have different meanings). According to Asher Ben Arieh, children’s quality of
liferelates to the ‘future success of the generation’ in a child-centred oriented
approach.Consequently, children’s civic skills,154 for example, are being measured as well.
Nevertheless, Anne-Marie Etienne et alassert that these assessments of children’s quality of
life still conceptualise children only as ‘subject[s] who are constantly changing and
developing’,155 thus undermining the claims of a paradigm shift in the way that this
movement conceptualises childhood and children’s development.This line of critique reflects
the tendency to conceptualise childhood in a polarised way, demanding researchers to choose
between one dichotomy or the other – between the ‘human becomings’ and the ‘human
beings’ approach.
UNICEF’s State of the World’s Children is considered the flagship of the movement. It was
first published in 1980,156 a decade before the Human Development Reports. The early State
of the World’s Children reports reflect the narrow ‘human development’ idea of the time,
before the Capability Approach revolution, and measure what UNICEF believed to influence
children’s poverty. The first report included, for example, statistical data on maternal ill-
health and malnutrition, rates of breastfeeding, family planning, children’s disability
(including the cost of preventing disabilities and treating children with disabilities),
151Ibid.
152Lippman, ‘Indicators and Indices of Child Well-Being: A Brief American History’, supra n. 148, 43.
153Ben-Arieh, ‘The Child Indicators Movement: Past, Present, and Future’, supra n. 148. See Lippman, Ibid, 46.
See also Kristin Anderson Moore and Laura H. Lippman, What Do Children Need to Flourish? (Springer, New
York 2005).
154 Ben-Arieh, ‘The Child Indicators Movement: Past, Present, and Future’, supra n. 148, 12.
155Anne-Marie Etienne et al., ‘The Gap Concept as a Quality of Life Measure: Validation Study of the Child
Quality of Life Systemic Inventory’ (2011) 100 Social Indicators Research 241, 242.
156James P. Grant for UNICEF, The State of the World’s Children 1980-1981 (UNICEF, New York 1981).
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prevention of diseases caused by malnutrition, personal hygiene, lack of access to clean
water, health education, safe sanitation and immunization,and food security.157In time, the
State of the World Childrenreport expanded the range of indicators it measured. But
unfortunately, as the latest report from 2011 shows,158 its perception of children’s
development and well-being has not changed significantly. Even today, most, if not all of the
indices are negative ones, expressing concern for issues that relate to children’s survival
rather than their development, well-being or quality of life. This index is a perfect
representation of the dominance of the ‘human becomings’ paradigm. The indicators it uses
conceive children as passive recipients of welfare, ignoring children’s agency, perspectives
and rights. As the most important index of the movement, it casts shadow on other, much
more progressive, effort to measure children’s development.
Some recent indices had more success where UNICEF has failed. These indices provide
comprehensive conceptions of children’s development, well-being and quality of life. Ken
Land’s index is one of the first indices to meet these challenges.159According to Land,
children’s quality of life includes ‘objective and subjective axes of human existence’.160He
divides children’s quality of life seven domains: material well-being; social relationship;
health; safety/behavioural concerns; productive activity (educational attainments); place in
community (participation in schooling or work institutions); and emotional/spiritual well-
being. Twenty-eight indicators measure these domains:161 poverty rate; secure parental
employment rate, median annual income; rate of children with health insurance; infant
mortality rate; low birth weight rate; mortality rate (ages 1-19); rate of children with very
good or excellent health; rate of children with activity limitations (as reported by parents);
rate of overweight children and adolescents (ages 6-19); teenage birth rate (ages 10-17); rate
of violent crime victimization (ages 12-19); rate of crime offenders (ages 12-17); rate of
cigarette smokers; rate of alcohol drinking; rate of illicit drug use; reading test scores (ages 9,
13 and 17); mathematics test scores (ages 9, 13 and 17); rate of persons who have received a
high school diploma (ages 18-24); rate of youth not working and not in school (ages 16-19);
rate of pre-kindergarten enrolment (ages 3-4); rate of persons who have received a bachelor’s
157Ibid.
158UNICEF, The State of The World’s Children 2011 (UNICEF, New York 2011).
159Kenneth C. Land et al, ‘Child and Youth Well-Being in the United States, 1975–1998: Some Findings from a
New Index’ (2001) 56 Social Indicators Research 241. See also Lippman, ‘Indicators and Indices of Child
Well-Being: A Brief American History’ supra n. 148, 47.
160 Land et al, ibid, 244.
161Land et al, ibid, 243.
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degree (ages 25-29); rate of voting in presidential elections (ages 18-20); rate of children in
families headed by a single parent; rate of children who have moved within the last year (age
1-18); suicide rate (age 10-19); rate of weekly religious attendance; and per cent of children
who report religion as being very important.
The index provides a comprehensive breakdown of various elements of children’s lives,
which compose a detailed directory for children’s development, well-being and quality of
life.162The index encompasses variants related to many aspects of children’s lives and
different spaces of activities and social interactions. It encompasses children’s lives as
children, and not only as future adults, alongside factors that influence their future. In that
sense, it accommodates both the ‘human beings’ and ‘human becomings’ conceptions of
childhood. Furthermore, although the index was created before the UN Committee on the
Rights of the Child became operational, and even before the final text of the Convention was
adopted, it is much broader and more complex than the UN Committee’s catalogue on
children’s development.163 The index is also broader and more comprehensive than the
Human Development Index, and it appears to succeed where that index has failed, in
providing a holistic concept of children’s development. It is rather easy to rule out those
factors that are not related to children (according to Article 1 of the Convention’s definition
of children as a person under the age of 18), such as the percentage of people holding
bachelor’s degrees. However, it is more difficult to distinguish between development, well-
being and quality of life. A separate question is whether these three concepts are in fact
different.
While most of its indictors can be articulated in human rights terms, some cannot. For
example, while most variables that relate to health and education can be seen as covered by
the rights to health and education, it is more difficult to articulate the rate of children who
have moved within the last year to human rights issues, since moving houses is not a human
rights violation, per se. Furthermore, the index is USA-centric and reflects conservative
middle-class values and life style (for example, when it measures children’s obesity, alcohol
and drug consumption, and weekly religious attendance). As such, using its indicators in
other contexts may generate a distorted picture concerning the state of children’s
162See also the Index of Social Health, first published in the USA in 1987. This index addressed ‘the ways in
which social problems interact to create a social climate, instead of focusing on individual problems
themselves’. The list of indicators is much longer than Land’s list, and it included ‘infant mortality, child abuse,
children in poverty; and for youth, teen suicide, drug abuse, and high school drop-outs’. Lippman, ‘Indicators
and Indices of Child Well-Being: A Brief American History’ supra n. 148, 46.
163 See chapter three.
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development, well-being and quality of life. Nonetheless, from the perspective of protecting
children’s rights in general, and their right to development in particular, this index can be
proved useful in the effort to concretise children’s development in human rights terms.
As a response to Lands’ project, Kristin Moore et al developed an even more comprehensive
and complex index. Moore et al have tried to overcome some of the methodological and
conceptual shortcomings of Land’s work, as well as those of other similarly USA-focused
indices’.164 They stated that their aim was to:
‘truly measure well-being, as opposed to documenting the prevalence of
risks, and to do so comprehensively by using a conceptual framework based
on developmental theory, which specifies multiple levels of functioning at
the individual level (physical, cognitive/educational, social, and
psychological) and multiple contexts of influence (sociodemographic,
family and community) that might promote or constrain development’.165
Accordingly, the index addresses children’s social links and conditions in a way consistent
with ‘developmental theory that typically considers four key domains of development:
physical, intellectual/educational, psychological, and social and embeds individuals in a
system of ecological influence.’166It is worth noting that they refer to only one theory of
developmental psychology, ignoring the existence of range of theories.
The index includes four domains for measuring children’s well-being: physical,
psychological, social and educational/intellectual, which are measured in three contexts:
family, neighbourhood and socio demographic. The index contains 69 variants,167 two and a
half times more than Land’s index. This index is a meaningful step forward in concretising
the development in the child’s right to development’ and, as with Land’s index, can be
formulated, to some extent, in terms of the Convention’s rights. Nonetheless, and despite its
aims, the index suffers from similar deficiencies as Land’s index does. It perceives children
as passive actors and as recipients of welfare policies and does not accommodate any
participatory methods. This index is also culturally biased, reflecting similar Western,
middle-class, conservative values and liberal market ideology. It also employs mainstream
developmental psychology’s theories, and therefore, does not fit all children and can not
164Kristin A. Moore et al, ‘A Microdata Child Well-Being Index: Conceptualization, Creation and Findings’
(2008) 1 ChildIndicator Research 17.
165Ibid, 41.
166Ibid, 24.
167Ibid, 45-48.
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comprehend their different experiences of childhood, and thus, their different experiences and
wishes from their own development.
Having said that, this line of critique is also the reason why this index is comparable to the
Convention, particularly to the Convention’s conception of children’s development. Ashwani
Saith and Rekha Wazir criticised this index, as well as others that employ similar
perspectives, arguing that while these indices can be valid in developed countries (and thus
accurately reflect the state of children’s lives there) if used in less developed countries, these
indicators will present a distorted picture of children’s lives.168 Saith and Wazir further argue,
in similarity to Sagar and Najam’s critique on the Human Development index, that there is a
need to develop local indexes that can accommodate a holistic nature of child well-being
within the context of less developed countries.169 As novel as this wish sounds, experience
showsthat reaching such a national consensus is not an easy task, as the recent effort of the
Republic of Ireland shows, since it involves contested values that need to be mediated.170
Many other indices are available, and they will not be reviewed here. The high volume of
indices exemplifies the lack of a unified taxonomy for measuring children’s development and
well-being,171 and also shows that there is more than one way to conceptualise children’s
development. In light of this diversity, Ivar Frønesand Asher Ben-Arieh have recently
suggested using the Capability Approach as a common language.172
‘The concept of capabilities is especially suited related to children’s well-
being because children’s movement through life produces new contexts,
assigning new values to resources and commodities…the fact that
capabilities influences well-being illustrates the significant of the approach.
Yet we are not suggesting a set of indicators on capabilities; rather we call
for the positioning of well-being within the framework of the capabilities
approach, underlining the differences and dynamic relationships – between
capabilities and outcomes.’173
168Ashwani Saith and Rekha Wazir, ‘Towards Conceptualizing Child Well-being in India: The Need for a
Paradigm Shift’ (2010) 3 Children Indication Research 385.
169Ibid.
170Sinéad Hanafin et al, ‘Achieving Consensus in Developing a National Set of Child Well-Being Indicators’
(2007) 80 Social Indicators Research 79. See also John Pinkerton, ‘Children’s Participation in the Policy
Process: Some Thoughts on Policy Evaluation Based on the Irish National Children’s Strategy’ (2004) 18
Children & Society 119. But see a more positive experiences in Australia and the EU: Ann V. Sanson et al, ‘The
Development and Validation of Australian Indices of Child Development – Part I: Conceptualisation and
Development’ (2010) 3 Children Indication Research 275, 290; Jonathan Bradshaw and Dominic Richardson,
‘An Index of Child Well-Being in Europe’ (2009) 2 Children Indication Research 319.
171Asher Ben-Arieh and Ivar Frønes, ‘Taxonomy for Child Well-Being Indicators: A Framework for the
Analysis of the Well-Being of Children’ (2011) 18 Childhood 460.
172Ibid, 464.
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Frønes and Ben-Arieh concentrate on the child’s present and future well-being (and not
necessarily development),174 and ask to conceptualise children’s lives according to ‘the
developmental relationship between today and tomorrow; [since] the conditions of the
present influences further development’.175 At first glance this approach may seem appealing,
not only because it rejects the ‘human becomings’ model, but primarily because it also rejects
polarized views about childhood. Nonetheless, this suggestion is not significantly different
from previous approaches. On the one hand, this suggestion employs a similar rhetoric
concerning childhood, children and well-being, which according to Ben-Arieh himself, was
used176 and allegedly asks to remedy their faults. Therefore, Frønes and Ben-Arieh do not
present new indices, or provide more concrete or practical tools for understanding children’s
well-being and development. On the other hand, this approach does pointtothe need to be
context-sensitive in relation to the child’s social and economic environments, as well as to the
individual child. This approach recognises diversity among children, even if only according
to their age (a division that reflects Western conception of childhood and developmental
psychology models of childhood).177 Therefore, such a new taxonomy can contribute to the
realisation that children are not a homogenous group, and subsequently neither their
‘development’, nor the meaning of their ‘right to development’ is homogenous as well.
A major flaw of most of the early indices is that they perceive children as passive and fail to
recognise their agency. In recent years, new indices have been created to remedy this
problem,178 and they accommodate children’s views.179Children’s participation is respected
because it is ‘the only way to grasp how they [children] perceive differences within their
local contexts, both between groups of children and between children and adults’.180
Employing the method of participation leads to ‘a child focused approach [that]
174Ibid, 474.
175Ibid, 463.
176Ben-Arieh, ‘The Child Indicators Movement: Past, Present, and Future’, supra n. 148.
177 Allison James et al, Theorizing Childhood (Polity Press, Cambridge 1998) 60-61.
178Ferran Casas, ‘Children’s Rights and Children’s Quality of Life: Conceptual and Practical Issues’ (1997)
Social Indicators Research 283, 287-288.
179Asher Ben-Arieh, ‘Where Are the Children? Children’s Role in Measuring and Monitoring Their Well-
Being’ (2005) 74 Social Indicators Research 573, 574-579. According to Ben-Arieh, children can take part in
research not only as sources of information, but also to participate at the study design, to be the date collectors,
to take part at the date analysis or to take part in utilising the data. 580-586.
180Gina Crivello et al, ‘How Can Children Tell Us About Their Wellbeing? Exploring the Potential of
Participatory Research Approaches within Young Lives’ (2009) 90 Social Indicators Research 51, 54.
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acknowledges that children are diverse in their capacities for resilience’.181 Participatory
methods allow children to have active roles in research concerning them and subsequently,
the policy that is formulated on the basis of these surveys that affect their lives.
One example of a participatory project is Young lives. Young lives is a study concerning the
effects of poverty on children’s lives, with the goal of understanding how children experience
living in poverty and how poverty shapes their future.182 In that sense, the project focuses on
one dimension of children’s life, echoing pre-Capability Approach conception of
development. The project accommodates tensions between universality and contextualization,
aiming to
‘improve existing indicators, to develop methods and methodologies
appropriate to data collection with children in general, to develop
methodologies to fully understand the situation of children… and to
develop means of information sharing that will result in more holistic and
integrated information about children’.183
Young Life, therefore, is not fixed with a certain, predefined concept of well-being, but rather
modifies the definition based on the input received from children themselves.184 Thus far, the
study shows four key findings. The first is concerned with the negative effect of under-
nutrition in several domains of children’s development, including physical growth and
cognitive development. The second highlights the connection between different competencies
and skills and children’s learning and development. The third centres on the persistence of
poverty and inequality (i.e chronic poverty), showing that economic growth does not
necessarily trickle down, and that some children remain ‘trapped in poverty’. The fourth is
the relationship between poverty and other forms of risks.185 These findings can contribute to
an understanding of how children interpret their lives and the world that surrounds them.
Allof these indices measure different components of what presumably composes children’s
well-being, quality of life and development. They provide empirical data, which is based on
different preliminary assumptions concerning the meaning of this term, as well as the
meaning of childhood. Despite claims of paradigm shifting, and in congruence with the
181Ibid.
182See the collection of article dedicated to the Young Life project. Jo Boyden and Michael Bourdillon (eds)
Childhood Poverty – Multidisciplinary Approach (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2012).
183Casas, supra n. 178, 291.
184Ibid.
185Michael Bourdillon, ‘Introduction’ in Jo Boyden and Michael Bourdillon (eds) Childhood Poverty –
Multidisciplinary Approach, supra n. 182, 1-12, 6-8.
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Convention or the Committee’s jurisprudence, the paramount conception of childhood is still
‘human becomings’. This conception not only dictates what variables these indices measure,
but also how they are being measured. Mainly, it excludes children from actively
participating in these studies.
Not all the indicators can be articulated in the Convention’s human rights terms, but most of
them,especially those related to education, health, working environment and family
relationships, can certainly be. Consequently, the indices are utilized in analysing the child’s
right to development.
Conclusion
The chapter presented two conceptions of ‘human development’, one according to the general
right to development and one according to the Capability Approach. Both concepts are
different from the concept of ‘children’s development’ that is currently employed in
international children’s rights law. I suggest that employing key components of these
instruments, mainly the distinctions between the process of development and the outcome of
it; the significance of respecting people’s agency; and the conceptualisation of development
as freedom, in a framework that analyses the child’s right to development, will enable to
broaden the meaning of the right beyond its current limited interpretation. The well-
developed Capability Approach has also demonstrated what capabilities are necessary to
support ‘human development’ and, in turn, how these capabilities can be articulated in human
rights terms. A comprehensive, let alone conclusive list of capabilities, which can be more
relevant to children’s development, is not yet available.
The various indices measuring children’s development, well-being and quality of life have
shown that ‘children’s development’ should not be deemed to be a vague concept, nor should
it be bound by mainstream developmental psychology. The indices demonstrate that
‘children’s development’ can be understood in broader terms, which can later be translated
into measurable fragmentations and articulated in human rights terms. In other words, the
indexes show that the promotion of particular human rights of children, such as the right to
education, the right to health or the right to non-discrimination, can promote the child’s
human development. The question that remains unanswered is what is the added value of the
child’s right to development over respecting other numerated rights? Phrased differently, is
the child’s right to development only a summation of other rights? The next chapter addresses
this question.
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Chapter Six: A New Framework To Analyse The Child’s Right To
Development
‘States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and
development of the child’ (Article 6(2), UN Convention on the Rights of
the Child)
Introduction
Thischapter offers a new framework for analysing the child’s right to development. The
framework is situated within theUN Convention on the Rights of the Child’s broad protection
for children’s development and the Convention’s ethical perspective.1 This framework adopts
an interdisciplinary approach to the analysis of the child’s legal right to development,2 and
perceives ‘children’s development’ as an issue of human rights and not of welfare or
salvation. It incorporates a hybrid conception of childhood, promotes further respect for
children’s agency, and draws a clearer distinction between the right to development’s
meaning as a guiding principle of the Convention and its meaning as a distinct human right.
Using this framework in conjunction with a cross-disciplinary understanding of the term
‘children’s development’ will enable creating a comprehensive and concrete interpretation of
the child’s right to development.
The chapter has four sections. The first section contextualises the discussion about the child’s
right to development within the framework of the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child,and highlights shortcomings in the current approach and interpretation of this right. The
second section suggests a road map for remedying these shortcomings. It includes adopting a
conception of childhood that synthesises the ‘human beings’ and ‘human becomings’
approaches to childhood,utilising the Capability Approach as an additional dimension of
children’s development, and re-defining the aim of the right to development accordingly. In
accordance with these key themes, the third section presents a new framework for the
analysis of the child’s right to development. The last sectiondiscusses the practicality of the
suggested framework, highlights questions that remain unanswered and suggests avenues for
future research.
1 With respect to the Convention’s ethical perspective see John Wall, Ethics in Light of Childhood (Georgetown
University Press, Washington DC 2010) 113-138.
2 Compare with Adrian James, ‘Competition or Integration? The Next Step in Childhood Studies?’ (2010) 17
Childhood 485; Priscilla Alderson, ‘Young Children’s Human Rights: A Sociological Analysis’ (2012) 20
International Journal of Children’s Rights 177; Michael Freeman, ‘Towards a Sociology of Children’s Rights’
in Michael Freeman (ed) Law and Childhood Studies (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012) 29-38.
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Contextualising the Discussion: Children’s Rights and Children’s Development
This section contextualises the discussion about the child’s right to development within the
frameworks of childhood studies, children’s rights theory and the UN Convention on the
Rights of the Child’s ethical perspective. Based on chapters one-four, I draw a picture of how
the child’s right to development is perceived in international children’s rights law today, and
what the main limitations of this approach are.
Article 6(2) of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child protects the child’s right to
development. In addition, five other articles(Articles 18(1), 23(3), 27(1), 29(1)(a) and 32(1))
protect eight specific domains of children’s development (physical, mental, moral, social,
cultural, spiritual, personality and talent). This broad protection for children’s development is
the ultimate expression of international children’s rights law’s aspirationto protect children’s
journey towards adulthood. Thisaspiration mirrors the prevailing sociologicalconception of
childhood in the West, known as the ‘human becomings’ approach. According to this
approach, children are generally perceived as weak, immature, and in need of protection in
order to survive the process of transforming into adults. The emergence of a new conception
of childhood, ‘the human beings’ approach, that conceives children as people in their own
right and recognises their agency, did not influence the Convention’s treatment of children’s
development. Although the Convention embraces, to different degrees, both conceptions of
childhood, when it comes to the child’s development it is entrenched with the image of
childrenas adults in the making, and the sense that there is‘something very strange about
thinking of children as bearers of rights’.3 Other approaches toward childhood, children and
the maturation process, such as those of Korczak or the child liberation movement,4did not
get much attention and have been either neglected or dismissed in the literature, in the few
times they were mentioned; not least because these approaches challenge the tradition of
perceiving children in psycho-social developmental terms.
The history of international children’s rights law in general, and the drafting process of the
Convention in particular, demonstrates that the comprehensive protection for children’s
development and the creation of children’s unique right to development were intended to
meet society’s concern for children’s future. The study of the Convention’s travaux
préparatoires has shown that while the term ‘children’s development’ (and its
3 Harry Brighouse, ‘What Rights (If Any) Do Children Have?’ in David Archard and Colin Macleod (eds), The
Moral and Political Status of Children (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002) 31-52, 31.
4 See chapter one.
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subsequentterms such as ‘moral development’ or ‘emotional development’) was mentioned
time and again during the drafting process, no discussions about its meanings took place.
Based on the Convention’s drafting history, I have suggested seeing Article 6 as a
representation of a continuum, where the right to life is located at the negative end, and the
right to development is located at the opposite, positive, end, with the right to survival located
in between the two. As a positiveright, the child’s right to development can be understood as
a right that protects the child’s needs required for a healthy process of growth. This
interpretation suffers from some inherent limitations, including its sole care for the child’s
future and its lack in respect for children’s agency. It also assumes knowledge about the
meaning of ‘healthy process of growth’, and the components of this process. Another
problem is its insufficient differentiation between the right to development as an independent
right and the right to development as an umbrella right, which only summarises the other five
Articles of the Convention that protect specific domains of children’s development.
The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child’s approach to the right to development is
another link in the chain of theorising the child’s right to development. As chapter three
shows, the Committee understands the child’s right to development as a means to an end – as
a tool for facilitating the child’s transformation into an adult. On the one hand, the Committee
defined the right to development as one of the Convention’s guiding principles. On the other
hand, the Committee focuses on the care for children’s development, ignoring the right to
development. This dichotomy is further reflected in the Committee’s jurisprudence, where it
defined the connection between most of the Convention’s rights to children’s development in
one of two ways: rights that are instrumental to the promotion of children’s development,and
rights that protect substantial elements of development. While the Committee did not say
what children’s development stands for, it implicitly employs mainstream developmental
psychology when referring to this term, and kept silence about the meaning of the child’s
legal right to development. Thus, the Committee did notmeet its own interpretation
guidelines,5 and so far has not provided a coherent, distinct and meaningful interpretation of
the child’s right to development.
I have suggested two explanations for this disappointing jurisprudence. First, when it comes
to children’s development, the Convention, and subsequently the Committee, are confined
5 UNCRC ‘General Comment 5 – General Measures of Implementations of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child’ (27 November 2003) UN Doc CRC/GC/5/2003.
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within the perception of children as ‘human becomings’. This conception limits the scope of
potential interpretations, does not aligned with core human rights principles and leads the
Committee to subjugate most of the Convention’s rights for the care of the child’s future,
overlooking children’s personhood. Second, the Committee often interpreted the term
‘children’s development’ in accordance with mainstream developmental psychology.
Subjugating ‘children’s development’ to this approach of psychology ignoresother
psychological theories, as well as the biases of this particular body. Perhapseven more
important is that this interpretation ignores the meaning of ‘development’ in other disciplines
such as pedagogy, anthropology, economics and political science, and their potential
contributions to the interpretation of the child’s legal right to development. As some members
of the Committee boldly admitted at the interviews I had with them,6 the lack of
understanding of the term ‘the right to development’ leads the Committee to ignore the right
to development, assuming that ‘development’ will happen on its own, as a result of protection
of other rights.
Against this background, the next section suggests a framework for interpreting the child’s
right to development. This framework, I argue, can remedy these shortcomings and enables
the articulation of ‘children’s development’ in human rights terms.
A Roadmap for Change
I propose to frame the analysis of the child’s right to development according to the following
two core elements: First, abandoning the usage of polarised conceptions of childhood in
favour of a hybrid conception, where the child’s present and future are recognised as equally
important.Key components of the hybrid conception of childhood are the respect for
children’s agency and for children as social agents. Second, I suggest to reconceptualise the
meaning of ‘children’s development’ in a way that syntheses the Capability Approach’s
emancipatory idea of ‘human development’ with the Convention’s conception of ‘children’s
development’.
6 See chapter four.
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Adopting a Hybrid Conception of Childhood
The two dominant conceptions of childhood – the ‘human becomings’ and the ‘human
beings’ - limit, each in different ways, the scope of interpretation of the child’s legal right to
development. Both approaches confine‘the child’ to one, homogenous and universal narrative
of childhood: the child is either considered as a person in the making or as an agent in her
own right.
Under the ‘human becomings’ idea, the child’s right to development is interpreted as a means
to an end: a right that aims to ensure that the child ‘survive’ the time of childhood and
become an adult. In other words, the right to development is the right of the child to become
an adult.7 The ‘human beings’ approach thus far has not informed the analysis of the child’s
right to development, despite the advantages of this approach. Using this approach in the
analysis of the child’s right to development can lead to respecting children as rights holders,
to respecting children’s views about their own development, and to recognising the
importance of the process of maturation, rather than only its outcome. As such, it might be
argued that using the ‘human beings’ approach instead of the ‘human becomings’ approach
will remedy the limitations of the current interpretation of the child’s right to development.
I see three problems withusingthe‘human beings’ concept in this context. First, adopting the
‘human beings’ approach as the sole approach would inevitably lead to as polarized, and
therefore distorted, interpretation of the child’s right to development, as the usage of the
‘human becomings’ approach has led to. Neither of these two conceptions adequately
comprehends the complexity of children’s lives on their own. Second, the ‘human beings’
approach undermines the normative grounds of the construction of childhood in international
children’s rights law (and subsequently the grounds for the entire project of transforming
children into adults). If we recognise the personhood of the child, the current intrinsic and
instrumental meaning of the Convention’s right to development will, to a large extent, loose
their validity. Third, in light of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the intentions
of the Convention’s drafters should not be easily dismissed. As chapter two has shown, the
Convention’s drafters followed the ‘human becomings’ concept of childhood in the
Convention’s drafting process.
When addressing the child’s right to development, it should be realised that the present
(beings) and the future (becomings) are intertwined in the child’s life. Therefore, employing
7 Compare with Michael Freeman, ‘The Human Rights of Children’ (2010) 63 Current Legal Problems 1, 15.
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any polarized conception cannot result in any coherent, holistic, and contextualised
interpretation of children’s right to development. This argument does not dismiss the
proposition that these two conceptions are not mutually exclusive, and that childhood could
be conceptualised as both a time of being and a time of becoming.8 But accommodating these
two concepts together ‘simply accepts the child/adult dualism: the being child will become an
adult’.9 It also reproduces the same binary images of childhood, which were created by adults
in order to preserve their supremacy over children, to silence children’s voices, and ignore
their expectations from their own processes of maturation and development.10 Within the
context of the child’s right to development, this dualism will, at best, result in a fragmented
interpretation that focuses on caring for the child’s future, while only paying lip service to the
child’s life in the present.
I therefore suggest not conceiving childhood as a linear or binary experience. There is a need
for a different concept, one that does not embrace only the extremes.11The child should not be
seen only as a ‘human beings’ or as a ‘human becoming’, but rather as a person that is
engaged in a process of growth in her own right, anticipating changes in the future, including
her or his life as an adult. The process of growing up is one important characteristic of
childhood, but not the only one. This process should not be a reason for suppression, but
rather a cause for empowerment. A hybrid conception of childhood is not a summary of the
two conceptions of childhood, but a more complex idea. It is rooted in Korczak’s writing:
‘When I approach a child, I have two feelings: affection for what he is
today and respect for what he can become…’.12
‘Children are not the people of tomorrow, but people today. They are
entitled to be taken seriously, they have a right to be treated by adults with
tenderness and respect, as equal. They should be allowed to grow into
whoever they were meant to be – the unknown person inside each of them
in the hope for the future’.13
8 Emma Uprichard, ‘Children As ‘Being and Becomings: Children, Childhood and Temporality’ (2008) 22
Children & Society 303.
9 Freeman, supra n. 7, 15.
10 According to James et al, the dichotomies between childhood and adulthood are: structure and agency,
identity and difference, continuity and change, local and global. Allison James et al, Theorizing Childhood
(Polity Press, London 1998) 199-218.
11Compare to Judith Butler, Gender Trouble (Routledge, New York 1999).
12 Janusz Korczak, Loving Every Child (Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill, North Carolina 2007) 17.
13 Janusz Korczak, ‘The Child’s Right to Respect’ in Janusz Korczak – The Child’s Right to Respect: Lectures
on Today’s Challenges for Children (Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg 2009. Originally published in
1929) 23-43, 36.
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Korczak viewed children’s lives as multi-dimensional, giving equal importance to the child’s
maturation process and to the child’s future. According to this conception of childhood, the
child’s right to development can be understood as a right that respects the child for what she
is now, for what she or he can be, and what she or he herself would like to be in the future.
The ‘child’s future’is a term that needs to be unpacked as well. The child’s future should not
only refer to the age of 18 and ‘adulthood’, as the Convention deems,14but also for what a
child sees as her own ‘future’. For a child, the ‘future’ can also be the coming day or the
coming month. There is a need to realise that time and temporality are dynamic and relational
ideas. For a baby, for example, the concept ‘future’ does not only stand for being ‘an adult’,
but it includes being a toddler, a pupil, an adolescent, and an adult.
Like the ‘human becomings’ and ‘human being’ conceptions, the hybrid conception of
childhood carries ideological baggage as well. It is based on a moral claim towardschildren
and human rights, and assumes universal acceptance to the ideas that children are human
rights holders, and that the period of childhood is significant on its own. This conception
adopts the culturally biased division of the human life span between adulthood and
childhood, as well as the intra-division between different stages of childhood (infancy,
adolescence etc).15 These biases should be taken into account when employing this
conception and the suggested framework in different cultural contexts, but without
compromising its core components. There should be no retreat from the idea that children are
human rights holders.
Upholding Children’s Agency and Right to Participation
The second principle I suggest adopting is inherent to the hybrid conception of childhood.
This principle is respect for children’s agency and children’s right to participation as
substantive and procedural elements of the right to development. The significance and
implicationsof these two principles have been discussed in detail, primarily within the
14 Article 1. Childhood ends at the age of 18, unless domestic law sets a younger age. The Convention does not
mandate setting a later age. Childhood may very well not end at the age of 18. As a social concept, it can end
before of after. As James Chisholm shows, the Native American Navajo’s model of childhood, for example,
includes eight stages of development that are not based on age but rather on social competence. Childhood
therefore does not end at a specific age but rather after the person has progressed throughout the stages, which
usually take until the age of thirty. James Chisholm, ‘Learning “Respect for Everything”: Navajo Image of
Development’ in Philip Hwang et al (eds) Images of Childhood (Lawrence Eribaum, New Jersey 1996) 167-
184.
15 See Erica Burman, ‘Local, Global or Globalized’ (1996) 3 Childhood 46.
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contexts of the ‘human beings’ approach to childhood,16the ‘general’ right to development,
the Capability Approach and the child indicators movements.17 All of these examples
demonstratenot only the theoretical significance of respecting children’s agency and their
right to participation, but also their practical implications. Here, I would like to expand
further on the importance in the context of the right to development.
Recognising children’s agency will inevitably change the discussion about ‘children’s
development’ and shift the attention from questions of competence and welfare to the
question of human rights. Respecting children as human rights holders will enableto
articulate the child’s right to development as a distinct and concrete human right. In other
words, Durkheim’s ‘law of growth’18 will become an issue of human rights law. The child
will be seen as entitled to grow, and not only as in need of growing. Finally, recognising
children’s agency will also enable to broaden the meaning of the term ‘development’ in the
‘right to development’ beyond its current psycho-social developmental conception.
Another implication of respecting children’s agency will be the respect for children’s right to
participation, which is probably the most profound right that symbolises the recognition of
children’s abilities - and right - to make sense of the world around them.19Thus far, and
despite the Convention’srecognition of the child’s right to participation (Article 12), and the
rights’ definition as one of the Convention’s four guiding principles,20no meaningful
connection has been made between thesetwo rights. Ignoring children’s views in the context
of their development perpetuates the image of children as passive subjects, whose sole
purpose in life isto sit still and grow up.
The conceptual linkage between the right to development and the right to participation should
not only be part of the implementation of the right to development, but should also be applied
as part of the process of developing its meaning. Children should participate in the creation of
a new interpretation of the right to development, and to contribute their own opinion on the
subject. Children should also be part of the process of realising the right to development in
practice, including in the process of developing implementation tools and practices (for
example, developmental policies and programmes, and drafting new legislation on the
subject).
16 See the Introduction to this thesis.
17 See chapter five.
18 See the Introduction to this thesis.
19 Gerison Lansdown, ‘International Developments in Children’s Participation: Lessons and Challenges’ in Kay
Tisdall et al (eds) Children, Young People and Social Inclusion (The Policy Press, Bristol 2006) 139-155.
20 UNCRC ‘General Comment 5’, supra n. 5.
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Respecting children’s agency and their right to participation does not meanthat children will
dictate the course of their childhood and future adulthood. This proposal does not mandate
‘full liberation’, or ‘abandoning’ children to their rights.21 Not least because no one, children
and adults alike, has a free standing in society. Children’s participation does not mandate,
whether we like it or not, children being the only decision makers. Nonetheless, the respect
for children’s agency means that the child will be considered as an active agent in her own
life and as someone that can, and should, participate in her own development.
Children’s participation also reflects, and promotes, the understanding of ‘development’ as an
emancipatory process, which is the contribution of the Capability Approach (and to some
extent, the ‘general’ right to development) to our analysis. The usage of the Capability
Approach in the context of the child’s right to development will be further discussed in the
next section, but at this point I argue that manifestation of the right to development as an
emancipatory right and giving children a voice in this process requires a social and cultural
transformation.22Such a change includes the creation of a ‘political space in which children
are empowered to express their own distinctive and submerged point of view’.23 It will enable
children, as a marginalised group, to express their own perspective24about their own
development.
Re-Conceptualising ‘Children’s Development’
The last element I suggest adopting relates to the meaning of ‘children’s development’ in the
context of the child’s right to development. First, the meaning of ‘children’s development’
should be re-conceptualised, so it will not be interpreted only from a developmental
psychology perspective. Re-conceptualising ‘children’s development’ should be done by
bringing together a range of disciplines that employ this term. For example, education,
sociology, psychiatry, anthropology, medicine and political science. This process will expand
the meaning of the term ‘children’s development’, and will set the grounds for a cross-
disciplinary understanding of it.
21 Bruce C. Hafen and Jonathan O. Hafen, ‘Abandoning Children to their Autonomy: The United Nations
Convention on the Rights o the Child’ (1996) 37 Harvard International Law Journal 449.
22 Ragnhild Lund, ‘At The Interface of Development Studies and Child Research: Rethinking Participating
Child’ (2007) 5 Children’s Geographies 131.
23 John Wall, ‘Can Democracy Represent Children? Towards a Politics of Difference’ (2012) 19 Childhood 86,
92.
24 Nigel Thomas, ‘Towards A Theory Of Children’s Participation’ (2007) 15 International Journal of Children’s
Rights 199, 210.
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As we saw earlier, there are two reasons for the ambiguity of the current interpretation of the
child’s right to development are: the fuzziness of the term ‘children’s development’ for
lawyers; and the miscommunication between professions that employ this term and lawyers.
While in psychology, for example, ‘children’s development’ has one meaning, in paediatrics
this term has other meanings. A psychologist may have in mind the theories of Piaget or
Freud, while for the paediatrician, the term ‘stages of development’ is probably linked to
matrix of age, weight and height. Thus, the psychologists and the medical doctor may use the
same words, but their content varies according to one’s professional discipline. The common
lawyer probably will not be able to contribute much to this conversation, mainly because the
term ‘children’s development’ is not part of legal vocabulary.The suggested re-
conceptualisation process can narrow down this disciplinary gap, and enable to interpret the
child’s right to development in a more coherent manner.
The unfamiliarity of legal scholars with the term ‘children’s development’ can be explained
by comparing this right to the right of freedom of speech. When a lawyer interprets the right
to freedom of speech, the meaning of ‘speech’ is clear to him or her. ‘Speech’ and ‘freedom
of speech’ were, and still are, the subjectsof extensive academic writing and have been
adjudicated for many years in domestic, regional and international fora. The meaning of
‘speech’ in the context of the right to freedom of speech has changed over the years, ranging
from protecting a person that stands on Speakers Corner in Hyde Park to protests against the
government, to include commercial advertising, and tweeting. Lawyers were able to realise
that these changes in the forms, fora and content of ‘speech’ have happened, and were able to
reinterpret the right to freedom of speech accordingly.
Legal scholars therefore need to consult with professionals from other fields in order to be
able to comprehend the term ‘children’s development’. Educators, psychologists, social
workers, sociologists, paediatricians, political scientists and children (from a range of
personal and professional backgrounds, professional streams and geographical
locations)should contribute to the discussion.25 Such a consultation will not result in creating
a unified understanding of the term ‘children’s development’, nor should it. ‘Children’s
development’ is a normative idea, not a neutral one.
25 Claire Cassidy advocates for creating a dialogue between children and adults as part of realizing children’s
right to participation and empowering children. Claire Cassidy, Thinking Children (Continuum International,
London 2009) 173-176.
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This consultation does not, and will not, make lawyers expert in any other discipline. Nor
should they. But they should be able to understand what ‘children’s development’ stands for
in different disciplines, in order to overcome their inherent professional limitations and be
able to articulate this concept in human rights terms. Without having a clearer idea of what
‘children’s development’ means, any attempt to interpret the legal right to development is
destined to fail.
A cross-disciplinary consultation will enable the interpreters of the right to articulate what
‘development’ in the right to development stands for. For example, what is the meaning of
the eight developmental domains that the Convention mentions? Are there additional aspects
that should be included? How should ‘physical’ development or ‘moral’ development, to
name just two of the eight, be defined and according to which discipline? Only then, after the
normative grounds are set, will it be possible to articulate children’s development in human
rights terms, and to ask what sorts of entitlements this right creates, and what kinds of duties
it imposes on different duty bearers. Subsequently, it will be possible to concretise its
components and meaning and develop empirical indicators to measure its implementation.
Second, as part of the re-conceptualisation process, I suggest integrating the Capability
Approach’s conception of human development into the interpretation of the ‘child’s right to
development’. Synthesising the Capability Approach’s idea of emancipation, alongside the
insights of psychology, pedagogy etc, will enable to broaden the meaning of this right, and to
add a new moral dimension to it. While medicine or education can tell us what qualifies as a
‘good’ or ‘normal’ development, and how these ideas are best served, using the Capability
Approach will enable to re-define the aim of the right, so it will mean more than just a right
to grow up.
Adaptation the term ‘children’s development’ into legal norms should be done cautiously.26
Emily Buss has recently discussed the connection between law and the science with respect
to child’s development (in the context of USA children’s constitutional rights case law).27
Buss claimed that the discussions about children’s rights usually focus on children’s
capacities in order to determine their guilt, sentencing and the interpretation of their
constitutional rights. She identified four limitations of this approach: law cannot
26 For a general overview of the relationship between law and science see Helen Reece (ed), Law and Science
(Oxford University Press, Oxford 1998). See also Barbara Beatty et al (eds), When Science Encounters the
Child – Education, Parenting and Child Welfare in 20th Century America (Teachers College Press, New York
2006).
27 Emily Buss, ‘What the Law Should (and Should Not) Learn From Child Development Research’ (2009-2010)
38 Hofstra Law Review 13.
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accommodate the complexity of social science; this approach perpetuates the supremacy of
the ‘competent adult’ image and dictates assessing children accordingly; it prevents from
achieving coherence in children’s constitutional rights law; if focuses on children’s current
capacities in order to determine their legal competence distracts attention from the child’s
future.28 Buss therefore suggests changing the way that law treats child’s development. She
suggests that it is the role of lawyers to interpret the law while considering what science has
to say.
Children’s rights analysis should be informed by child’s development studies, and law, as
Buss adequately put it, should be put back in the driver’s seat.29 In our context, it is the role
of legal scholars to interpret the legal entitlement of children to develop. But Buss’s
articulation of children’s development and the question of capacities are too narrow and
confine children’s agency to the question of competence. Children’s legal right to
development should have a broader and more complex meaning than what Buss suggests.
The hybrid conception of childhood can help to achieve this goal, since it changes the way
the discussion is framed. If we look at these issues as representations of different perspectives
on the relationship between children and human rights, then the child’s current capacities
should not be a reason for denying children their right to development, while at the same time
the care for the child’s future should not be so easily dismissed. These two dimensions – the
current and anticipated capacities – and the care for both are not mutually exclusive, but
rather, they merge in a harmonious way in children’s legal right to development. At this point
the contribution of synthesising the Capability Approaches’ conception of human
development into the interpretation of the child’s right to development becomes even clearer.
As a human right, the right to development should provide the child the entitlement to be an
active agent in her own development.The right to development will not only mean the right to
become an adult, but rather it can mean the right to be a free child, while becoming a free
adult.
How the process of ‘development’ should result is a question rarely discussed. When it is
addressed, the vague answer usually given, also by the UN Committee on the Rights of the
Child, is that the child should become an adult. Most of the discussion tends to focus on the
process of development, expressing wishes that the child will develop ‘normally’, or in a
‘healthy’ manner. A unique perspective about the result of the maturation process can be
28Ibid, 20-34
29Ibid, 15.
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found in the drafting process of the Convention,30 and in the Convention’s definition of the
aims of education. There, the Convention asks to see the child fulfil her or his human
potential as the result of development. The Committee has embraced this perspective on
children’s development on a small number of occasions, mostly with respect to education.31 I
suggest moving this perception to the centre of the discussion, and to interpret the child’s
right to development as a right that aims to protect and promote the fulfilment of the child’s
human potential to the maximum. This approach focuses on every child as an individual and
is tuned to the inner capacities of each child.
Defining the aims of the developmental in such a manner does not ignore the process of
development or its significance. On the contrary; this aim, in the context of the suggested
hybrid conception of childhood, requires that the process of development will not hinder the
potential of the child. The process of maturation and the experiences of children throughout
it, are inherently important to the child’s ability to fulfil her or his potential in every step of
the way. Moreover, the care for the child’s potential is shared by many cultures, and not only
by Western cultures, and thus caries less cultural bias and ideological bags than the dismissal
of the child’s agency. Therefore, this concept can be more easily accepted in different
contexts, and more easily implemented (or enforced, if needed).
Since there is no paradigmatic child, and there is no one singular and universal childhood,32
there is also no one right way to develop. Different childrenexperience different childhoods,
and different processes of development. Therefore, there is a place to argue that there should
be no one, universal and contextless meaning for the term ‘children’s development’ and the
right to development.Furthermore, as an emancipatory right, the right to development will
acknowledge the child’s right to develop in different ways, as long as it enables the child to
fulfil her potential. The interpretation of the right to development should leave a space to
accommodate such a variety of life experiences of children.
30 UNHCR, ‘Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (25 March 1983)
UN Doc E/CN.4/1983/62.
31 See, for example, UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: New Zealand’ (24 January 1997) UN Doc
CRC/C/15/Add. 71, paragraph 5; UNCRC ‘General Comment 1 – Article 29(1): The Aims of Education’ (17
April 2001) UN Doc CRC/GC/1/2001; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Slovakia’ (23 October 2000) UN
Doc CRC/C/15/Add. 140, paragraph 46; UNCRC ‘Concluding Observations: Thailand’ (17 March 2006) UN
Doc CRC/C/THA/CO/2, paragraph 64.
32 Freeman, ‘Towards a Sociology of Children’s Rights’, supra n. 2, 33.
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A New Framework for Analysing the Child’s Right to Development
This section presents a new framework for the analysis of the child’s right to development.
This framework aims to enable to create a coherent interpretation of the right, distinguishing
it from other rights of the child and differentiating between its meanings as a human right and
as a guiding principle of the Convention. This approach applies the hybrid conception of
childhood, comprehends broad and complex meanings of ‘development’, and distinguishes
between substantial and procedural elements of the right. Thissuggested framework,
however,does not provide a conclusive definitionfor the child’s right to development. Such a
definition should be the result of applying this framework with a specific understanding of
‘children’s development’.
Children’s development should be perceived as a human right of all children.33 The right to
development should be realised in accordance with its dual roles:an independent right of
children, and a guiding principle of the Convention.34 As a separate human right, the child’s
right to development should be seen as a composite right that respects, protects and promotes
the child’s process of development, as well as its outcome, with the aim to enable the child to
fulfil her human potential to the maximum. As a guiding principle, the right should be seen as
a litmus test for scrutinising actions that impact children’s lives and development.
The right should not be seen only as a summary of other human rights that support children’s
development.This interpretation is different from current views that see the promotion of
children’s development as a by-product of the realisation of other human rights of the child,
such as the right to education or health (as, for example, the UN Committee on the Rights of
the Child suggests). At this point it is worth reminding Sengupta’s explanation about the
realisation of the ‘general’ right to development as a composite right, which means that ‘the
whole is greater than the sum of the parts….the composite rights are related in a non-linear
way with positive feedback…‘.35 Understanding the child’s right to development as a
composite right means that it will comprehend all eight development domains protected by
the Convention, as well as the child’s rights to participation and non-discrimination,36with the
aim of enablingthe child to be free to fulfil her or his human potential.
33 And not only of small children as Woodhead has suggested. Martin Woodhead, ‘Early Childhood
Development: A Question of Rights’ (2005) 37 International Journal of Early Childhood 80.
34 UNCRC, ‘General Comment Number 5’, supra n.20.
35 Arjun Sengupta, ‘The Human Right to Development’ (2004) 32 Oxford Development Studies 179, 183.
36 Compare to UNCRC, ‘General Comment number 5’, supra n. 20.
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The right to development has a holistic objective that elevates the realisation of other rights to
a different dimension. This perception will enable to define the aims of the right also as the
right that enables the child to have as many options as possible to live her life. The right
should enable the child to be aware of the range of available options and to increase choices
and freedoms,entitle the child to have the necessary capabilities to choose, the voice to
articulate her preferences, and ensure that these preferences are taken into account in a non-
discriminatory way. The child’s right to education serves other ends than those served by the
right to development. The right to education also reflects different, but partially overlapping,
justifications, including, but not limited to, the support for the child’s development. Teaching
the child how to read and write has its own values and reasons. It allows the child to acquire
new skills and knowledge, and as such, promotes the child’s intellectual development. It also
contributes to the child’s emancipation by creating future opportunities and in doing so
promotes the fulfilment of the child’s potential. But realising the child’s right to education
does not satisfy all the child’s developmental needs, nor is it equal to realising the child’s
fullest potential. The child has more developmental needs, and realising her or his fullest
potential require more than the capability to read and write. Therefore, while education is a
necessary component of realising the right to development, the right to development is more
comprehensive.
What is required as ‘support’ for child’s development depends on how we define this term. A
potential source for articulating the components of development is the Convention and the
eight developmental domains it mentions. Another source is the list of capabilities necessary
for ‘development’, which were described in chapter five. While Nussbaum’s list of ten
capabilities was not tailored for children, Biggeri and Mehrotra’s list of fourteen capabilities
seems more adequate.37 The various indices that the child indicator movement has created are
another potential sources. All of these examples demonstrate the feasibility of articulating
children’s development in concrete terms, identifying its components and then adapting these
components to human rights terms. Further articulation of a child-specific list of capabilities
is needed. Such a list should be based on a different conception of ‘child’s development’ than
those currently available.
As a guiding principle of the Convention, the right to development should be used as a
benchmark for scrutinising decisions that affect children as a collective and as individuals. It
means that when a duty bearer takes an action, not only the right to non-discrimination, the
37 See chapter five.
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right to participation and the best interests of the child that should be respected, but also the
right to development. Every decision, policy and piece of legislation should be measured
against its impact on the right to development.38
Substantiating the right to development as a guiding principle of the Convention should be
done in accordance with three factors: the understanding of the right to development as an
independent right; and the ‘maximum available resources’ test set by Article 6 of the
Convention;39 and the division of responsibilities between different actors according to
Articles 4, 5 and 18 of the Convention. To some extent, the UN Committee on the Rights of
the Child already employs this perspective. Although the Committee ignores the right to
development as an independent right, it nevertheless examines legislation and policies with
respect to their potential or actual impact on children’s development (and not on the right to
development). Using the example of education one more time, understanding the right to
development as a guiding principle means that every decision that affects children, for
example the budget of the ministry of education, schools’ enrolment policies, curricula and
schools’ disciplines, should be measured against its impact on the child’s right to
development (and not only children’s development). Articulating the role of the right to
development as a guiding principle in this way might resemble or overlap with the role that
the principle of the best interests of the child has, as a primary consideration (Article 3). In
the future, there is a need to address the relationship, and potential overlaps, between these
two guiding principles.
38 Compare with Marta Maurás’ suggestion on the relationship between public policies and the implementation
of the Convention. Marta Maurás, ‘Public Policies and Child Rights: Entering the Third Decade of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (2011) 633 ANNALS 52, 56.
39 The meaning of the term ‘maximum available resources’ is beyond the scope of this research.
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Conclusion
International children’s rights law in general, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child
in particular, tells us a convincing story about children and children’s development. The child
is a person in making that should enjoy the maximum available resources in order to develop
and become an adult. More specifically, the Convention tells us that the child has a right to
develop.
The child, the Convention’s preamble asserts, should ‘grow up in a family environment, in an
atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding.’ Accordingly, parents not only need to
love and understand their child, but also bear the responsibility for ‘the upbringing and
development of the child’ (Article 18). The child’s material standard of living should be
adequate for ‘the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development’ (Article
27). Education is expected to develop ‘the child’s personality, talents and mental and physical
abilities’ (Article 29).
The Convention therefore tells us how ‘development’ should be supported and what the
potential factors that put its implementation at risk are. Littleis said about how ‘development’
should end. With the exception of Article 29, the Convention is silent about the person that
the child should turn into upon becoming an adult.
Although the protection for children’s development is embedded in the Convention, and
although the Convention is the only binding treaty that protects the right to development,
only a handful of studies have asked what ‘children’s development’ means once articulated as
a human right. This thesis fills this gap, and suggests a framework for understanding the
child’s legal right to development, with the hope that a lively debate will follow this
suggestion.
In chapters one and two I described the background for creating children’s unique right to
development. I argued that in order to understand the child’s right to development, there is a
need to realise the social conceptions that led to its creation. Chapter one reviewed the
development of children’s rights law and theory, highlighting the importance given to the
protection of children’s development, and the ways in which this term was understood.
Chapter two systematically analysed the drafting process of the Convention on the Rights on
the Child, aiming to understand the motivations for including a broad protection for
children’s development in this pioneering treaty. The chapter shows that while the care for
children’s development was always an issue for the Convention’s drafters, no significant
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attention was given to the meaning of the legal right to development. Chapter three analysed
how the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has interpreted this right. The findings of
this analysis reaffirm the hypothesis about the dominance that the ‘human becomings’
conception of childhood has in the interpretation of the Convention’s protection for children’s
development. While the Committee ascribes a broad protection for an undefined concept of
‘children’s development,’ it ignores, almost entirely, children’s legal right to development.
Chapter four followed up on this point in a series of interviews with members of the UN
Committee on the Rights of the Child. The Committee members gave several reasons for the
Committee’s insufficient jurisprudence on the right to development, ranging from blaming
States Parties for ignoring the right, to admitting that the Committee simply does not know
how to address this right. An analysis of the Committee’s ‘chain of monitoring’ shows that it
does not matter what States Parties write in their implementation reports, the Committee is
likely to ignore the right to development. Chapter five addressed two of the main obstacles
that preclude adequate interpretation of the right to development: the diverse meaning of
‘development’ and the difficulty of concretising this term. The chapter suggested comparing
the child’s right to development with some elements of the ‘general’ right to development
and with the Capability Approach. Primarily, the chapter demonstrated the importance of
recognising the agency of the right holder, the differentiation between the process of
development and its outcome and the articulation of development as an emancipatory idea.
The chapter further analysed a number of indices that take specific conceptions of
development and delineated their measurable components.
Following this trajectory, chapter six offers a new framework for the analysis of the child’s
right to development. The suggested framework is broad and comprehensive. It holds great
promise for children. It can lead to the creation of a concrete interpretation of the child’s right
to development. It accommodates a hybrid conception of childhood that respects children’s
agencyand comprehends wide-ranging perspectives of ‘children’s development’. These
include, but are not limited to, the Convention’s eight developmental domains and the
Capability Approach’s idea of development as freedom. These conceptions of development
are a good starting point to conduct a cross-disciplinary consultation about the meaning of
‘children’s development’. The suggested framework takes substantive and procedural rights
together, in order to create a right that is greater than the summery of its parts. The aim of this
right is to enable the child to fulfil her potential to the maximum.
To paraphrase Korczak one last time, the right to development should be understood as a
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right to ensure the ‘optimal conditions to grow and develop’, as well as the right to ‘live in
the present’.1These aims are not mutually exclusive, but rather, complement each other. They
represent a concept that acknowledges the right to development of children whilst defining
the idea of ‘development’ in complex terms.
The framework I suggest is articulated in relatively general terms so that it can meet the
‘challenge’, as Smart, Neale and Wade put it,2 of exploring the plurality of childhood and of
children’s development. The suggested framework should be employed in a context-sensitive
manner, with the realisation that children are not a homogenous group. Since there is no
paradigmatic ‘child’, there is no paradigmatic ‘development’. Children vary in their
experiencesof their childhood, as it is shaped by their identities and the ways they intersect.
Children can develop in different ways, experience their childhoods differently and grow up
to become different people. The meaning of ‘normal’ development therefore varies in
different contexts and cultures.
There is a need to be aware of the differences between children with respect to gender, sexual
orientation, class, ethnicity, disability, religion, culture and age. These characteristics should
first apply to children themselves, and not to adults. Respecting children’s agency means that
we should not measure or compare children to adults. All of these factors can influence
children’s perceptions about their life, shape the opportunities that they can generate for
themselves, and the opportunities that society offers them. The interpretation of the legal
right to development should reflect this understanding.
1 Janusz Korczak, Loving Every Child (Algonquin Books, Chapel Hill, North Carolina 2007. Originally
published in 1919) 355.
2 Carol Smart et al, The Changing Experience of Childhood (Polity Press, Cambridge 2001) 12.
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